[edk2-rfc] [edk2-devel] RFC: design review for TDVF in OVMF
jiewen.yao at intel.com
Thu Jun 3 23:19:51 UTC 2021
To clarify your "one binary" feedback below, do you mean you suggest A) create a separate DSC (for example OvmfPkg/ConfidentialComputing.dsc) for a full solution including AMD SEC + Intel TDX + NonConfidentialComputing?
Or B) to create a standalone DSC for Intel TDX (for example, create a OvmfPkg/IntelTdx/IntelTdxXS64.dsc) ?
To me, A) does not change too much, we just create another DSC file - that is it.
Then the original OvmfPkgX64.dsc will only be used for POC/Testing purpose. It does not provide any security guarantee.
(The threat model is: we don't trust VMM. Without attestation, you don't know if VMM modified the OVMF.)
I don't know how "simply" it means. To enable TDX to make it work is not a simple work.
Some architecture changes are mandatory, such as reset vector, IO/MMIO access, #VE handler, IOMMU based shared memory access, etc. I think AMD SEV already did those.
My point is that the "one binary" that the slide deck refers to (i.e.,
OvmfPkgX64.dsc) might prove OK for utilizing the Intel TDX *technology*
in itself. Simply enabling OVMF + a guest OS to boot in a TDX domain.
But "OvmfPkgX64.dsc" is *not* the "one binary" that is suitable for
remote attestation, which has a much broader scope, involving multiple
computers, networking, deployment, guest-owner/host-owner separation,
whatever. For the latter, we needed a separate platform anyway, even
with only SEV in mind; that's why "OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc" exists.
> -----Original Message-----
> From: rfc at edk2.groups.io <rfc at edk2.groups.io> On Behalf Of Laszlo Ersek
> Sent: Friday, June 4, 2021 12:12 AM
> To: Yao, Jiewen <jiewen.yao at intel.com>; rfc at edk2.groups.io;
> devel at edk2.groups.io
> Cc: jejb at linux.ibm.com; Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh at amd.com>; Tom
> Lendacky <thomas.lendacky at amd.com>; erdemaktas at google.com;
> cho at microsoft.com; bret.barkelew at microsoft.com; Jon Lange
> <jlange at microsoft.com>; Karen Noel <knoel at redhat.com>; Paolo Bonzini
> <pbonzini at redhat.com>; Nathaniel McCallum <npmccallum at redhat.com>;
> Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert at redhat.com>; Ademar de Souza Reis Jr.
> <areis at redhat.com>
> Subject: Re: [edk2-rfc] [edk2-devel] RFC: design review for TDVF in OVMF
> On 06/03/21 15:51, Yao, Jiewen wrote:
> > Hi, All
> > We plan to do a design review for TDVF in OVMF package.
> > The TDVF Design slides for TinaoCore Design Review Meeting (Jun 11) is
> > now available in blow link:
> > https://edk2.groups.io/g/devel/files/Designs/2021/0611.
> > The Bugzilla is https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3429
> > You can have an offline review first. You comments will be warmly
> > welcomed and we will continuously update the slides based on the
> > feedbacks.
> Resending my earlier comments in this mailing list thread, with the
> feedback inserted at the proper spots that has been given in the
> off-list thread since then:
> *** Slides 4, 6, 7: the "one binary requirement".
> (1) The presentation refers to "OvmfPkgX64.dsc" as "the one" on slide#4,
> but then the explanation for the requirement, given on slide 7, speaks
> about "common attestation interface".
> I think we have a misunderstanding here. The "OvmfPkgX64.dsc" platform
> indeed contains SEV, SEV-ES, and (in the future, will contain) SEV-SNP
> support. In that sense, adding TDX support to the same platform should
> be (hopefully) possible, at the cost of ugly gymnastics in the reset
> But "OvmfPkgX64.dsc" is *already* different from the remotely attested
> OVMF platform, namely "OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc".
> The latter has some additional modules (secret PEIM and DXE driver), it
> has the Grub binary built in, and -- probably most importantly -- it
> trusts host-originated information less than "OvmfPkgX64.dsc".
> For example, "OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc" has a dedicated
> PlatformBootManagerLib instance, one that ignores the non-volatile UEFI
> variables Boot#### and BootOrder, and ignores (thus far) the fw_cfg
> originated kernel/initrd/cmdline as well.
> It remains an "area of research" to see what else should be removed from
> the traditional host-guest integration (which integration is usually
> desirable for management and convenience), in the remotely-attested boot
> scenario. See e.g.
