[edk2-devel] [RESEND PATCH RFC v3 00/22] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support
Laszlo Ersek
lersek at redhat.com
Fri Jun 4 13:09:14 UTC 2021
On 06/04/21 13:50, Brijesh Singh wrote:
> Hi Laszlo,
>
> On 6/4/21 4:32 AM, Laszlo Ersek wrote:
>> Hi Brijesh,
>>
>> On 05/27/21 01:10, Brijesh Singh wrote:
>>> (I missed adding devel at edk2.groups.io, resending the series)
>>>
>>> BZ: https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fbugzilla.tianocore.org%2Fshow_bug.cgi%3Fid%3D3275&data=04%7C01%7Cbrijesh.singh%40amd.com%7Ccc15730c886844d4783708d9273ba4e2%7C3dd8961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C637583960920109416%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=iN6ph%2BfbfEyY7xIeUAQEeB5FgSAjbeg6VNrU1P6zevU%3D&reserved=0
>>>
>>> SEV-SNP builds upon existing SEV and SEV-ES functionality while adding
>>> new hardware-based memory protections. SEV-SNP adds strong memory
>>> integrity protection to help prevent malicious hypervisor-based
>>> attacks like data replay, memory re-mapping and more in order to
>>> create an isolated memory encryption environment.
>>>
>>> This series provides the basic building blocks to support booting the
>>> SEV-SNP VMs, it does not cover all the security enhancement introduced
>>> by the SEV-SNP such as interrupt protection.
>>>
>>> Many of the integrity guarantees of SEV-SNP are enforced through a new
>>> structure called the Reverse Map Table (RMP). Adding a new page to
>>> SEV-SNP VM requires a 2-step process. First, the hypervisor assigns a
>>> page to the guest using the new RMPUPDATE instruction. This
>>> transitions the page to guest-invalid. Second, the guest validates the
>>> page using the new PVALIDATE instruction. The SEV-SNP VMs can use the
>>> new "Page State Change Request NAE" defined in the GHCB specification
>>> to ask hypervisor to add or remove page from the RMP table.
>>>
>>> Each page assigned to the SEV-SNP VM can either be validated or
>>> unvalidated, as indicated by the Validated flag in the page's RMP
>>> entry. There are two approaches that can be taken for the page
>>> validation: Pre-validation and Lazy Validation.
>>>
>>> Under pre-validation, the pages are validated prior to first use. And
>>> under lazy validation, pages are validated when first accessed. An
>>> access to a unvalidated page results in a #VC exception, at which time
>>> the exception handler may validate the page. Lazy validation requires
>>> careful tracking of the validated pages to avoid validating the same
>>> GPA more than once. The recently introduced "Unaccepted" memory type
>>> can be used to communicate the unvalidated memory ranges to the Guest
>>> OS.
>>>
>>> At this time we only support the pre-validation. OVMF detects all the
>>> available system RAM in the PEI phase. When SEV-SNP is enabled, the
>>> memory is validated before it is made available to the EDK2 core.
