[redhat-lspp] LSPP Development Telecon 01/23/2006 Minutes

Debora Velarde dvelarde at us.ibm.com
Thu Jan 26 19:41:40 UTC 2006


-----------------------
LSPP Meeting 01/23/2006
-----------------------
Known Attendees:
        Matt Anderson (HP)
        Janak Desai (IBM) - jd
        Steve Grubb (Red Hat) - sg
        Chad Hanson (TCS)
        Dustin Kirkland (IBM) - dk
        Linda Knippers (HP)
        Joy Latten (IBM)
        Paul Moore (HP)
        Emily Ratliff (IBM)
        Stephen Smalley (NSA) - ss
        Mike Thompson (IBM)
        Debora Velarde (IBM)
        Al Viro (Red Hat) - av
        Klaus Weidner (atsec) - kw
        George Wilson (IBM) - gw
        Kris Wilson (IBM)
        Venkat Yekkirala (TCS)
        Catherine Zhang (IBM) - cz

Tentative Agenda:
        IPsec labeling, getockopt(), xinetd
        ipsec-tools
        VFS polyinstantiation
        AuditFS completion
        Audit enhancements
        Audit by role
        Audit of network events
        Audit API and binary records
        Print
        SELinux base update
        MLS policy gaps
        Device allocation, udev, DBUS
        Self tests
        Cron, mail, etc.
        Remaining tasks
        Package list
        Unit and functional tests
        Documentation

-----------
ipsec-tools
-----------
Joy forward ported but has not tested it yet due to OF oops 
test 2 rawhide, 2.6.16 kernel
stopping her from testing her stuff and nethooks stuff

George also got oops on 64way when trying to do performance test

kw: preferred way to report bugs? redhat bugzilla or mailing list?
sg: kernel.org kernel needs to go to linux kernel mailing list
sg: rawhide kernel should go to rawhide

-----------------------------------
IPsec labeling, getockopt(), xinetd
-----------------------------------
kernel crash due to ipsec patches 
- sg doing tests on friday, disabled selinux caused networking errors
- sio error msg, not selinux denial msgs
cz: if kernel and patches are not the same version sometimes get crashes
sg: kernel used was rawhide, pretty close to what's upstream
    Trent's patches already included in rawhide kernel
    appears to be due to additional patch, labels
sg: Have you tested it with selinux disabled?
cz: No, will do that

getsockopt update
cz: not much work this (has paper deadline)
cz had problem with the mailer, trying mutt mailer, 
   sent out to a few to see if people received fine
gw received it and it looked fine
cz to send to the mailing list

xinetd
cz: need to pull that patch in and do testing on it

---------------------
VFS polyinstantiation
---------------------
unshare is in -mm tree
last week Andrew Morton asked:
1. for automated test for system call
   Janak working on test; should be ready by end of day
2. If code has been reviewed enough?
   av: only #1 is an issue now

problem found by sg while testing userspace module, couldn't delete a dir
narrowed down, not coming from unshare
av: will look into that tonight

pam modules - sg has been testing, augmenting, fixing problems
pam namespace - trust putting it on a machine
sg: real close

gw: is unshare avail on all arch's?
ppc, x86_64 (janak testing), i386 (janak testing)
IBM should try it on ppc

------------------
AuditFS completion
------------------
Amy not here, Linda has status
Tim had comments on it last week
Amy's patch out last week
updated patch on the 19th
updated patch for the 3rd chunk of work
1st draft of the inotify client
hoping to get some feedback on that
Amy out of the office until wed, and moving offices that day
Amy will send an update at end of week

Are changes to Amy's patches gated on decision or gated on doing the work?
- Dustin currently using hers as if its untouched
- up to Amy if she wants to change her code

another comment from serge:
- statically sized arrays, 54 elements, 
- already making new struct arbitrary, 
- usually only 1/54 filled w/ data
- could be a lot more efficient w/ that

------------------
Audit enhancements
------------------
-------------
Audit by role
-------------
arbitrary string coming in and out of the kernel
using audit_rule_data struct
Feedback given to Amy suggested fields be dynamically allocated.
If Amy does change that then Dustin's audit by role will need change too
dk working on filter to path now
   will work on filter on syscall later
should finish next day or two
once that's done, will be out on the mailing list
gw: would be interesting to do perf runs
dk: patch out within next couple of days, certainly by the end of the week

2 dependencies before Dustin's patch gets upstream:
1. work Amy's put forth, audit_rule_struct
2. Tim's user data patch

Getting patches upstream:
David has been taking care of that

Al Viro taking over role from David
TODO: gw to add Al Viro to meeting list, but don't remove David yet

Will we still have git tree?
sg going to check on getting an updated kernel
new place to save the test kernels
   maybe in sg's people's page?
   hopefully later this week

-----------------------
Audit of network events
-----------------------
last week, decided need to do a bit of testing to see what coverage is 
to ensure getting sufficient info from network events
get label off of inbound connections and record that?
maybe goes along with xinitd, userspace audit records?