> My point is that the "one binary" that the slide deck refers to (i.e.,
> OvmfPkgX64.dsc) might prove OK for utilizing the Intel TDX *technology*
> in itself. Simply enabling OVMF + a guest OS to boot in a TDX domain.
> But "OvmfPkgX64.dsc" is *not* the "one binary" that is suitable for
> remote attestation, which has a much broader scope, involving multiple
> computers, networking, deployment, guest-owner/host-owner separation,
> whatever. For the latter, we needed a separate platform anyway, even
> with only SEV in mind; that's why "OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc"
> *** Slides 8-9: general boot flow -- TDVF; TDVF Flow
> I'm likely missing a big bunch of background here, so just a few
> (2) Not sure what RTMR is, but it's associated with "Enable TrustedBoot"
> -- so is a virtual TPM a hard requirement?
> ... Back from slide 10: "TCG measurement and event log framework w/o
> TPM" -- that's curious.
> [response from Dave Gilbert:]
> > My reading of this is that the RTMR (and another set of similar
> > registers) are a TDX thing that is like the PCRs from a TPM but
> > without the rest of the TPM features; so you can do the one-way
> > measurement into the RTMRs just like you do into a TPM PCR, and the
> > measurements pop out somewhere in the TDX quote. Just like a TPM you
> > need the event log to make any sense of how the final hashed value
> > supposedly got to where it did.
> [response from Erdem Aktas:]
> > +1 to David on this. TDX provides 2 kinds of measurement registers:
> > MRTDs and RTMRs
> > section 10.1.2) . MRTDs are build-time measurement registers which are
> > updated when TDX is being created. Once TDX is finalized (before the
> > first run), the MRTDs are finalized and cannot be updated anymore. On
> > the other hand, while the TD is running, TD can extend RTMRs through
> > TDCALLs which will provide TPM PCR kind of capabilities.
> ... Back from slide 43: feel free to skip this now; I will comment in
> more detail below.
> (3) Prepare AcpiTable -- OVMF fetches ACPI tables from QEMU; is this a
> new (firmware originated) table that is installed in addition, or does
> it replace QEMU's tables?
> ... Ignore for now, will comment on the MADT stuff later.
> (4) Does DMA management mean a different IOMMU protocol? That is
> to conflict with the SEV IOMMU protocol. Depexes in OVMF expect one or
> zero IOMMU protocols to be present.
> ... Back from slide 40: feel free to skip this now; I'll comment on this
> separately, below.
> (5) Enumerate VirtIO -- virtio enumeration is PCI based on x86. But I
> see no mention of PCI. If you mean VirtioMmioDeviceLib, that's no good,
> because it does not support virtio-1.0, only virtio-0.9.5.
> ... Back from slide 42: I got my answer to this on slide 42, so don't
> worry about this point.
> (6) The PEI phase is skipped as a whole. I don't see how that can be
> reasonably brought together with either "OvmfPkgX64.dsc" or
> "OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc". I guess you can always modify SEC to
> jump into DXE directly, but then why keep the PEI core and a bunch of
> PEIMs in the firmware binary?
> Also touched on by slide 9, TDVF Flow -- PEI is eliminated but SEC
> becomes more heavy-weight.
> Wouldn't this deserve a dedicated, separate platform DSC? The
> 8-bit/32-bit branching at the front of the reset vector is a smaller
> complication in comparison.
> Slide 6 references the mailing list archive:
> and in that message, I wrote:
> I'm doubtful that this is a unique problem ("just fix the reset
> vector") the likes of which will supposedly never return during the
> integration of SEV and TDX
> See also:
> where I said:
> It's not lost on me that we're talking about ~3 instructions.
> Let's keep a close eye on further "polymorphisms" that would require
> The first 9 slides in the presentation introduce much-much more
> intrusive problems than the "polymorphism" of the reset vector. Would I
> be correct to say that my concern in the above messages was right? I
> think I was only given a fraction of the necessary information when I
> was asked "do you agree 'one binary' is viable".
> [response from Erdem Aktas:]
> > Let's not worry about this for now. We want the one binary solution
> > for practical reasons and also for simplicity. In the end, we want to
> > do what is right and good for everyone.
> > Those are legit concerns and I think what Intel is trying to do (sorry
> > for mind reading) is to discuss all those concerns and questions to
> > make the right decision. I really appreciate their effort on preparing
> > those slides and bringing it to the community to review.