>>>
>>> This series does not implements the following SEV-SNP features yet:
>>>
>>> * CPUID filtering
>>> * Lazy validation
>>> * Interrupt security
>>>
>>> The series builds on SNP pre-patch posted here: https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Ftinyurl.com%2Fpu6admks&data=04%7C01%7Cbrijesh.singh%40amd.com%7Ccc15730c886844d4783708d9273ba4e2%7C3dd8961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C637583960920119403%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=6NGf3nC%2BmDpPIUOIkSaQ0AW0LdDylM5eAvIH7oZdXWg%3D&reserved=0
>> That series ("[PATCH v3 00/13] Add GHCBv2 macro and helpers") has been
>> merged at this point, as commit range dbc22a178546..adfa3327d4fc. [*]
>>
>>> Additional resources
>>> ---------------------
>>> SEV-SNP whitepaper
>>> https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.amd.com%2Fsystem%2Ffiles%2FTechDocs%2FSEV-SNP-strengthening-vm-isolation-with-integrity-protection-and-more.pdf&data=04%7C01%7Cbrijesh.singh%40amd.com%7Ccc15730c886844d4783708d9273ba4e2%7C3dd8961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C637583960920119403%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=YeTxsYnwYYiONaJ%2BizikzwjH7czwLVUxR7cwDAo%2F1qA%3D&reserved=0
>>>
>>> APM 2: https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.amd.com%2Fsystem%2Ffiles%2FTechDocs%2F24593.pdf&data=04%7C01%7Cbrijesh.singh%40amd.com%7Ccc15730c886844d4783708d9273ba4e2%7C3dd8961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C637583960920119403%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=%2BtOsP5zw%2BFPZzCBHQYYSCXTpRdxPXW4okrJmiRNwDH4%3D&reserved=0 (section 15.36)
>>>
>>> The complete source is available at
>>> https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.com%2FAMDESE%2Fovmf%2Ftree%2Fsev-snp-rfc-2&data=04%7C01%7Cbrijesh.singh%40amd.com%7Ccc15730c886844d4783708d9273ba4e2%7C3dd8961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C637583960920119403%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=L8FXX8X%2FITpLvY6JnXXMbZvTQ%2Br0VLsau5DRJ4kKYN8%3D&reserved=0
>> So, I'm having trouble applying this series. I attempted to apply it in
>> preparation for reviewing patch#2 with a larger context, but I failed,
>> as follows:
>>
>> - When I try applying the series with git-am, upon current master
>> (c410ad4da4b7), patch#21 ("UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: Use SEV-SNP AP
>> Creation NAE event to launch APs") does not apply.
>>
>> AFAICT, that's because your modification of GetApResetVectorSize() did
>> not (could not) take into account Tom's commit dbc22a178546
>> ("UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: Allocate a separate SEV-ES AP reset stack
>> area", 2021-05-29).
>>
>> - Your remote branch (with HEAD @ 2dbd79823402) is based on upstream
>> commit 01c0ab90beb3 ("AzurePipelines: Add support for ArmPlatformPkg",
>> 2021-04-28). If I try to rebase the branch from there to current
>> master (c410ad4da4b7), I get the following rebase action list:
>>
>> 1 pick 570829c5a0d6 MdePkg: Expand the SEV MSR to include the SNP definition
>> 2 pick b9247f69bdfe MdePkg: Define the GHCB Hypervisor features
>> 3 pick d09ed6d44ffd MdePkg: Define the Page State Change VMGEXIT structures
>> 4 pick 7148b2684f87 MdePkg: Add AsmPvalidate() support
>> 5 pick d6a2c2a0d625 OvmfPkg/BaseMemEncryptSevLib: Introduce MemEncryptSevClearMmioPageEncMask()
>> 6 pick 9b1037d0d9ac OvmfPkg: Use MemEncryptSevClearMmioPageEncMask() to clear EncMask from Mmio
>> 7 pick 556e8fc40179 OvmfPkg/BaseMemEncryptSevLib: Remove CacheFlush parameter
>> 8 pick 03e27af79c61 OvmfPkg/VmgExitLib: Allow PMBASE register access in Dxe phase
>> 9 pick a81925eeb1c6 OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add MemEncryptSevSnpEnabled()
>> 10 pick 3d443240f91c OvmfPkg: Reserve Secrets page in MEMFD
>> 11 pick 94dad29970b0 OvmfPkg: Reserve CPUID page for the SEV-SNP guest
>> 12 pick b3e3faa12b0f OvmfPkg: Validate the data pages used in the Reset vector and SEC phase
>> 13 pick 62290e03c79a UefiCpuPkg: Define the SEV-SNP specific dynamic PCDs
>> 14 pick c04e71dabf63 OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: extend the workarea to include SNP enabled field
>> 15 pick 76072671f367 OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: Extend Es Workarea to include hv features
