[edk2-devel] [PATCH RFC v2 11/28] OvmfPkg: Reserve Secrets page in MEMFD
Dov Murik
dovmurik at linux.vnet.ibm.com
Wed May 5 06:42:45 UTC 2021
[+cc: Tobin]
Hi Brijesh,
On 30/04/2021 14:51, Brijesh Singh wrote:
> BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3275
>
> When AMD SEV is enabled in the guest VM, a hypervisor need to insert a
> secrets page.
>
> When SEV-SNP is enabled, the secrets page contains the VM platform
> communication keys. The guest BIOS and OS can use this key to communicate
> with the SEV firmware to get attesation report. See the SEV-SNP firmware
> spec for more details for the content of the secrets page.
>
> When SEV and SEV-ES is enabled, the secrets page contains the information
> provided by the guest owner after the attestation. See the SEV
> LAUNCH_SECRET command for more details.
>
> Cc: James Bottomley <jejb at linux.ibm.com>
> Cc: Min Xu <min.m.xu at intel.com>
> Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao at intel.com>
> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky at amd.com>
> Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen at intel.com>
> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore at kernel.org>
> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek at redhat.com>
> Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas at google.com>
> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh at amd.com>
> ---
> OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretPei/SecretPei.c | 16 +++++++++++++++-
> OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretPei/SecretPei.inf | 1 +
> OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc | 2 ++
> OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf | 5 +++++
> 4 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretPei/SecretPei.c b/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretPei/SecretPei.c
> index ad491515dd..92836c562c 100644
> --- a/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretPei/SecretPei.c
> +++ b/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretPei/SecretPei.c
> @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
> #include <PiPei.h>
> #include <Library/HobLib.h>
> #include <Library/PcdLib.h>
> +#include <Library/MemEncryptSevLib.h>
>
> EFI_STATUS
> EFIAPI
> @@ -15,10 +16,23 @@ InitializeSecretPei (
> IN CONST EFI_PEI_SERVICES **PeiServices
> )
> {
> + UINTN Type;
> +
> + //
> + // The secret page should be mapped encrypted by the guest OS and must not
> + // be treated as a system RAM. Mark it as ACPI NVS so that guest OS maps it
> + // encrypted.
> + //
> + if (MemEncryptSevSnpIsEnabled ()) {
> + Type = EfiACPIMemoryNVS;
> + } else {
> + Type = EfiBootServicesData;
> + }
> +
Would it make sense to always use EfiACPIMemoryNVS for the injected secret area, even for regular SEV (non-SNP)?
-Dov
> BuildMemoryAllocationHob (
> PcdGet32 (PcdSevLaunchSecretBase),
> PcdGet32 (PcdSevLaunchSecretSize),
> - EfiBootServicesData
> + Type
> );
>
> return EFI_SUCCESS;
> diff --git a/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretPei/SecretPei.inf b/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretPei/SecretPei.inf
> index 08be156c4b..9265f8adee 100644
> --- a/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretPei/SecretPei.inf
> +++ b/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretPei/SecretPei.inf
> @@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
> HobLib
> PeimEntryPoint
> PcdLib
> + MemEncryptSevLib
>
> [FixedPcd]
> gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdSevLaunchSecretBase
> diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc
> index a7d747f6b4..593c0e69f6 100644
> --- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc
> +++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc
> @@ -716,6 +716,7 @@
> OvmfPkg/SmmAccess/SmmAccessPei.inf
> !endif
> UefiCpuPkg/CpuMpPei/CpuMpPei.inf
> + OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretPei/SecretPei.inf
>
> !if $(TPM_ENABLE) == TRUE
> OvmfPkg/Tcg/Tcg2Config/Tcg2ConfigPei.inf
> @@ -965,6 +966,7 @@
> OvmfPkg/PlatformDxe/Platform.inf
> OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe/AmdSevDxe.inf
> OvmfPkg/IoMmuDxe/IoMmuDxe.inf
> + OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretDxe/SecretDxe.inf
>
> !if $(SMM_REQUIRE) == TRUE
> OvmfPkg/SmmAccess/SmmAccess2Dxe.inf
> diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf
> index d519f85328..b04175f77c 100644
> --- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf
> +++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf
> @@ -88,6 +88,9 @@ gUefiCpuPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdSevEsWorkAreaBase|gUefiCpuPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdSevE
> 0x00C000|0x001000
> gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSecGhcbBackupBase|gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSecGhcbBackupSize
>
> +0x00D000|0x001000
> +gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdSevLaunchSecretBase|gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdSevLaunchSecretSize
> +
> 0x010000|0x010000
> gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSecPeiTempRamBase|gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSecPeiTempRamSize
>
> @@ -178,6 +181,7 @@ INF OvmfPkg/Tcg/Tcg2Config/Tcg2ConfigPei.inf
> INF SecurityPkg/Tcg/TcgPei/TcgPei.inf
> INF SecurityPkg/Tcg/Tcg2Pei/Tcg2Pei.inf
> !endif
> +INF OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretPei/SecretPei.inf
>
> ################################################################################
>
> @@ -313,6 +317,7 @@ INF OvmfPkg/LinuxInitrdDynamicShellCommand/LinuxInitrdDynamicShellCommand.inf
> INF ShellPkg/Application/Shell/Shell.inf
>
> INF MdeModulePkg/Logo/LogoDxe.inf
> +INF OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretDxe/SecretDxe.inf
>
> #
> # Network modules
>
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