[edk2-devel] [PATCH v4 0/4] SEV Live Migration support for OVMF.

Laszlo Ersek lersek at redhat.com
Wed Jun 23 16:42:42 UTC 2021


On 06/22/21 19:46, Ashish Kalra wrote:
> Hello Laszlo,
> 
> Please see my replies below :
> 
> On Tue, Jun 22, 2021 at 07:20:53PM +0200, Laszlo Ersek wrote:
>> Hi Ashish,
>>
>> (+Dave, +Paolo)
>>
>> On 06/21/21 15:56, Ashish Kalra wrote:
>>> From: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra at amd.com>
>>>
>>> By default all the SEV guest memory regions are considered encrypted,
>>> if a guest changes the encryption attribute of the page (e.g mark a
>>> page as decrypted) then notify hypervisor. Hypervisor will need to
>>> track the unencrypted pages. The information will be used during
>>> guest live migration, guest page migration and guest debugging.
>>>
>>> The patch-set adds a new SEV and SEV-ES hypercall abstraction
>>> library to support SEV Page encryption/decryption status hypercalls
>>> for SEV and SEV-ES guests.
>>>
>>> BaseMemEncryptSevLib invokes hypercalls via this new hypercall library.
>>>
>>> The patch-set detects if it is running under KVM hypervisor and then
>>> checks for SEV live migration feature support via KVM_FEATURE_CPUID,
>>> if detected setup a new UEFI enviroment variable to indicate OVMF
>>> support for SEV live migration.
>>>
>>> A branch containing these patches is available here:
>>> https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.com%2Fashkalra%2Fedk2%2Ftree%2Fsev_live_migration_v4&data=04%7C01%7Cashish.kalra%40amd.com%7Ca402470f4cba428feaac08d935a21c79%7C3dd8961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C637599792647899814%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=41Jj%2BGNUyEL43UhZgI19iwGcOJcP%2FWg94D8fTopaZxQ%3D&reserved=0
>>>
>>> Changes since v3:
>>>  - Fix all DSC files under OvmfPkg except X64 to add support for 
>>>    BaseMemEncryptLib and add NULL instance of BaseMemEncryptLib
>>>    for 32 bit platforms.
>>>  - Add the MemEncryptHypercallLib-related files to Maintainers.txt,
>>>    in section "OvmfPkg: Confidential Computing".
>>>  - Add support for the new KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE hypercall interface.
>>>  - Add patch for SEV live migration support.
>>
>> I have absolutely zero context in my mind about this work.
>>
>> By v1 / v2 / v3, are you referring to the following patch series (from December 2020):
>>
>> - [PATCH v1 0/2] SEV Page Encryption Bitmap support for OVMF.
>>   https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Flistman.redhat.com%2Farchives%2Fedk2-devel-archive%2F2020-December%2Fmsg00081.html&data=04%7C01%7Cashish.kalra%40amd.com%7Ca402470f4cba428feaac08d935a21c79%7C3dd8961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C637599792647899814%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=cVUvWe6VgjR78OAk5LXgBQiKon4Gp%2F62a2hc%2FKwoLw4%3D&reserved=0
>>
>> - [PATCH v2 0/3] SEV Page Encryption Bitmap support for OVMF.
>>   https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Flistman.redhat.com%2Farchives%2Fedk2-devel-archive%2F2020-December%2Fmsg00198.html&data=04%7C01%7Cashish.kalra%40amd.com%7Ca402470f4cba428feaac08d935a21c79%7C3dd8961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C637599792647899814%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=IXLGA2ttyxdVoC63HeCkPVNuUMH3u5Vd3U1fc6c8LQc%3D&reserved=0
>>
>> - [PATCH v3 0/3] SEV Page Encryption Bitmap support for OVMF.
>>   https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Flistman.redhat.com%2Farchives%2Fedk2-devel-archive%2F2020-December%2Fmsg00202.html&data=04%7C01%7Cashish.kalra%40amd.com%7Ca402470f4cba428feaac08d935a21c79%7C3dd8961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C637599792647899814%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=cOJBqGyM3a7xMbfhbBAh3IEm7IBJFOGu2ReQMSFJ%2BDw%3D&reserved=0
>>
> 
> Yes, actually the guest kernel API for SEV live migration was not
> decided at the time of the last patch-set submission, hence, i am now
> submitting this patch-set as the guest kernel API has been discussed and
> closed and the corresponding KVM/kernel patches have been queued now.
> 
> And therefore, this is simply not the SEV Page Encryption Bitmap support
> anymore, but the SEV live migration support which includes the guest page
> encryption status tracking.
> 
>> We certainly need a new TianoCore BZ for tracking this feature; I only found the above patch set versions because I have full text search for my complete email traffic on my laptop. Sending v4 after half a year hiatus is like sending it in the next century. :)
>>
> 
> Ok. 
> 
> As i mentioned above it took such a long time to re-submit the
> patch-set because of the guest kernel API discussions taking some
> time and getting closed.
> 
>> Anyway, where I'm particularly lost is that I (very vaguely) recall conflicting approaches from AMD and IBM on migration. Has an agreement been reached there?
>>
> 
> Yes, these are the slow SEV live migration patches. The fast migration
> support is being developed by IBM and that is a separate effort. 
> 
> As this slow live migration support has now been included in KVM, we
> will need the corresponding OVMF and QEMU support now.
> 
>> I certainly apologize for missing the context here; had someone asked me if I had seen any version of this patch set before, I would have *sworn* that I hadn't.
>>
>> I'm basically incapable of tracking this volume of development around confidential computing; sorry.
>>
>>
> 
> Please find below your reply on v3 of this patch-set :
> 
> Please include such a patch in v4 -- if Tom and Brijesh agree, I'd like to put the new lib explicitly under their reviewership.
> 
> Also, I plan to review this series (v4, at this point) only for formalities. I'd like to receive an R-b from Tom or Brijesh [*], and another from Dov or a colleague at IBM, for this series; those together should suffice for merging the library.
> 
> So, if you are fine with this approach, then probably Tom or Brijesh can
> take these patches under their reviewership and provide their R-b for
> this patch-set to be accepted and merged.