----------------------------
Audit API and binary records
----------------------------
sg will schedule a meeting to include all interested parties

-----
Print
-----
update from Matt
- audit patch in a way works that with 1.2 and older one
- 1.2 won't be ready in time for RHEL5
- breaking up MLS patch
- some for doing page resizing
- selinux type, storing in spool dir, still needed untrusted one to save 
types
- getting proof of concept further along
- send audit patch out end of this week
- other not ready for a while, 
  part of a bigger glue that will hold 2 pieces together

cut off date? 
- fedora core 5
  feb 6th - test 3 freeze 
  need everything a couple days before that

-------------------
SELinux base update
-------------------
Dan not on the phone
ss: James Morris did an updated MCS document 
        maybe can mutate that for MLS documentation
chad: ??con interface yet?
ss: no, if its a priority to you, let people on the list, ss, and Dan know

---------------
MLS policy gaps
---------------
mls policy rpm
when we see deficiencies, need to update and post on the list
high and low at the same time
another problem: getting created w/ wrong label

-----------------------------
Device allocation, udev, DBUS
-----------------------------
debbie volunteered to look at what happens when you disable dbus, hotplug, 
udev
udev, already not starting on gw's pseries lpars
        all device nodes getting created, and not 
dbus, in some testing, prior level
        dbus drops the audit capability when switches from root to user
        if it does should go to bugzilla

----------
Self tests
----------

DISCUSSION
gw: want reading from klaus
gw's read: 
- need something minimal to meet RBAC, PP
- might want to go a little beyond that for people expecting to verify 
policy
- policy is being composed from modules, 
  a little more interesting to verify the policy is the policy you really 
want
  make sure the policy you build is what you expect when you load it

How far do we need to go? opinions?
- Do we need Tripwire?
- policy verification?
- like what ss posted on the list? 

kw: start w/ something minimal
- trusted solaris - argued away need for something like this
- make sure things that are supposed to be denied by the policy are denied
  DAC would allow but RBAC would deny
- check if you're in that mode, 
  that some very basic security functions are working

Easier to do w/ rpm checking or tripwire?
- rpm not a good choice for checking config files

gw: verifying the policy?
kw: same kind of thing, when loading the policy and error occurs 
    make sure you're not able to access the audit record unless you're in 
the right role
gw to ss: how much work beyond this should we do?
ss: which parts do you want to verify? 
    if you don't do all of them then not really buying us anything

- Would be nice to know the admin is running what he knows
chad: change a boolean to updated the checksum, otherwise when you do a 
check its going to be inconsistent

sounds like we should do more
given date, diminishing # of people working on this
probably just going to meet RBAC, doesn't really give us any measurable 

rpm db - portion of the db that are included in verification
when do i update this? 
if every time then the same thing that corrupts the policy might affect 
the checksum
things to think about before diving into 
ss: may not be necessary
gw: rpm verify, at policy load time (maybe not even at load time)
   as ss said if not going to build the whole chain then not really adding 
to it, so could just add the letter of the law
ss: people investigating #5 other space, integrity verification

simple mechanism for verifying the policy
- tripwire? needed for what?
- rpm verify 
- tripwire for the config files? example: audit-rules
- test the desired behavior of 
- lighter weight utility or modify tripwire?
- kw: testcases needed for eval already, just reuse a subset of these to 
verify this

How to go about defining that set?
- policy isn't completely broke and that its doing its job
- fundamental features

Kicked off in a cron job periodically?
- Do it at start up and admin has the opportunity to run when he wants
admin should get 
- kw: automatically at start up doesn't mean periodically, he'll check 
- RBAC: periodically 

Resurrect tripwire? or write our own? 
- simple to recreate something tripwire light
- going through all the files 
- utility to snapshot the md5sum DB or flat file
- more baggage than you want to resurrect tripwire
- shell script or something that verifies the binaries and the config 
files a different way
- augmenting of sestatus - selinux health check
- what it got when it just ran
- could script something together rather simply


CONSENSUS - direction moving forward
- given date, diminishing # of people working on this
  probably just going to meet RBAC
- start w/ something minimal
- make sure things that are supposed to be denied by the policy are denied
  (DAC would allow but RBAC would deny)
- make sure you're not able to access the audit record unless you're in 
the right role
- reuse a subset of testcases needed for evaluation to verify fundamental 
security features
- will NOT use Tripwire
- need to create utility (could be shell script) that verifies the 
binaries and the config files 
- utility to snapshot the md5sum DB or flat file
- to be kicked off at start up and periodically by the admin 
  such as in a cron job
- could use rpm verify 
- augmenting of sestatus - selinux health check


----------------
Cron, mail, etc.
----------------
jd: no new news other than incorporating Steven's comments
should be on the list soon w/ latest changes

---------------
Remaining tasks
---------------
gw went through tasks lists and will publish that to sg, Linda, and Ken 
Hake

task list - remaining items:

- debbie on dbus

- multilevel sshd, multilevel xinitd might alleviate

- at and tempwatch on hold for Janak's completion of cron

- documentation and test in general until we get development pieces
- James' MCS guide update

- non-upstream kernel features - gap in getting updates 
  need to augment test 2 system
  install mls system that will look like lspp system

- restricting access to kernel key ring 
  part of MLS policy 
  haven't done any explicitly work

- audit of selinux booleans - done, upstream

- audit records patch for userspace records rejected - Tim working on that

- configurability
  panic or fail to single user mode
  variable in selinux config
  we haven't done anything yet

- util to compute closure, 
  steve had customer who wants that
  want to be able to tell, any given file who has access to that
  want to be able to point it to a file 
  tresys has a tool, apol
  need to add DAC permission check
  sg: need to see how it works
  not a command line tool? 
  have a couple of command line tools, but don't know that it uses those 
  libraries do all the real work
  sesearch tool, put types in and it will search the rule

- packet analyzers - handle labels
  not a nice to have, need to understand
  display labels and match against them
  not strict lspp requirement but sounds like something that would be 
really useful

------------
Package list
------------

-------------------------
Unit and functional tests
-------------------------
IBM and HP interested in tests you're willing to opensource
- certification work and functional tests
- go into LTP

-------------
Documentation
-------------
ss: James Morris did an updated MCS document 
        maybe can mutate that for MLS documentation


issues?
none

lspp wiki: http://cable.coker.com.au:800/wiki/index.php/Main_Page




More information about the redhat-lspp mailing list