>> 16 pick 2bf0eaf2beea OvmfPkg/ResetVector: Invalidate the GHCB page
>> 17 pick 2f050b2a1033 OvmfPkg: Add a library to support registering GHCB GPA
>> 18 pick b2681bdfbebc OvmfPkg: register GHCB gpa for the SEV-SNP guest
>> 19 pick d9f1abb1ff35 UefiCpuPkg/MpLib: add support to register GHCB GPA when SEV-SNP is enabled
>> 20 pick 814084815108 OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: Add support to validate system RAM
>> 21 pick ec34893c46ab OvmfPkg/BaseMemEncryptSevLib: Skip the pre-validated system RAM
>> 22 pick 37af54f86c3a OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: Add support to validate > 4GB memory in PEI phase
>> 23 pick 25891f51499e OvmfPkg/SecMain: Pre-validate the memory used for decompressing Fv
>> 24 pick f2f55135b562 OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: Validate the system RAM when SNP is active
>> 25 pick a28b66462eae OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: Change the page state in the RMP table
>> 26 pick b10c0e61913b OvmfPkg/AmdSev: Expose the SNP reserved pages through configuration table
>> 27 pick 2dbd79823402 MdePkg/GHCB: Increase the GHCB protocol max version
>>
>> This is 27 patches, while your series contains 22 patches. It *seems*
>> like some of these 27 patches have been merged via [*] already, but it's
>> not easy to say which ones. In particular, I can't just drop a
>> contiguous *prefix* of this rebase action list, because your *posted*
>> patch#1 is "UefiCpuPkg: Define the SEV-SNP specific dynamic PCDs", but
>> on your topic branch, that's patch#13! And if I dropped the 12 patches
>> before that, then we'd be left with 27-12=15 patches, which obviously
>> doesn't match your posted series consisting of 22 patches. I assume some
>> of the patches may have been reordered, but I wouldn't like to guess.
>>
>> I believe we have two problems here: (1) the patch set does not apply to
>> current master, (2) the posted patch set doesn't even match your remote
>> topic branch.
>>
>> Problem (1) is somewhat expected (the master branch is expected to
>> diverge over time), but problem (2) should never occur. Please never do
>> this. If you provide a fetch URL + branch reference in your cover
>> letter, then that remote topic branch must match the posted patches
>> *forver*. It effectively becomes read only, same as your posted emails
>> are read-only. If you need to modify the branch, please create a brand
>> new topic branch (possibly with a new version number in the name), and
>> rebase that branch.
>>
>> (It's also possible that you modified your local branch just before
>> posting, without pushing it to the <https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.com%2FAMDESE%2Fovmf&data=04%7C01%7Cbrijesh.singh%40amd.com%7Ccc15730c886844d4783708d9273ba4e2%7C3dd8961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C637583960920119403%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=AbSYW0DGz0m1L7Xf9tkpF33coQE%2Brg1tDHYEFk9eKfc%3D&reserved=0>
>> repository afterwards, but that's quite disruptive too.)
>>
>> So... what do you want me to do?
>>
>> - Are at least patches 01 through 20 (as posted to the list)
>> authoritative? Should I review those?
>>
>> - Or would you like to rebase and repost the entire series (this time
>> keeping the posted version and the fetchable topic branch in sync)?
>
> The main issue is I typed wrong branch name in the cover letter. The
> branch name should be "sev-snp-rfc-3" and not "sev-snp-rfc-2". I
> apologies for it :(. Ray asked the branch name and I replied him with
> the correct branch.
Hmmm... indeed, but that discussion happened off-list, namely under the
original posting of this v3 RFC set that did not reach the list. And now
I was working with my list folder.
>
> https://github.com/AMDESE/ovmf/tree/sev-snp-rfc-3
>
> This branch was based on commit 5531fd48ded1271b8775725355ab83994e4bc77c
> from the upstream.
Right, this branch indeed averts problem (2); it is in sync with the
posted series. Thanks!
Problem (1) stays the same -- git-rebase reports the same issue as
git-am above, for patch#21. So, I'm going to review this version on the
list, but I'll skip patch#21 (or perhaps I'll attempt to make useful
comments there too, if I can).
Thanks!