> > I will also read your comments more carefully and provide my thoughts
> > on them.
> > Sorry for being a little slow on this.
> *** Slide 10 -- Key impact to firmware
> (7) "CPUs are left running in long mode after exiting firmware" -- what
> kind of "pen" are we talking about? Does a HLT loop still work?
> (8) "I/O, MMIO, MSR accesses are different" -- those are implemented by
> low-level libraries in edk2; how can they be configured dynamically?
> ... Back from slide 53: I'll comment on slide 53 separately; ignore
> *** Slide 11 -- TDVF Image (1)
> (9) CFV -- Configuration Firmware Volume (VarStore.fdf.inc),
> containing SB keys -- how is this firmware volume populated (at build
> time)? Is this a hexdump?
> ... Back from slide 16: it seems like CFV is a raw hexdump indeed; how
> is that managed when keys change (at build time)?
> (10) This slide (slide 11) basically describes an intrusive
> reorganization of "OvmfPkgX64.fdf". I don't think I can agree to that.
> While confidential computing is important, it is not relevant for many
> users. Even if we don't cause outright regressions for existent setups,
> the maintenance cost of the traditional OVMF platform will skyrocket.
> The big bunch of areas that SEV-ES introduced to MEMFD is already a big
> complication. I'd feel much better if we could isolate all that to a
> dedicated "remote attested boot" firmware platform, and not risk the
> functionality and maintenance of the traditional platform. I think this
> ties in with my comment (1).
> For example, seeing a configuration firmware volume (CFV) with secure
> boot keys embedded, in the "usual" FDF, will confuse lots of people, me
> included. In the traditional OVMF use case, we use a different method:
> namely OvmfPkg/EnrollDefaultKeys, for "priming" a variable store
> template, in the build environment.
> Edk2 (and PI and UEFI) are definitely flexible enough for accommodating
> TDX, but the existent, traditional OVMF platforms are a bad fit. In my
> *** Slide 12: TDVF Image (2)
> (11) "Page table should support both 4-level and 5-level page table"
> As a general development strategy, I would suggest building TDX support
> in small, well-isolated layers. 5-level paging is not enabled (has never
> been tested, to my knowledge) with OVMF on QEMU/KVM, regardless of
> confidential computing, for starters. If 5-level paging is a strict
> requirement for TDX, then it arguably needs to be implemented
> independently of TDX, at first. So that the common edk2 architecture be
> at least testable on QEMU/KVM with 5-level paging enabled.
> *** Slide 13:
> (12) My comment is that the GUID-ed structure chain already starts at a
> fixed GPA (the "AMD SEV option"). Ordering between GUID-ed structures is
> irrelevant, so any TDX-specific structures should be eligible for
> appending to, prepending to, or intermixing with, other (possibly
> SEV-specific) structures. There need not be a separate entry point, just
> different GUIDS.
> (13) Regarding "4G-0x20[0x10] is OVMF AP reset vector (used in OVMF
> implementation)" -- I think this is a typo: this "AP reset vector" is
> *not* used in OVMF. To my knowledge, it is a vestige from the UefiCpuPkg
> reset vector. In OVMF, APs are booted via MpInitLib (in multiple
> firmware phases), using INIT-SIPI-SIPI, and the reset vector for the
> APs, posited through those IPIs, is prepared in low RAM.
> *** Slides 14 through 16:
> I consider these TDVF firmware image internals, implementation details
> -- do whatever you need to do, just don't interfere with existing
> platforms / use cases. See my comment (10) above.
> *** Slides 17-21:
> (14) Again, a very big difference from traditional OVMF: APs never enter
> SEC in traditional OVMF. I assume this new functionality is part of
> TdxStartupLib (from slide 18) -- will there be a Null instance of that?
> Last week I posted a 43-part patch series to edk2-devel, for separating
> out the dynamic Xen enlightenments from the IA32, IA32X64, X64
> platforms, in favor of the dedicated OvmfXen platform. TDX seems to
> bring in incomparably more complications than Xen, and the OvmfPkg
> maintainers have found even the Xen complications troublesome in the
> long term.
> If I had had access to all this information when we first discussed "one
> binary" on the mailing list, I'd have never agreed to "one binary". I'm
> OK with attempting one firmware binary for "confidential computing", but
> that "one platform" cannot be "OvmfPkgX64.dsc".