Indeed. This helps. Thanks.

I'll keep this patch set in my review queue then, for said "formalities
review".

Thanks.
Laszlo

> 
> I believe that they are anyway the maintainers for confidential computing related stuff.
> 
> Thanks,
> Ashish
> 
>>>
>>> Changes since v2:
>>>  - GHCB_BASE setup during reset-vector as decrypted is marked explicitly
>>>    in the hypervisor page encryption bitmap after setting the 
>>>    PcdSevEsIsEnabled PCD.
>>>
>>> Changes since v1:
>>>  - Mark GHCB_BASE setup during reset-vector as decrypted explicitly in
>>>    the hypervisor page encryption bitmap.
>>>  - Resending the series with correct shallow threading.
>>>
>>> Ashish Kalra (3):
>>>   OvmfPkg/MemEncryptHypercallLib: add library to support SEV hypercalls.
>>>   OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: Mark SEC GHCB page as unencrypted via hypercall
>>>   OvmfPkg/PlatformDxe: Add support for SEV live migration.
>>>
>>> Brijesh Singh (1):
>>>   OvmfPkg/BaseMemEncryptLib: Support to issue unencrypted hypercall
>>>
>>>  Maintainers.txt                               |   2 +
>>>  OvmfPkg/Include/Guid/MemEncryptLib.h          |  20 ++++
>>>  .../Include/Library/MemEncryptHypercallLib.h  |  43 +++++++
>>>  .../DxeMemEncryptSevLib.inf                   |   1 +
>>>  .../PeiMemEncryptSevLib.inf                   |   1 +
>>>  .../X64/PeiDxeVirtualMemory.c                 |  22 ++++
>>>  .../Ia32/MemEncryptHypercallLib.c             |  37 ++++++
>>>  .../MemEncryptHypercallLib.inf                |  42 +++++++
>>>  .../X64/AsmHelperStub.nasm                    |  28 +++++
>>>  .../X64/MemEncryptHypercallLib.c              | 105 +++++++++++++++++
>>>  OvmfPkg/OvmfPkg.dec                           |   1 +
>>>  OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc                       |   1 +
>>>  OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc                    |   1 +
>>>  OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc                        |   1 +
>>>  OvmfPkg/OvmfXen.dsc                           |   1 +
>>>  OvmfPkg/PlatformDxe/AmdSev.c                  | 108 ++++++++++++++++++
>>>  OvmfPkg/PlatformDxe/Platform.c                |   5 +
>>>  OvmfPkg/PlatformDxe/Platform.inf              |   2 +
>>>  OvmfPkg/PlatformDxe/PlatformConfig.h          |   5 +
>>>  OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/AmdSev.c                  |  10 ++
>>>  20 files changed, 436 insertions(+)
>>>  create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Include/Guid/MemEncryptLib.h
>>>  create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Include/Library/MemEncryptHypercallLib.h
>>>  create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Library/MemEncryptHypercallLib/Ia32/MemEncryptHypercallLib.c
>>>  create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Library/MemEncryptHypercallLib/MemEncryptHypercallLib.inf
>>>  create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Library/MemEncryptHypercallLib/X64/AsmHelperStub.nasm
>>>  create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/Library/MemEncryptHypercallLib/X64/MemEncryptHypercallLib.c
>>>  create mode 100644 OvmfPkg/PlatformDxe/AmdSev.c
>>>
>>
> 



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