[edk2-devel] [PATCH v14 00/32] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support
Yao, Jiewen
jiewen.yao at intel.com
Thu Dec 9 06:30:59 UTC 2021
This patch has been merged - https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/pull/2269
> -----Original Message-----
> From: devel at edk2.groups.io <devel at edk2.groups.io> On Behalf Of Brijesh
> Singh via groups.io
> Sent: Thursday, December 9, 2021 11:27 AM
> To: devel at edk2.groups.io
> Cc: James Bottomley <jejb at linux.ibm.com>; Xu, Min M <min.m.xu at intel.com>;
> Yao, Jiewen <jiewen.yao at intel.com>; Tom Lendacky
> <thomas.lendacky at amd.com>; Justen, Jordan L <jordan.l.justen at intel.com>;
> Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore at kernel.org>; Erdem Aktas
> <erdemaktas at google.com>; Michael Roth <Michael.Roth at amd.com>; Gerd
> Hoffmann <kraxel at redhat.com>; Kinney, Michael D
> <michael.d.kinney at intel.com>; Liming Gao <gaoliming at byosoft.com.cn>; Liu,
> Zhiguang <zhiguang.liu at intel.com>; Ni, Ray <ray.ni at intel.com>; Kumar, Rahul1
> <rahul1.kumar at intel.com>; Dong, Eric <eric.dong at intel.com>; Brijesh Singh
> <brijesh.singh at amd.com>
> Subject: [edk2-devel] [PATCH v14 00/32] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-
> SNP) support
>
> BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3275
>
> SEV-SNP builds upon existing SEV and SEV-ES functionality while adding
> new hardware-based memory protections. SEV-SNP adds strong memory
> integrity
> protection to help prevent malicious hypervisor-based attacks like data
> replay, memory re-mapping and more in order to create an isolated memory
> encryption environment.
>
> This series provides the basic building blocks to support booting the SEV-SNP
> VMs, it does not cover all the security enhancement introduced by the SEV-SNP
> such as interrupt protection.
>
> Many of the integrity guarantees of SEV-SNP are enforced through a new
> structure called the Reverse Map Table (RMP). Adding a new page to SEV-SNP
> VM requires a 2-step process. First, the hypervisor assigns a page to the
> guest using the new RMPUPDATE instruction. This transitions the page to
> guest-invalid. Second, the guest validates the page using the new PVALIDATE
> instruction. The SEV-SNP VMs can use the new "Page State Change Request
> NAE"
> defined in the GHCB specification to ask hypervisor to add or remove page
> from the RMP table.
>
> Each page assigned to the SEV-SNP VM can either be validated or unvalidated,
> as indicated by the Validated flag in the page's RMP entry. There are two
> approaches that can be taken for the page validation: Pre-validation and
> Lazy Validation.
>
> Under pre-validation, the pages are validated prior to first use. And under
> lazy validation, pages are validated when first accessed. An access to a
> unvalidated page results in a #VC exception, at which time the exception
> handler may validate the page. Lazy validation requires careful tracking of
> the validated pages to avoid validating the same GPA more than once. The
> recently introduced "Unaccepted" memory type can be used to communicate
> the
> unvalidated memory ranges to the Guest OS.
>
> At this time we only support the pre-validation. OVMF detects all the available
> system RAM in the PEI phase. When SEV-SNP is enabled, the memory is validated
> before it is made available to the EDK2 core.
>
> Now that series contains all the basic support required to launch SEV-SNP
> guest. We are still missing the Interrupt security feature provided by the
> SNP. The feature will be added after the base support is accepted.
>
> Additional resources
> ---------------------
> SEV-SNP whitepaper
> https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/SEV-SNP-strengthening-vm-
> isolation-with-integrity-protection-and-more.pdf
>
> APM 2: https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/24593.pdf (section 15.36)
>
> The complete source is available at
> https://github.com/AMDESE/ovmf/tree/snp-v14
>
> GHCB spec:
> https://developer.amd.com/wp-content/resources/56421.pdf
>
> SEV-SNP firmware specification:
> https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/56860.pdf
>
> Change since v13:
> * Added Ack's.
> * Rebased to recent master
>
> Change since v12:
> * MpLib: Add comment to clarify that SEV-SNP enabled implicitly means SEV and
> SEV-ES are active.
> * MpLib: Move the extended topology initialization in AmdSev.c
>
> Change since v11:
> * rebase to the latest
> * fix the UefiCpuPkg PCD definition patch header.
>
> Change since v10:
> * fix 'unresolved external symbol __allshl' link error when building I32 for
> VS2017.
>
> Changes since v9:
> * Move CCAttrs Pcd define in MdePkg
> * Add comment to indicate that allocating the identity map PT is temporary until
> we get lazy validation
>
> Changes since v8:
> * drop the generic metadata and make it specific to SEV.