> Even if I make a comparison with just the "technology" (not the
> remotely-attested deployment) of SEV and SEV-ES, as it is included in
> "OvmfPkgX64.dsc", TDX is hugely more complicated and intrusive than
> that. SEV proved possible to integrate into existing modules, into the
> existing boot flow, maybe through the addition of some new drivers (such
> as a new IOMMU protocol implementation, and some "clever" depexes).
> we never had to restructure the FD layout, eliminate whole firmware
> phases, or think about multiprocessing in the reset vector or the SEC
> In order to bring an example from the ARM world, please note that
> platforms that use a PEI phase, and platforms that don't, are distinct
> platforms. In ArmVirtPkg, two examples are ArmVirtQemu and
> ArmVirtQemuKernel. The latter does not include the PEI Core.
> *** Slides 22 through 34:
> (15) All these extra tasks and complications are perfectly fine, as long
> as they exist peacefully *separately* from the traditional ("legacy")
> OVMF platforms.
> Honestly, in the virtual world, picking your firmware binary is easy.
> The approach here reminds me of a physical firmware binary that includes
> everything possible from "edk2-platforms/Features/Intel", just so it can
> be deployed to any physical board imaginable. That's not how Intel
> builds physical firmware, right? We have "edk2-platforms/Platform/Intel"
> and "edk2-platforms/Silicon/Intel" with many-many separate DSC files.
> *** Slide 35-36: DXE phase
> (16) "Some DXE Drivers not allowed to load/start in Td guest -- Network
> stack, RNG, ..."
> Same comment as (several times) above. The Linuxboot project is a good
> example for eliminating cruft from DXEFV (in fact, for eliminating most
> of the DXE phase). In a TDX environment, why include drivers in the
> firmware binary that are never used? Meanwhile, DXEFV in OVMF grows by
> MB every 1.5 years or so. Again, remove these drivers from the DSC/FDF
> then, and it needs to be a separate platform.
> (17) "Other DXE Phase drivers -- [...] AcpiPlatformDxe"
> I'm not sure what this section is supposed to mean. Other DXE phase
> drivers included, or excluded? Without AcpiPlatformDxe, the guest OS
> will not see QEMU's ACPI content, and will almost certainly malfunction.
> ... Back from slide 48: ignore this for now, I'll comment in more detail
> *** Slide 37: DXE Core
> (18) says "SMM is not supported in Td guest" -- how is the variable
> store protected from direct hardware (pflash) access from the guest OS?
> Without SMM, the guest OS need not go through gRT->SetVariable() to
> update authenticated non-volatile UEFI variables, and that undermines
> Secure Boot.
> Note that, while SEV-ES has the same limitation wrt. SMM, the
> "OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc" platform doesn't even include the
> Boot firmware feature. For another example, the OVMF firmware binary in
> RHEL that's going to support SEV-ES is such a build of "OvmfPkgX64.dsc"
> that does not include the Secure Boot feature either.
> But in this TDX slide deck, Secure Boot certificates are embedded in the
> CFV (configuration firmware volume) -- see slide 11 and slide 16 --,
> which suggests that this platform does want secure boot.
> ... Back from slide 48: I'm going to make *additional* comments on this,
> when I'm at slide 48, too.
> The rest of this slide (slide 37) looks reasonable (generic DXE Core
> changes -- possibly PI spec changes too).
> *** Slides 38 through 39:
> These seem reasonable (TdxDxe assumes some responsibilities of
> *** Slides 40 through 42:
> *If* you really can implement TDX support for the IOMMU driver *this*
> surgically, then I'm OK with it. The general logic in the IOMMU driver
> was truly difficult to write, and I'd be seriously concerned if those
> parts would have to be modified. Customizing just the page
> encryption/decryption primitives for TDX vs. SEV is OK.
> *** Slides 43 through 47:
> (19) Slide 46 and slide 47 are almost identical. Please consolidate them
> into a single slide.
> (20) the TPM2 infrastructure in edk2 is baroque (over-engineered), in my
> opinion. It has so many layers that I can never keep them in mind. When
> we added TPM support to OVMF, I required commit messages that would
> us recall the layering. In particular, please refer to commit
> 0c0a50d6b3ff ("OvmfPkg: include Tcg2Dxe module", 2018-03-09). Here's an
> TPM 2 consumer driver
> Tpm2DeviceLib class: Tpm2DeviceLibTcg2 instance
> TCG2 protocol interface
> TCG2 protocol provider: Tcg2Dxe.inf driver
> Tpm2DeviceLib class: Tpm2DeviceLibRouter instance
> NULL class: Tpm2InstanceLibDTpm instance
> (via earlier registration)
> TPM2 chip (actual hardware)
> The slide deck says that EFI_TD_PROTOCOL is supposed to reuse the
> EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL definition. If that's the case, then why don't we push
> the TDX specifics (more or less: the replacement of PCRs with RTMR) down
> to the lowest possible level?