Laszlo
>
>
>> Thanks,
>> Laszlo
>>
>>> GHCB spec:
>>> https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fdeveloper.amd.com%2Fwp-content%2Fresources%2F56421.pdf&data=04%7C01%7Cbrijesh.singh%40amd.com%7Ccc15730c886844d4783708d9273ba4e2%7C3dd8961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C637583960920119403%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=DLMzZTZIu1kQa%2BKdDWhDsBatiP%2BnHRZEBMiAPwc%2FYIo%3D&reserved=0
>>>
>>> SEV-SNP firmware specification:
>>> https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fdeveloper.amd.com%2Fsev%2F&data=04%7C01%7Cbrijesh.singh%40amd.com%7Ccc15730c886844d4783708d9273ba4e2%7C3dd8961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C637583960920119403%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=eVdldUsQlNqFpDHGCjwl0vbh1Wn3D3dag5CLxybdSM8%3D&reserved=0
>>>
>>> Cc: James Bottomley <jejb at linux.ibm.com>
>>> Cc: Min Xu <min.m.xu at intel.com>
>>> Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao at intel.com>
>>> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky at amd.com>
>>> Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen at intel.com>
>>> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore at kernel.org>
>>> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek at redhat.com>
>>> Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas at google.com>
>>>
>>> Changes since v2:
>>> * Add support for the AP creation.
>>> * Use the module-scoping override to make AmdSevDxe use the IO port for PCI reads.
>>> * Use the reserved memory type for CPUID and Secrets page.
>>> *
>>> Changes since v1:
>>> * Drop the interval tree support to detect the pre-validated overlap region.
>>> * Use an array to keep track of pre-validated regions.
>>> * Add support to query the Hypervisor feature and verify that SNP feature is supported.
>>> * Introduce MemEncryptSevClearMmioPageEncMask() to clear the C-bit from MMIO ranges.
>>> * Pull the SevSecretDxe and SevSecretPei into OVMF package build.
>>> * Extend the SevSecretDxe to expose confidential computing blob location through
>>> EFI configuration table.
>>>
>>> Brijesh Singh (21):
>>> UefiCpuPkg: Define the SEV-SNP specific dynamic PCDs
>>> OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add MemEncryptSevSnpEnabled()
>>> OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: extend the workarea to include SNP enabled
>>> field
>>> OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: extend Es Workarea to include hv features
>>> OvmfPkg: reserve Secrets page in MEMFD
>>> OvmfPkg: reserve CPUID page for the SEV-SNP guest
>>> OvmfPkg/ResetVector: validate the data pages used in SEC phase
>>> OvmfPkg/ResetVector: invalidate the GHCB page
>>> OvmfPkg: add library to support registering GHCB GPA
>>> OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: register GHCB gpa for the SEV-SNP guest
>>> UefiCpuPkg/MpLib: add support to register GHCB GPA when SEV-SNP is
>>> enabled
>>> OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe: do not use extended PCI config space
>>> OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add support to validate system RAM
>>> OvmfPkg/BaseMemEncryptSevLib: skip the pre-validated system RAM
>>> OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: add support to validate > 4GB memory in PEI
>>> phase
>>> OvmfPkg/SecMain: pre-validate the memory used for decompressing Fv
>>> OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: validate the system RAM when SNP is active
>>> OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: Change the page state in the RMP table
>>> OvmfPkg/MemEncryptSevLib: skip page state change for Mmio address
>>> OvmfPkg/AmdSev: expose the SNP reserved pages through configuration
>>> table
>>> MdePkg/GHCB: increase the GHCB protocol max version
>>>
>>> Tom Lendacky (1):
>>> UefiCpuPkg/MpInitLib: Use SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event to launch APs
>>>
>>> OvmfPkg/OvmfPkg.dec | 21 ++
>>> UefiCpuPkg/UefiCpuPkg.dec | 11 +
>>> OvmfPkg/AmdSev/AmdSevX64.dsc | 5 +-
>>> OvmfPkg/Bhyve/BhyveX64.dsc | 5 +-
