Directory structures in the future and other things I want.

[Jeff Spaleta]

2008/3/27 Jesse Keating <jkeating at redhat.com>:

>
> Again, this argument is bunk.  If they're not supposed to be ran by
> normal users, hiding them behind a path is no form of security.  One can
> just run the full path to it.  If they're not supposed to be ran by
> users, they should have correct permissions on them, or they should
> check EUID of the caller before doing anything.
>


The question is, do we have programs down the sbins that make the wrong
assumption about path segregation equalling protection?  And if so, how
many?  The obvious ones to me that need scrutiny are the executables that
are setuid root.  Do we need to take some extra care about those setuid'd
executables?

-jef
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