[Platformone] EXT :Re: [EXT] Platform1 SAR

Tue Jan 7 04:53:05 UTC 2020

Just before I sent that email, I copied out the SSH privkeys from the CI/CD configuration for each of platform-infrastructure, up-appdev-a, and up-prod, dumped the moduli, and diff'd them.  All three are the same.  So that was Sunday.  What did I miss?

The rest of this email didn't parse, but it's been a 16h day for me, so maybe it's just me.

The problem isn't necessarily the ec2-user named account by itself, it's the attribution.  It's possible to establish attribution when processing logs since sshd will log the pubkey.  However, that requires post-facto log analysis to track, and if there are multiple users active it can get confusing.

The real problem is the current ec2-user privkey is being shared, intentionally and unintentionally, so there's absolutely no way to establish attribution.

This is Yet Another Reason why you want to deploy as immutable infrastructure.  This problem simply goes away.

-- T

On 1/5/20, 13:35, "Kevin O'Donnell" <kodonnel at redhat.com> wrote:

    Hello Tim, 

    Welcome back. Happy New Year. 

    We have a plan in place to swap out the ec2-user for another user seeing as the major issue is the actual name of the user not its privs in prod. 

    Incorrect up-prod-a keys were switched out before Xmas. This process will need to be included in the Day Two OPS onboarding process. Jet, who should be the holder of this key on day two? We are also ensuring that anyone that authenticates to the nodes
     in the vpc use dedicated IDM accounts with per user dedicated keys and sudo privs. 

    Correct. Re-enforcing the Day Two requirements. And also supporting that the pipelines and CI process can support CI/CD to only dev/staging. For prod or any environment were the keys have been swapped and are not included as private Git variables we can
     not support CD into prod/appdev if so deemed. 

    We are fast approaching policy with this topic. We should have a further discussion this week. I will be in San Antonio on Wed and Thur. 

    Do you have any additional mitigation techniques Tim?

    Thanks, 

    KEVIN O'DONNELL 
    ARCHITECT MANAGER
    Red Hat Red Hat NA Public Sector Consulting <https://www.redhat.com/>

    kodonnell at redhat.com <mailto:kodonnell at redhat.com%20M:240-605-4654> M: 240-605-4654
     <https://red.ht/sig>

    On Sun, Jan 5, 2020 at 2:58 PM Miller, Timothy J. <tmiller at mitre.org> wrote:

    Some more points of interest--

    - The ec2-user account can't currently be avoided given the current design of the IaC.

    - This SSH key provisioned for this account is shared across up-prod-a, up-dev-a, and DSOP.

    - The ec2-user SSH privkey is available to anyone with Maintainer or higher access to the GitLab repo that holds the customer's environment definitions or the platform-infrastructure repo.

    -- T

    On 12/20/19, 08:13, "Blade, Eric D [US] (MS)" <Eric.Blade at ngc.com> wrote:

        I just want to clarify on the topic of the EC2-user.  The key is attribution.  We need to know who or what is configuring the systems.

        We are repeatedly seeing the ec2-user account used to manually configure systems.  Ec2-user should only be used to perform programmatic tasks from committed and
         reviewed code as part of initial provisioning.   If the code to provision and configure systems is unavailable, then you must create attributable accounts to perform changes to the systems.

        Any use of ec2-user remote login or su to ec2-user will be flagged as a violation and the source IP or user account logged as the violating source.  Any manual/command
         line activities MUST be performed using an attributable user account.

        If that is not clear, please let me know and I will attempt to elaborate further.

        Thank you

        Eric Blade, GXPN, GPEN
        Unified Platform System Coordinator
        Northrop Grumman Mission Systems
        Work: 410.649.0706
        Mobile: 240.258.8089

        From: Kevin O'Donnell <kodonnel at redhat.com>

        Sent: Thursday, December 19, 2019 6:22 PM
        To: Lastrilla, Jet <jlastrilla at mitre.org>
        Cc: Feiglstok, Colleen M [US] (MS) <Colleen.Feiglstok at ngc.com>; BRYAN, AUSTEN R Capt USAF AFMC AFLCMC/HNCP <austen.bryan.1 at us.af.mil>;
     DIROCCO, ROGER E GG-13 USAF AFMC ESC/AFLCMC/HNCP <roger.dirocco.4 at us.af.mil>;
    platformONE at redhat.com; Tim Gast <tg at braingu.com>;
         Bubb, Mike <mbubb at mitre.org>; TRAMBLE, ELIJAH Q Capt USAF AFMC AFLCMC/HNC <elijah.tramble.1 at us.af.mil>;
    tj.zimmerman at braingu.com; LOPEZDEURALDE, RICHARD A Lt Col USAF AFMC AFLCMC/HNCP <richard.lopezdeuralde at us.af.mil>; Blade, Eric
     D [US] (MS) <Eric.Blade at ngc.com>;
         RAMIREZ, JOSE A CTR USAF AFMC AFLCMC/HNCP <jose.ramirez.50.ctr at us.af.mil>; Leonard, Michael C. <leonardm at mitre.org>; REINHARDT, MELISSA
     A GG-13 USAF AFMC AFLCMC/HNCP <melissa.reinhardt.2 at us.af.mil>; Taylor Biggs <taylor at redhat.com>; Miller, Timothy J. <tmiller at mitre.org>;
         CRISP, JOSHUA M GS-09 USAF AFMC AFLCMC/HNCP <joshua.crisp.2 at us.af.mil>; BOGUE, STEVEN E CTR USAF AFMC AFLCMC/HNCP <steven.bogue.1.ctr at us.af.mil>;
     Wilcox, John R. (San Antonio, TX) [US] (MS) <John.R.Wilcox at ngc.com>
        Subject: EXT :Re: [EXT] Platform1 SAR