> Can we have "Tpm2InstanceLibTdxRtmr", plugged into the same Tcg2Dxe.inf
> If not, can we have a new TdTcg2Dxe.inf driver, but make it so that it
> install the same protocol as before (EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL -- same old
> protocol GUID)? Then DxeTpmMeasurementLib doesn't have to change.
> As long as there is *at most* one EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL instance published
> in the protocol database, DxeTpmMeasurementLib should be fine. In SEV*
> guests, the standard Tcg2Dxe driver provides that protocol. In TDX
> guests, TdTcg2Dxe.inf should provide the protocol. Arbitration between
> the two can be implemented with the pattern seen in the following
> 1 05db0948cc60 EmbeddedPkg: introduce EDKII Platform Has ACPI GUID
> 2 786f476323a6 EmbeddedPkg: introduce PlatformHasAcpiLib
> 3 65a69b214840 EmbeddedPkg: introduce EDKII Platform Has Device Tree
> 4 2558bfe3e907 ArmVirtPkg: add PlatformHasAcpiDtDxe
> The basic idea is that Tcg2Dxe can have a depex on a new "running in
> SEV" protocol GUID, and TdTcg2Dxe can have a depex on a new "running in
> TDX" protocol GUID. A separate platform driver can install the proper
> GUID -- possibly *neither* of those GUIDs.
> And, we don't have to change the depex section of
> "SecurityPkg/Tcg/Tcg2Dxe/Tcg2Dxe.inf" for this; we can implement a
> library instance with an empty constructor, but a non-empty depex, and
> then hook this lib instance into Tcg2Dxe.inf via module scope NULL lib
> class override in the DSC file. Basically we could forcibly restrict
> Tcg2Dxe's DEPEX by making it inherit the new DEPEX from the library.
> *** Slide 48: DXE Phase -- Other Modules
> Regarding IncompatiblePciDeviceSupportDxe: the proposed update sounds
> plausible and simple enough.
> (21) "AcpiPlatformDxe: Support for MADT/ACPI addition to report Td
> Mailbox entry"
> Firmware-owned tables must not be installed from this driver.
> Please refer to my "Xen removal" patch set again, for
> <https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2122>, which I mention
> above in point (14). As part of the Xen removal, the AcpiPlatformDxe
> driver in OvmfPkg is significantly trimmed: all unused (dead) cruft is
> removed, including any ACPI table templates that are built into the
> OvmfPkg/AcpiPlatformDxe is responsible *solely* for implementing the
> client side of the QEMU ACPI linker/loader.
> If you need to prepare & install different ACPI tables, please do it
> elsewhere, in another DXE driver. A bunch of other firmware modules do
> that (NFIT, IBFT, BGRT, ...).
> For example, the OvmfPkg/TdxDxe DXE_DRIVER is supposed to be launched
> early in the DXE phase, via APRIORI section -- please consider
> registering a protocol notify in that driver, for
> EFI_ACPI_TABLE_PROTOCOL, and when it becomes available, install
> *extra* tables you need.
> Note that if you need to *customize* an ACPI table that QEMU already
> provides, then you will have to modify the ACPI generator on the QEMU
> side. It is a design tenet between QEMU and OVMF that OVMF include no
> business logic for either parsing or fixing up ACPI tables that QEMU
> provides. AcpiPlatformDxe contains the minimum (which is already a whole
> lot, unfortunately) that's necessary for implementing the QEMU ACPI
> linker/loader client in the UEFI environment.
> The slide deck mentions MADT, which is also known as the "APIC" table --
> and indeed, QEMU does provide that. (See acpi_build_madt()
> [hw/i386/acpi-common.c].) So if TDX needs MADT customizations, that
> should go into QEMU.
> (22) EmuVariableFvbRuntimeDxe
> Ouch, this is an unpleasant surprise.
> First, if you know for a fact that pflash is not part of the *board* in
> any TDX setup, then pulling
> into the firmware platform is useless, as it is mutually exclusive with
> (via dynamic means -- a dynamic PCD).
