[edk2-devel] [PATCH v4 00/11] Measured SEV boot with kernel/initrd/cmdline
Yao, Jiewen
jiewen.yao at intel.com
Sun Jul 25 02:43:44 UTC 2021
Hi
I am reviewing this patch series. I am OK with most parts.
And I do have one question:
May I know what is criteria to put a SEV module to OvmfPkg\AmdSev or OvmfPkg directly?
My original understanding is:
If a module is required by OvmfPkg{Ia32,Ia32X64,X64}.{dsc,fdf}, then it should be OvmfPkg.
If a module is only required by OvmfPkg\AmdSev\AmdSevX64.{dsc,fdf}, Then it should be in OvmfPkg\AmdSev.
Am I right?
Thank you
Yao Jiewen
> -----Original Message-----
> From: devel at edk2.groups.io <devel at edk2.groups.io> On Behalf Of Dov Murik
> Sent: Thursday, July 22, 2021 4:43 PM
> To: devel at edk2.groups.io
> Cc: Dov Murik <dovmurik at linux.ibm.com>; Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum
> <tobin at linux.ibm.com>; Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum <tobin at ibm.com>; Jim
> Cadden <jcadden at ibm.com>; James Bottomley <jejb at linux.ibm.com>;
> Hubertus Franke <frankeh at us.ibm.com>; Ard Biesheuvel
> <ardb+tianocore at kernel.org>; Justen, Jordan L <jordan.l.justen at intel.com>;
> Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra at amd.com>; Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh at amd.com>;
> Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas at google.com>; Yao, Jiewen <jiewen.yao at intel.com>;
> Xu, Min M <min.m.xu at intel.com>; Tom Lendacky
> <thomas.lendacky at amd.com>; Leif Lindholm <leif at nuviainc.com>; Sami
> Mujawar <sami.mujawar at arm.com>
> Subject: [edk2-devel] [PATCH v4 00/11] Measured SEV boot with
> kernel/initrd/cmdline
>
> BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3457
>
> Booting with SEV prevented the loading of kernel, initrd, and kernel
> command-line via QEMU fw_cfg interface because they arrive from the VMM
> which is untrusted in SEV.
>
> However, in some cases the kernel, initrd, and cmdline are not secret
> but should not be modified by the host. In such a case, we want to
> verify inside the trusted VM that the kernel, initrd, and cmdline are
> indeed the ones expected by the Guest Owner, and only if that is the
> case go on and boot them up (removing the need for grub inside OVMF in
> that mode).
>
> This patch series reserves an area in MEMFD (previously the last 1KB of
> the launch secret page) which will contain the hashes of these three
> blobs (kernel, initrd, cmdline), each under its own GUID entry. This
> tables of hashes is populated by QEMU before launch, and encrypted as
> part of the initial VM memory; this makes sure these hashes are part of
> the SEV measurement (which has to be approved by the Guest Owner for
> secret injection, for example). Note that populating the hashes table
> requires QEMU support [1].
>
> OVMF parses the table of hashes populated by QEMU (patch 10), and as it
> reads the fw_cfg blobs from QEMU, it will verify each one against the
> expected hash. This is all done inside the trusted VM context. If all
> the hashes are correct, boot of the kernel is allowed to continue.
>
> Any attempt by QEMU to modify the kernel, initrd, cmdline (including
> dropping one of them), or to modify the OVMF code that verifies those
> hashes, will cause the initial SEV measurement to change and therefore
> will be detectable by the Guest Owner during launch before secret
> injection.
>
> Relevant part of OVMF serial log during boot with AmdSevX86 build and
> QEMU with -kernel/-initrd/-append:
>
> ...
> BlobVerifierLibSevHashesConstructor: Found injected hashes table in secure
> location
> Select Item: 0x17
> Select Item: 0x8
> FetchBlob: loading 7379328 bytes for "kernel"
> Select Item: 0x18
> Select Item: 0x11
> VerifyBlob: Found GUID 4DE79437-ABD2-427F-B835-D5B172D2045B in table
> VerifyBlob: Hash comparison succeeded for "kernel"
> Select Item: 0xB
> FetchBlob: loading 12483878 bytes for "initrd"
> Select Item: 0x12
> VerifyBlob: Found GUID 44BAF731-3A2F-4BD7-9AF1-41E29169781D in table
> VerifyBlob: Hash comparison succeeded for "initrd"
> Select Item: 0x14
> FetchBlob: loading 86 bytes for "cmdline"
> Select Item: 0x15
> VerifyBlob: Found GUID 97D02DD8-BD20-4C94-AA78-E7714D36AB2A in table
> VerifyBlob: Hash comparison succeeded for "cmdline"
> ...
>
> The patch series is organized as follows:
>
> 1: Simple comment fix in adjacent area in the code.
> 2: Use GenericQemuLoadImageLib to gain one location for fw_cfg blob
> fetching.
> 3: Allow the (previously blocked) usage of -kernel in AmdSevX64.
> 4-7: Add BlobVerifierLib with null implementation and use it in the correct
> location in QemuKernelLoaderFsDxe.
> 8-9: Reserve memory for hashes table, declare this area in the reset vector.
> 10-11: Add the secure implementation BlobVerifierLibSevHashes and use it in
> AmdSevX64 builds.
