[edk2-devel] [patch 1/3] EmbeddedPkg: Unload image on EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION

[Dandan Bi]

For the LoadImage() boot service, with EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval,
the Image was loaded and an ImageHandle was created with a valid
EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be started right now.
This follows UEFI Spec.

But if the caller of LoadImage() doesn't have the option to defer
the execution of an image, we can not treat EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION
like any other LoadImage() error, we should unload image for the
EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak.

This patch is to do error handling for EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION explicitly
for the callers in EmbeddedPkg which don't have the policy to defer the
execution of the image.

Cc: Leif Lindholm <leif.lindholm at linaro.org>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel at linaro.org>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek at redhat.com>
REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1992
Signed-off-by: Dandan Bi <dandan.bi at intel.com>
---
 .../AndroidFastboot/Arm/BootAndroidBootImg.c         |  9 +++++++++
 .../Library/AndroidBootImgLib/AndroidBootImgLib.c    | 12 ++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+)

diff --git a/EmbeddedPkg/Application/AndroidFastboot/Arm/BootAndroidBootImg.c b/EmbeddedPkg/Application/AndroidFastboot/Arm/BootAndroidBootImg.c
index 591afbe7cc..9fa28e3390 100644
--- a/EmbeddedPkg/Application/AndroidFastboot/Arm/BootAndroidBootImg.c
+++ b/EmbeddedPkg/Application/AndroidFastboot/Arm/BootAndroidBootImg.c
@@ -71,10 +71,19 @@ StartEfiApplication (
 
   // Load the image from the device path with Boot Services function
   Status = gBS->LoadImage (TRUE, ParentImageHandle, DevicePath, NULL, 0,
                   &ImageHandle);
   if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+    //
+    // With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and an ImageHandle was created
+    // with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be started right now.
+    // If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the execution of an image, we should
+    // unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak.
+    //
+    if (Status == EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) {
+      gBS->UnloadImage (ImageHandle);
+    }
     return Status;
   }
 
   // Passed LoadOptions to the EFI Application
   if (LoadOptionsSize != 0) {
diff --git a/EmbeddedPkg/Library/AndroidBootImgLib/AndroidBootImgLib.c b/EmbeddedPkg/Library/AndroidBootImgLib/AndroidBootImgLib.c
index d9e7aa7d2b..2e9e74db1d 100644
--- a/EmbeddedPkg/Library/AndroidBootImgLib/AndroidBootImgLib.c
+++ b/EmbeddedPkg/Library/AndroidBootImgLib/AndroidBootImgLib.c
@@ -439,10 +439,22 @@ AndroidBootImgBoot (
                                            + KernelSize;
 
   Status = gBS->LoadImage (TRUE, gImageHandle,
                            (EFI_DEVICE_PATH *)&KernelDevicePath,
                            (VOID*)(UINTN)Kernel, KernelSize, &ImageHandle);
+  if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+    //
+    // With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and an ImageHandle was created
+    // with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be started right now.
+    // If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the execution of an image, we should
+    // unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak.
+    //
+    if (Status == EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) {
+      gBS->UnloadImage (ImageHandle);
+    }
+    return Status;
+  }
 
   // Set kernel arguments
   Status = gBS->HandleProtocol (ImageHandle, &gEfiLoadedImageProtocolGuid,
                                 (VOID **) &ImageInfo);
   ImageInfo->LoadOptions = NewKernelArg;
-- 
2.18.0.windows.1


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