Keeping SELinux on (was Attention: Proprietary video driver users (ATI, Nvidia, etc.))

Ivan Gyurdiev ivg2 at cornell.edu
Fri Feb 24 12:07:28 UTC 2006


>> That was my understanding of SELinux.  You could run a crazy program
>> that has root privileges, is hackable, has no SELinux policy, and all
>> that effort was for nigh.
>>     
It goes more like:
- "I have a crazy program that has root privileges, is hackable, has no 
SELinux policy"
- "I'll write a selinux policy for it"
- "Now the program's still hackable, but at least it doesn't break 
anything else when it gets get hacked"

I'm not sure what you expect to happen - policy should write itself?

Programs without a policy run in a high privilege domain, because we 
still want those programs to work, even though nobody has written a 
policy for them. It's easy to restrict those programs to run in a low 
privilege domain. Then they wouldn't work at all, and you'd only be able 
to run confined programs - I doubt this is what you want.

Note that strict policy confines a lot more things that targeted does - 
it's meant to be used in a locked-down environment.
(Unfortunately it seems broken at the moment, but I'm sure most of it 
will be fixed by FC5).




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