> Note that the FDF file places QemuFlashFvbServicesRuntimeDxe in APRIORI
> DXE when SMM_REQUIRE is FALSE. This driver checks for pflash presence,
> and lets EmuVariableFvbRuntimeDxe perform its in-RAM flash emulation
> only in case pflash is not found.
> So this is again in favor of a separate platform -- if we know pflash is
> never part of the board, then QemuFlashFvbServicesRuntimeDxe is never
> needed, but you cannot remove it from the traditional DSC/FDF files.
> Second, EmuVariableFvbRuntimeDxe consumes the PlatformFvbLib class,
> the PlatformFvbDataWritten() API (among other things). This lib class is
> implemented by two instances in OvmfPkg, PlatformFvbLibNull and
> EmuVariableFvbLib. The latter instance allows Platform BDS to hook an
> event (for signaling) via "PcdEmuVariableEvent" into the
> EmuVariableFvbRuntimeDxe driver.
> In old (very old) QEMU board configurations, namely those without
> pflash, this (mis)feature is used by OVMF's PlatformBootManagerLib to
> write out all variables to the EFI system partition in a regular file
> called \NvVars, with the help of NvVarsFileLib, whenever
> EmuVariableFvbRuntimeDxe writes out an emulated "flash" block. For this
> purpose, the traditional OVMF DSC files link EmuVariableFvbLib into
> But it counts as an absolute disaster nowadays, and should not be
> revived in any platform. If you don't have pflash in TDX guests, just
> accept that you won't have non-volatile variables. And link
> PlatformFvbLibNull into EmuVariableFvbRuntimeDxe. You're going to need
> separate PlatformBootManagerLib instance anyway.
> (We should have removed EmuVariableFvbRuntimeDxe a long time ago
> the traditional OVMF platforms, i.e. made pflash a hard requirement,
> even when SMM is not built into the platform -- but whenever I tried
> that, Jordan always shot me down.)
> My point is: using EmuVariableFvbRuntimeDxe in the TDX platform may be
> defensible per se, but we must be very clear that it will never provide
> a standards-conformant service for non-volatile UEFI variables, and we
> must keep as much of the \NvVars mess out of EmuVariableFvbRuntimeDxe
> possible. This will require a separate PlatformBootManagerLib instance
> for TDX anyway (or maybe share PlatformBootManagerLibGrub with
> Apart from the volatility aspect, let's assume we have this in-RAM
> emulated "flash device", storing authenticated UEFI variables for Secure
> Boot purposes. And we don't have SMM.
> What protects this in-RAM variable store from tampering by the guest OS?
> It's all guest RAM only, after all. What provides the privilege barrier
> between the guest firmware and the guest OS?
> *** Slide 50: Library
> (23) Should we introduce Null instances for all (or most) new lib
> classes here? Code size is a concern (static linking). If we extend a
> common OvmfPkg module with new hook points, it's one thing to return
> from that hook point early *dynamically*, but it's even better (given
> separate platforms) to allow the traditional platform firmware to use a
> Null lib instance, to cut out all the dead code statically.
> *** Slides 51 through 52
> Seems OK.
> *** Slide 53:
> (24) It might be worth noting that BaseIoLibIntrinsic already has some
> SEV enlightenment, as the FIFO IO port operations (which normally use
> the REP prefix) are not handled on SEV. I don't have an immediate idea
> why this might matter, we should just minimize code duplication if
> *** Slides 54-56:
> No comments, this stuff seems reasonable.
> *** Slide 57: MpInitLib
> I don't know enough to give a summary judgement.
> All in all, I see the controversial / messy parts in the platform
> bringup, and how all that differs from the traditional ("legacy") OVMF
> platforms. I admit I *may* be biased in favor of SEV, possibly because
> SEV landed first -- if you find signs of such a bias in my comments,
> please don't hesitate to debunk those points. Yet my general impression
> is that the early bringup stuff is significantly different from
> everything before, and because of this, a separate platform is
> Definitely separate from the traditional OVMF IA32, IA32X64, and X64
> platforms, and *possibly* separate from the "remote attestation"
> AmdSevX64.dsc platform. I would approach the TDX feature-set in complete
> isolation (exactly how Intel commenced the work, if I understand
> correctly), modulo obviously shareable / reusable parts, and then slowly
> & gradually work on extracting / refactoring commonalities.
> (But, given my stance on Xen for example, I could disagree even with the
> latter, retroactive kind of unification -- it all boils down to shared
> developer and user base. Component sharing should reflect the community
> structure, otherwise maintenance will be a nightmare.)
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