[Freeipa-devel] DNSSEC design page

[Ludwig Krispenz]

On 02/27/2014 02:14 PM, Jan Cholasta wrote:
> On 18.2.2014 17:19, Martin Kosek wrote:
>> On 02/18/2014 04:38 PM, Jan Cholasta wrote:
>>> On 18.2.2014 16:35, Petr Spacek wrote:
>>>> On 18.2.2014 16:31, Jan Cholasta wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> 2] low level replacement for eg the sqlite3 database in softhsm.
>>>>>>>> That's what I sometimes get the impression what is wanted. 
>>>>>>>> SoftHsm has
>>>>>>>> one component Softdatabase with an API, which more or less 
>>>>>>>> passes sets
>>>>>>>> of attributes (attributes defined by PKCS#11) and then stores 
>>>>>>>> it as
>>>>>>>> records in sql where each record has a keytype and opaque blob of
>>>>>>>> data.
>>>>>>>> If that is what is wanted the decision would be how fingrained the
>>>>>>>> pkcs
>>>>>>>> objects/attribute types would have to be mapped to ldap: one ldap
>>>>>>>> attribute for each possible attribute type ?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> One-to-one mapping of attributes from PKCS#11 to LDAP would be 
>>>>>>> the most
>>>>>>> straightforward way of doing this, but I think we can do some
>>>>>>> optimization for our needs. For example, like you said above, we 
>>>>>>> can
>>>>>>> use
>>>>>>> a single attribute containing PKCS#8 encoded private key rather 
>>>>>>> than
>>>>>>> using one attribute per private key component.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I don't think we need an LDAP attribute for every possible PKCS#11
>>>>>>> attribute, ATM it would be sufficient to have just these attributes
>>>>>>> necessary to represent private key, public key and certificate 
>>>>>>> objects.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> So, I would say it should be something between high-level and
>>>>>>> low-level.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> There won't be a separate public key, it's represented by the
>>>>>> certificate.
>>>>>
>>>>> I'm not sure if this is the case for DNSSEC.
>>>>
>>>> Honzo,
>>>>
>>>> we really need the design page with some goal statement, high-level
>>>> overview etc. There is still some confusion, probably from fact 
>>>> that we
>>>> want to use the same module for cert distribution and at the same time
>>>> for DNSSEC key storage.
>>>>
>>>
>>> It's on my TODO list, I'll try to get it out ASAP.
>>>
>>
>> +1, please do. We clearly need some design to start with.
>>
>> Martin
>>
>
> I already posted the link in other thread, but here it is anyway: 
> <http://www.freeipa.org/page/V3/PKCS11_in_LDAP>.
>
> Some more comments on the schema:
>
> I think I may have been too quick to dismiss RFC 4523. There is 
> CKA_CERTIFICATE_CATEGORY which can have values "unspecified", "token 
> user", "authority" and "other entity". We could map entries with 
> object class pkiUser to certificate object with 
> CKA_CERTIFICATE_CATEGORY "token user" and entries with object class 
> pkiCA to certificate object with CKA_CERTIFICATE_CATEGORY "authority". 
> There are no object classes in RFC 4523 for "unspecified" and "other 
> entity", but we will not be storing any certificates using PKCS#11 
> anyway, so I think it's OK.
not sure I understand what exactly you want here. If we don't store 
certificates using the pkcs#11 schema we don't need to define them, but 
on the other hand you talk about the usage of CKA_CERTIFICATE_CATEGORY. 
Do you mean to have a pkcs11 cerificate object with 
CKA_CERTIFICATE_CATEGORY and allow the the rfc4523 attributes 
userCertificate and cACertificate to store them ?
>
> Also the above got me thinking, is there any "standard" LDAP schema 
> for private keys? If so, can we use it?
I didn't find any, the only keys in ldap I found is a definition for 
sshPublicKey for openssh.
>
> I'm going to store NSS trust objects along with CA certificates, so 
> I'm going to need an object class for that. You can find the details 
> on CKO_NSS_TRUST at 
> <http://p11-glue.freedesktop.org/doc/storing-trust-policy/storing-trust-existing.html>.
>
> If we store multiple related PKCS#11 objects in a single LDAP entry, 
> there is going to be some redundancy. For example, public key value 
> can be extracted from private key value, so we don't need to store 
> both of the values. This can be bypassed by having separate object 
> classes for data and for metadata. For a key pair entry, the object 
> classes would be e.g. privateKey, pkcs11privateKey and 
> pkcs11publicKey, where privateKey is an object class with private key 
> data (without any PKCS#11 bits), pkcs11privateKey is an object class 
> with PKCS#11 private key metadata and pkcs11publicKey is an object 
> class with PKCS#11 public key metadata. In the PKCS#11 module, this 
> entry would be visible as two separate objects (private key object and 
> public key object).
I have not yet rewritten the objectcalss definition after the latest 
discussion, but I think if we have one structural objectclass 
pkcs11storageObject with only a uniqueid and auxiliary objectclasses for 
publickey,privatekey, certificate where the attributes (maybe 
withexception of label, id) are optional there will be no redundancy, 
store only what is needed.
you could use these aux objectclass also in other entries instead of 
using pkcs11storageObject.
>
> Regarding PKCS#11 metadata attributes (i.e. excluding certificate, 
> private key and public key value attributes), I think they all should 
> be single-valued. Comments on specific attributes:
>
>   * CKA_MODIFIABLE, CKA_SUBJECT, CKA_ISSUER, CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER, 
> CKA_JAVA_MIDP_SECURITY_DOMAIN, CKA_DERIVE, CKA_LOCAL, 
> CKA_KEY_GEN_MECHANISM, CKA_ALLOWED_MECHANISMS, CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER, 
> CKA_SIGN_RECOVER, CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE, CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE, 
> CKA_WRAP_WITH_TRUSTED, CKA_ALWAYS_AUTHENTICATE - there should be LDAP 
> attributes for these, for the sake of completeness
in progress
>
>   * CKA_TOKEN - this is CK_TRUE for persistent objects and objects in 
> LDAP are always persistent, so there is no need for pkcs11token
ok
>
>   * CKA_CERTIFICATE_TYPE - this will always be CKC_X_509, no need for 
> pkcs11certificateType
ok
>
>   * CKA_CERTIFICATE_CATEGORY - if this is mapped to RFC 4523 object 
> classes (see above), we don't need an LDAP attribute for it
see above, where do you want to define the mapping. Do we then  need 
cert attrs at all ?
>
>   * CKA_CHECK_VALUE, CKA_HASH_OF_SUBJECT_PUBLIC_KEY, 
> CKA_HASH_OF_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY - can be generated on-the-fly from 
> certificate value, no need for LDAP attributes
ok
>
>   * CKA_URL - do we want to support certificates with URL instead of 
> value?
don't know, there are just some other attrs required when a URL is used