>
> [1] https://lore.kernel.org/qemu-devel/20210624102040.2015280-1-
> dovmurik at linux.ibm.com/
>
> Code is at
> https://github.com/confidential-containers-demo/edk2/tree/sev-hashes-v4
>
> v4 changes:
> - BlobVerifierSevHashes (patch 10): more comprehensive overflow tests
> when parsing the SEV hashes table structure
>
> v3: https://edk2.groups.io/g/devel/message/77955
> v3 changes:
> - Rename to BlobVerifierLibNull, use decimal INF_VERSION, remove unused
> DebugLib reference, fix doxygen comments, add missing IN attribute
> - Rename to BlobVerifierLibSevHashes, use decimal INF_VERSION, fix
> doxygen comments, add missing IN attribute,
> calculate buffer hash only when the guid is found in hashes table
> - SecretPei: use ALIGN_VALUE to round the hob size
> - Coding style fixes
> - Add missing 'Ref:' in patch 1 commit message
> - Fix phrasing and typos in commit messages
> - Remove Cc: Laszlo from series
>
> v2: https://edk2.groups.io/g/devel/message/77505
> v2 changes:
> - Use the last 1KB of the existing SEV launch secret page for hashes table
> (instead of reserving a whole new MEMFD page).
> - Build on top of commit cf203024745f ("OvmfPkg/GenericQemuLoadImageLib:
> Read
> cmdline from QemuKernelLoaderFs", 2021-06-28) to have a single location in
> which all of kernel/initrd/cmdline are fetched from QEMU.
> - Use static linking of the two BlobVerifierLib implemenatations.
> - Reorganize series.
>
> v1: https://edk2.groups.io/g/devel/message/75567
>
> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore at kernel.org>
> Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen at intel.com>
> Cc: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra at amd.com>
> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh at amd.com>
> Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas at google.com>
> Cc: James Bottomley <jejb at linux.ibm.com>
> Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao at intel.com>
> Cc: Min Xu <min.m.xu at intel.com>
> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky at amd.com>
> Cc: Leif Lindholm <leif at nuviainc.com>
> Cc: Sami Mujawar <sami.mujawar at arm.com>
>
> ---
>
> Ard: please review patch 6 (ArmVirtPkg). Thanks.
>
> Tom, Brijesh: I'll also send the diff for patch 10. Thanks.
>
> ---
>
> Dov Murik (8):
> OvmfPkg/AmdSev: use GenericQemuLoadImageLib in AmdSev builds
> OvmfPkg: add library class BlobVerifierLib with null implementation
> OvmfPkg: add BlobVerifierLibNull to DSC
> ArmVirtPkg: add BlobVerifierLibNull to DSC
> OvmfPkg/QemuKernelLoaderFsDxe: call VerifyBlob after fetch from fw_cfg
> OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretPei: build hob for full page
> OvmfPkg: add BlobVerifierLibSevHashes
> OvmfPkg/AmdSev: Enforce hash verification of kernel blobs
>
> James Bottomley (3):
> OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretDxe: fix header comment to generic naming
> OvmfPkg: PlatformBootManagerLibGrub: Allow executing kernel via fw_cfg
> OvmfPkg/AmdSev: reserve MEMFD space for for firmware config hashes
>
> OvmfPkg/OvmfPkg.dec | 9 +
> ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemu.dsc | 5 +-
> ArmVirtPkg/ArmVirtQemuKernel.dsc | 5 +-
> OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc | 9 +-
> OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc | 5 +-
> OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc | 5 +-
> OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc | 5 +-
> OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.fdf | 5 +-
> OvmfPkg/Library/BlobVerifierLib/BlobVerifierLibNull.inf | 24
> +++
> OvmfPkg/Library/BlobVerifierLib/BlobVerifierLibSevHashes.inf | 37
> ++++
>
> OvmfPkg/Library/PlatformBootManagerLibGrub/PlatformBootManagerLibGrub.
> inf | 2 +
> OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.inf | 2 +
> OvmfPkg/Include/Library/BlobVerifierLib.h | 38 ++++
> OvmfPkg/Library/PlatformBootManagerLibGrub/BdsPlatform.h |
> 11 ++
> OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretDxe/SecretDxe.c | 2 +-
> OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretPei/SecretPei.c | 3 +-
> OvmfPkg/Library/BlobVerifierLib/BlobVerifierNull.c | 33 ++++
> OvmfPkg/Library/BlobVerifierLib/BlobVerifierSevHashes.c | 199
> ++++++++++++++++++++
> OvmfPkg/Library/PlatformBootManagerLibGrub/BdsPlatform.c |
> 5 +
> OvmfPkg/Library/{PlatformBootManagerLib =>
> PlatformBootManagerLibGrub}/QemuKernel.c | 0
> OvmfPkg/QemuKernelLoaderFsDxe/QemuKernelLoaderFsDxe.c
> | 9 +
> OvmfPkg/ResetVector/Ia16/ResetVectorVtf0.asm | 20 ++
> OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.nasmb | 2 +
> 23 files changed, 425 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
> create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Library/BlobVerifierLib/BlobVerifierLibNull.inf
> create mode 100644
> OvmfPkg/Library/BlobVerifierLib/BlobVerifierLibSevHashes.inf
> create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Include/Library/BlobVerifierLib.h
> create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Library/BlobVerifierLib/BlobVerifierNull.c
> create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Library/BlobVerifierLib/BlobVerifierSevHashes.c
> copy OvmfPkg/Library/{PlatformBootManagerLib =>
> PlatformBootManagerLibGrub}/QemuKernel.c (100%)
>
> --
> 2.25.1
>
>
>
>
>
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