>>> OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc | 2 +
>>> OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc | 7 +-
>>> OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc | 8 +-
>>> OvmfPkg/OvmfXen.dsc | 5 +-
>>> OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf | 17 +-
>>> OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretDxe/SecretDxe.inf | 4 +
>>> OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretPei/SecretPei.inf | 1 +
>>> .../DxeMemEncryptSevLib.inf | 3 +
>>> .../PeiMemEncryptSevLib.inf | 7 +
>>> .../SecMemEncryptSevLib.inf | 3 +
>>> .../GhcbRegisterLib/GhcbRegisterLib.inf | 33 +++
>>> OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/PlatformPei.inf | 5 +
>>> OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.inf | 4 +
>>> OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.inf | 3 +
>>> UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/DxeMpInitLib.inf | 4 +
>>> UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/PeiMpInitLib.inf | 4 +
>>> MdePkg/Include/Register/Amd/Ghcb.h | 2 +-
>>> .../Guid/ConfidentialComputingSecret.h | 18 ++
>>> OvmfPkg/Include/Library/GhcbRegisterLib.h | 27 ++
>>> OvmfPkg/Include/Library/MemEncryptSevLib.h | 31 +-
>>> .../X64/SnpPageStateChange.h | 31 ++
>>> .../BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/VirtualMemory.h | 19 ++
>>> UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/MpLib.h | 19 ++
>>> OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretDxe/SecretDxe.c | 22 ++
>>> OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretPei/SecretPei.c | 15 +-
>>> .../DxeMemEncryptSevLibInternal.c | 27 ++
>>> .../Ia32/MemEncryptSevLib.c | 17 ++
>>> .../PeiMemEncryptSevLibInternal.c | 27 ++
>>> .../SecMemEncryptSevLibInternal.c | 19 ++
>>> .../X64/DxeSnpSystemRamValidate.c | 40 +++
>>> .../X64/PeiDxeVirtualMemory.c | 167 ++++++++++-
>>> .../X64/PeiSnpSystemRamValidate.c | 126 ++++++++
>>> .../X64/SecSnpSystemRamValidate.c | 36 +++
>>> .../X64/SnpPageStateChangeInternal.c | 230 +++++++++++++++
>>> .../Library/GhcbRegisterLib/GhcbRegisterLib.c | 97 +++++++
>>> OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/AmdSev.c | 81 ++++++
>>> OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/MemDetect.c | 12 +
>>> OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.c | 106 +++++++
>>> UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/DxeMpLib.c | 11 +-
>>> .../MpInitLib/Ia32/SevSnpRmpAdjustInternal.c | 31 ++
>>> UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/MpLib.c | 274 ++++++++++++++++--
>>> .../MpInitLib/X64/SevSnpRmpAdjustInternal.c | 44 +++
>>> OvmfPkg/FvmainCompactScratchEnd.fdf.inc | 5 +
>>> OvmfPkg/ResetVector/Ia16/ResetVectorVtf0.asm | 23 ++
>>> OvmfPkg/ResetVector/Ia32/PageTables64.asm | 227 +++++++++++++++
>>> OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.nasmb | 6 +
>>> UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/MpEqu.inc | 1 +
>>> UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/X64/MpFuncs.nasm | 51 ++++
>>> 52 files changed, 1956 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-)
>>> create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Library/GhcbRegisterLib/GhcbRegisterLib.inf
>>> create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Include/Library/GhcbRegisterLib.h
>>> create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/SnpPageStateChange.h
>>> create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/DxeSnpSystemRamValidate.c
>>> create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/PeiSnpSystemRamValidate.c
>>> create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/SecSnpSystemRamValidate.c
>>> create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Library/BaseMemEncryptSevLib/X64/SnpPageStateChangeInternal.c
>>> create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Library/GhcbRegisterLib/GhcbRegisterLib.c
>>> create mode 100644 UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/Ia32/SevSnpRmpAdjustInternal.c
>>> create mode 100644 UefiCpuPkg/Library/MpInitLib/X64/SevSnpRmpAdjustInternal.c
>>>
>
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