[Libguestfs] [libnbd PATCH v4 01/25] block_status: Add some sanity checking of server lengths

[Eric Blake]

Previously, we had not been doing any validation of server extent
responses, which means a client query at an offset near the end of the
export can result in a buggy server sending a response longer than the
export length and potentially confusing the client.  The NBD spec also
says that an extent length should be non-zero so that a successful
block status call makes progress.  It is easy enough to track that the
server has not overflowed the export size, and that we ensure an error
on no progress even when the buggy server claims success.  Since the
spec says a client should be prepared for a block status result to be
truncated, the client should not care whether the truncation happened
at the server or at libnbd after validating the server's response.

In the process, this patch reorganizes some of the code so that early
exits are obvious, leading for less indentation in the success path.

Adding this sanity checking now makes it easier for future patches to
do orthogonal support for a server's 32- or 64-bit reply, vs. a
client's 32- or 64-bit API call.  Once 64-bit replies are in play, we
will additionally have to worry about a 64-bit reply that overflows a
32-bit API callback without exceeding the exportsize.  Similarly,
since nbd_get_size() already caps export size at 63 bits (based on
off_t limitations), we have guaranteed that a 64-bit API callback will
never see an extent length that could appear negative in a 64-bit
signed type (at least OCaml benefits from that guarantee, since its
only native 64-bit integer type is signed).

Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake at redhat.com>
---

v4: new patch
---
 generator/states-reply-chunk.c | 78 +++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 58 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)

diff --git a/generator/states-reply-chunk.c b/generator/states-reply-chunk.c
index 17bb5149..735f9456 100644
--- a/generator/states-reply-chunk.c
+++ b/generator/states-reply-chunk.c
@@ -461,6 +461,11 @@  REPLY.CHUNK_REPLY.RECV_BS_ENTRIES:
   struct command *cmd = h->reply_cmd;
   size_t i;
   uint32_t context_id;
+  int error;
+  const char *name;
+  uint32_t orig_len, len, flags;
+  uint64_t total, cap;
+  bool stop;

   switch (recv_into_rbuf (h)) {
   case -1: SET_NEXT_STATE (%.DEAD); return 0;
@@ -481,30 +486,63 @@  REPLY.CHUNK_REPLY.RECV_BS_ENTRIES:
       if (context_id == h->meta_contexts.ptr[i].context_id)
         break;

-    if (i < h->meta_contexts.len) {
-      int error = cmd->error;
-      const char *name = h->meta_contexts.ptr[i].name;
-
-      /* Need to byte-swap the entries returned, but apart from that
-       * we don't validate them.  Yes, our 32-bit public API foolishly
-       * tracks the number of uint32_t instead of block descriptors;
-       * see _block_desc_is_multiple_of_bs_entry above.
-       */
-      for (i = 0; i < h->bs_count * 2; ++i)
-        h->bs_entries[i] = be32toh (h->bs_entries[i]);
-
-      /* Call the caller's extent function.  */
-      if (CALL_CALLBACK (cmd->cb.fn.extent, name, cmd->offset,
-                         h->bs_entries, h->bs_count * 2, &error) == -1)
-        if (cmd->error == 0)
-          cmd->error = error ? error : EPROTO;
-    }
-    else
+    SET_NEXT_STATE (%FINISH);
+    if (i == h->meta_contexts.len) {
       /* Emit a debug message, but ignore it. */
       debug (h, "server sent unexpected meta context ID %" PRIu32,
              context_id);
+      break;
+    }

-    SET_NEXT_STATE (%FINISH);
+    name = h->meta_contexts.ptr[i].name;
+    total = 0;
+    cap = h->exportsize - cmd->offset;
+    assert (cap <= h->exportsize);
+
+    /* Need to byte-swap the entries returned.  The NBD protocol
+     * allows truncation as long as progress is made; the client
+     * cannot tell the difference between a server's truncation or if
+     * we truncate on a length we don't like.  We stop iterating on a
+     * zero-length extent (error only if it is the first extent), and
+     * on an extent beyond the exportsize (unconditional error after
+     * truncating to exportsize); but do not diagnose issues with the
+     * server's length alignments, flag values, nor compliance with
+     * the REQ_ONE command flag.
+     */
+    for (i = 0, stop = false; i < h->bs_count && !stop; ++i) {
+      orig_len = len = be32toh (h->bs_entries[i * 2]);
+      flags = be32toh (h->bs_entries[i * 2 + 1]);
+      total += len;
+      if (len == 0) {
+        stop = true;
+        if (i > 0)
+          break; /* Skip this and later extents; we already made progress */
+        /* Expose this extent as an error; we made no progress */
+        cmd->error = cmd->error ? : EPROTO;
+      }
+      else if (total > cap) {
+        /* Expose this extent as an error, after truncating to make progress */
+        stop = true;
+        cmd->error = cmd->error ? : EPROTO;
+        len -= total - cap;
+      }
+      h->bs_entries[i * 2] = len;
+      h->bs_entries[i * 2 + 1] = flags;
+    }
+
+    /* Call the caller's extent function.  Yes, our 32-bit public API
+     * foolishly tracks the number of uint32_t instead of block
+     * descriptors; see _block_desc_is_multiple_of_bs_entry above.
+     */
+    if (stop)
+      debug (h, "truncating server's response at unexpected extent length %"
+             PRIu32 " and total %" PRIu64 " near extent %zu",
+             orig_len, total, i);
+    error = cmd->error;
+    if (CALL_CALLBACK (cmd->cb.fn.extent, name, cmd->offset,
+                       h->bs_entries, i * 2, &error) == -1)
+      if (cmd->error == 0)
+        cmd->error = error ? error : EPROTO;
   }
   return 0;

-- 
2.41.0