        Colleen, 

        Thank you for the results and recommendations. We will get GIT issues crated for your findings and will prioritize the mitigation and implement them as code in our future IAC deployments. Many of the findings in the current VPC have been
         mitigated in up-prod-b with our current code release. 

        Please let us know when you have finished and we can power down the host that you have been using for scanning.

        Note for everyone: Once we power down the ec2 instance ssh or port 22 will not be externally accessible. Thus, mitigating many of the risks associated with the ec2-user and the keys.

        Thanks, 

        KEVIN O'DONNELL 
        ARCHITECT MANAGER
        Red Hat Red Hat NA Public Sector Consulting <https://www.redhat.com/>
        kodonnell at redhat.com <mailto:kodonnell at redhat.com%20M:240-605-4654> M: 240-605-4654
         <https://red.ht/sig>

        On Thu, Dec 19, 2019 at 4:52 PM Lastrilla, Jet <jlastrilla at mitre.org> wrote:

        Thanks Colleen. Sorry for the rushed feeling. If you want to take more time, please use tomorrow to do your testing.

        Thank you for all you do!!!!

        Get Outlook for iOS <https://aka.ms/o0ukef>

        ________________________________________

        From: Feiglstok, Colleen M [US] (MS) <Colleen.Feiglstok at ngc.com>
        Sent: Thursday, December 19, 2019 4:35:15 PM
        To: Lastrilla, Jet <jlastrilla at mitre.org>; BRYAN, AUSTEN R Capt USAF AFMC AFLCMC/HNCP <austen.bryan.1 at us.af.mil>; DIROCCO, ROGER E
         GG-13 USAF AFMC ESC/AFLCMC/HNCP <roger.dirocco.4 at us.af.mil>; Kevin O'Donnell <kodonnel at redhat.com>;
        platformONE at redhat.com <platformONE at redhat.com>; Tim Gast <tg at braingu.com>; Bubb,
     Mike
         <mbubb at mitre.org>; TRAMBLE, ELIJAH Q Capt USAF AFMC AFLCMC/HNC <elijah.tramble.1 at us.af.mil>;
        tj.zimmerman at braingu.com <tj.zimmerman at braingu.com>; LOPEZDEURALDE, RICHARD A Lt Col USAF AFMC AFLCMC/HNCP <richard.lopezdeuralde at us.af.mil>;
         Blade, Eric D [US] (MS) <Eric.Blade at ngc.com>; RAMIREZ, JOSE A CTR USAF AFMC AFLCMC/HNCP <jose.ramirez.50.ctr at us.af.mil>; Leonard,
     Michael
         C. <leonardm at mitre.org>; REINHARDT, MELISSA A GG-13 USAF AFMC AFLCMC/HNCP <melissa.reinhardt.2 at us.af.mil>; Taylor Biggs <taylor at redhat.com>;
         Miller, Timothy J. <tmiller at mitre.org>; CRISP, JOSHUA M GS-09 USAF AFMC AFLCMC/HNCP <joshua.crisp.2 at us.af.mil>; BOGUE, STEVEN E CTR USAF
     AFMC
         AFLCMC/HNCP <steven.bogue.1.ctr at us.af.mil>; Wilcox, John R. (San Antonio, TX) [US] (MS) <John.R.Wilcox at ngc.com>
        Subject: [EXT] Platform1 SAR 

        All,

        The SAR and raw results from the new security testing will be sent through NGSafe in a few moments.

        As usual, I felt very rushed with the testing, and feel like I have not done as thorough of a job as required. I was unable to log into the Web UIs, as no one from the Platform1 team gave me the account information. I had issues with Nessus, so the CVE’s
         were found through OSCAP this time.

        A lot is the same as the last report, but please read through it, because there is some new information. I had to test as ec2-user again, which is another big issue that needs to be resolved ASAP. The more I use it and find out
         how it is being used, the more extremely concerned I am. It has multiple keys throughout the platform located in the .ssh directory, one of which is world readable. On some hosts, a real user is using the ec2-user account to create accounts, groups, and
     pull
         docker files. The account is non-attributable, so we have no way of knowing who is doing this. Someone could do serious damage with no consequence. I understand that the ec2-user is needed for standing up an ec2-image, but
        this account should only be used for implementing IAC, so that the changes implemented by ec2-user are codified.  If manual admin is required, that IAC should provision the appropriate attributable accounts, and those accounts should
         be used from then on. In my opinion, this is a critical finding and needs to be addressed ASAP.

        I will be available during the day tomorrow for any questions.

        Thanks
        Colleen