>
> Changes since v7:
> * Move SEV specific changes in MpLib in AmdSev file
> * Update the GHCB register function to not restore the GHCB MSR because
> we were already in the MSR protocol mode.
> * Drop the SNP name from PcdSnpSecPreValidate.
> * Add new section for GHCB memory in the OVMF metadata.
>
> Change since v6:
> * Drop the SNP boot block GUID and switch to using the Metadata guided
> structure
> proposed by Min in TDX series.
> * Exclude the GHCB page from the pre-validated region. It simplifies the reset
> vector code where we do not need to unvalidate the GHCB page.
> * Now that GHCB page is not validated so move the VMPL check from reset
> vector
> code to the MemEncryptSevLib on the first page validation.
> * Introduce the ConfidentialComputingGuestAttr PCD to communicate which
> memory encryption is active so that MpInitLib can make use of it.
> * Drop the SEVES specific PCD as the information can be communicated via
> the ConfidentialComputingGuestAttr.
> * Move the SNP specific AP creation function in AmdSev.c.
> * Define the SNP Blob GUID in a new file.
>
> Change since v5:
> * When possible use the CPUID value from CPUID page
> * Move the SEV specific functions from SecMain.c in AmdSev.c
> * Rebase to the latest code
> * Add the review feedback from Yao.
>
> Change since v4:
> * Use the correct MSR for the SEV_STATUS
> * Add VMPL-0 check
>
> Change since v3:
> * ResetVector: move all SEV specific code in AmdSev.asm and add macros to
> keep
> the code readable.
> * Drop extending the EsWorkArea to contain SNP specific state.
> * Drop the GhcbGpa library and call the VmgExit directly to register GHCB GPA.
> * Install the CC blob config table from AmdSevDxe instead of extending the
> AmdSev/SecretsDxe for it.
> * Add the separate PCDs for the SNP Secrets.
>
> Changes since v2:
> * Add support for the AP creation.
> * Use the module-scoping override to make AmdSevDxe use the IO port for PCI
> reads.
> * Use the reserved memory type for CPUID and Secrets page.
> *
> Changes since v1:
> * Drop the interval tree support to detect the pre-validated overlap region.
> * Use an array to keep track of pre-validated regions.
> * Add support to query the Hypervisor feature and verify that SNP feature is
> supported.
> * Introduce MemEncryptSevClearMmioPageEncMask() to clear the C-bit from
> MMIO ranges.
> * Pull the SevSecretDxe and SevSecretPei into OVMF package build.
> * Extend the SevSecretDxe to expose confidential computing blob location
> through
> EFI configuration table.
>
> Brijesh Singh (28):
> OvmfPkg/SecMain: move SEV specific routines in AmdSev.c
> UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: move SEV specific routines in AmdSev.c
> OvmfPkg/ResetVector: move clearing GHCB in SecMain
> OvmfPkg/ResetVector: introduce SEV metadata descriptor for VMM use
> OvmfPkg: reserve SNP secrets page
> OvmfPkg: reserve CPUID page
> OvmfPkg/ResetVector: pre-validate the data pages used in SEC phase
> OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add MemEncryptSevSnpEnabled()
> OvmfPkg/SecMain: register GHCB gpa for the SEV-SNP guest
> OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: register GHCB gpa for the SEV-SNP guest
> OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe: do not use extended PCI config space
> OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add support to validate system RAM
> OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add function to check the VMPL0
> OvmfPkg/BaseMemEncryptSevLib: skip the pre-validated system RAM
> OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add support to validate > 4GB memory in PEI
> phase
> OvmfPkg/SecMain: validate the memory used for decompressing Fv
> OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: validate the system RAM when SNP is active
> MdePkg: Define ConfidentialComputingGuestAttr
> OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: set PcdConfidentialComputingAttr when SEV is
> active
> UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: use PcdConfidentialComputingAttr to check SEV
> status
> UefiCpuPkg: add PcdGhcbHypervisorFeatures
> OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: set the Hypervisor Features PCD
> MdePkg/GHCB: increase the GHCB protocol max version
> UefiCpuPkg/MpLib: add support to register GHCB GPA when SEV-SNP is
> enabled
> OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: change the page state in the RMP table
> OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: skip page state change for Mmio address
> OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: mark cpuid and secrets memory reserved in EFI map
> OvmfPkg/AmdSev: expose the SNP reserved pages through configuration
> table
>
> Michael Roth (3):
> OvmfPkg/ResetVector: use SEV-SNP-validated CPUID values
> OvmfPkg/VmgExitLib: use SEV-SNP-validated CPUID values
> UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: use BSP to do extended topology check
>
> Tom Lendacky (1):
> UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: Use SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event to launch APs
>
> MdePkg/MdePkg.dec | 4 +
> OvmfPkg/OvmfPkg.dec | 19 +
> UefiCpuPkg/UefiCpuPkg.dec | 5 +
> OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc | 8 +-
> OvmfPkg/Bhyve/BhyveX64.dsc | 5 +-
> OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc | 4 +
> OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc | 9 +-
> OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc | 8 +-
> OvmfPkg/OvmfXen.dsc | 5 +-
> OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf | 6 +
> OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe/AmdSevDxe.inf | 7 +
> .../DxeMemEncryptSevLib.inf | 3 +
> .../PeiMemEncryptSevLib.inf | 7 +
> .../SecMemEncryptSevLib.inf | 3 +
> OvmfPkg/Library/VmgExitLib/SecVmgExitLib.inf | 2 +
> OvmfPkg/Library/VmgExitLib/VmgExitLib.inf | 3 +
> OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/PlatformPei.inf | 7 +
> OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.inf | 5 +
> OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.inf | 5 +
> UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/DxeMpInitLib.inf | 6 +-
> UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/PeiMpInitLib.inf | 6 +-
> .../Include/ConfidentialComputingGuestAttr.h | 25 +
> MdePkg/Include/Register/Amd/Ghcb.h | 2 +-
> .../Guid/ConfidentialComputingSevSnpBlob.h | 33 ++
> OvmfPkg/Include/Library/MemEncryptSevLib.h | 26 +
> .../X64/SnpPageStateChange.h | 35 ++
> .../BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/VirtualMemory.h | 24 +
> OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/Platform.h | 5 +
> OvmfPkg/Sec/AmdSev.h | 94 ++++
> UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/MpLib.h | 107 +++-
> OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe/AmdSevDxe.c | 23 +
> .../DxeMemEncryptSevLibInternal.c | 27 +
> .../Ia32/MemEncryptSevLib.c | 17 +
> .../PeiMemEncryptSevLibInternal.c | 27 +
> .../SecMemEncryptSevLibInternal.c | 19 +
> .../X64/DxeSnpSystemRamValidate.c | 40 ++
> .../X64/PeiDxeVirtualMemory.c | 166 +++++-
> .../X64/PeiSnpSystemRamValidate.c | 128 +++++
> .../X64/SecSnpSystemRamValidate.c | 82 +++
> .../X64/SnpPageStateChangeInternal.c | 300 +++++++++++
> OvmfPkg/Library/VmgExitLib/VmgExitVcHandler.c | 499 +++++++++++++++++-
> OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/AmdSev.c | 231 ++++++++
> OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/MemDetect.c | 2 +
> OvmfPkg/Sec/AmdSev.c | 303 +++++++++++
> OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.c | 161 +-----
> UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/AmdSev.c | 266 ++++++++++
> UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/DxeMpLib.c | 17 +-
> UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/Ia32/AmdSev.c | 70 +++
> UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/MpLib.c | 361 +++++--------
> UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/PeiMpLib.c | 4 +-
> UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/X64/AmdSev.c | 263 +++++++++
> OvmfPkg/FvmainCompactScratchEnd.fdf.inc | 5 +
> OvmfPkg/ResetVector/Ia16/ResetVectorVtf0.asm | 14 +
> OvmfPkg/ResetVector/Ia32/AmdSev.asm | 86 ++-
> OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.nasmb | 18 +
> OvmfPkg/ResetVector/X64/OvmfSevMetadata.asm | 74 +++
> UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/MpEqu.inc | 2 +
> UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/X64/AmdSev.nasm | 200 +++++++
> UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/X64/MpFuncs.nasm | 100 +---
> 59 files changed, 3448 insertions(+), 535 deletions(-)
> create mode 100644 MdePkg/Include/ConfidentialComputingGuestAttr.h
> create mode 100644
> OvmfPkg/Include/Guid/ConfidentialComputingSevSnpBlob.h
> create mode 100644
> OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/SnpPageStateChange.h
> create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Sec/AmdSev.h
> create mode 100644
> OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/DxeSnpSystemRamValidate.c
> create mode 100644
> OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/PeiSnpSystemRamValidate.c
> create mode 100644
> OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/SecSnpSystemRamValidate.c
> create mode 100644
> OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/SnpPageStateChangeInternal.c
> create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Sec/AmdSev.c
> create mode 100644 UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/AmdSev.c
> create mode 100644 UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/Ia32/AmdSev.c
> create mode 100644 UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/X64/AmdSev.c
> create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/ResetVector/X64/OvmfSevMetadata.asm
> create mode 100644 UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/X64/AmdSev.nasm
>
> --
> 2.25.1
>
>
>
>
>
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