New README file for cipe
Benny Amorsen
benny+nospam at amorsen.dk
Sun Oct 5 15:55:57 UTC 2003
On 2003-10-05 at 09:44, Pekka Pietikainen wrote:
> Please recommend something like:
>
> [root at connecting root]# dd if=/dev/random bs=1 count=16 | xxd -ps
> 16+0 records in
> 16+0 records out
> 9a1639e5fd8674eed2b6ab31aa62fcc1
>
> so you don't have to worry about the amount entropy of ps aux
> has. I would argue that it's less than 128 bits, especially
> if generate the key on a fresh system just after rebooting.
> Too risky when talking about crypto keys in any case :-)
The quality of the key used for CIPE is probably unimportant. CIPE has
significant other weaknesses:
http://www.mit.edu:8008/bloom-picayune/crypto/14238
Personally I think CIPE should just be removed from Fedora. IPSEC is
ready, it is just a matter of integrating the tools. And IPSEC has a
chance of being reasonably secure.
(I actually use CIPE in production since it is so hard to deal with
IPSEC when the distribution lacks the necessarily tools. I only send
encrypted data over CIPE though, so I feel reasonably safe. I look
forward to migrating to IPSEC.)
/Benny
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