Hardening Doc Update

tuxxer tuxxer at cox.net
Fri Dec 24 17:20:40 UTC 2004


On Fri, 2004-12-24 at 09:49 -0500, Paul W. Frields wrote:
> On Thu, 2004-12-23 at 21:42 -0800, tuxxer wrote:

[...snip...]

> > 
> > I checked, and I didn't see anything DIDN'T look like you suggested.  Do
> > you have a specific part that looks "off" that you can point me to?
> 
> Yes, go to the very first one:
> 
> <screen>
> <userinput>
> yum check-update
> </userinput>
> </screen>
> 
> This should instead be formatted like this:
> 
> <screen>
> <userinput>yum check-update</userinput>
> </screen>
> 

Gotcha.  I think I misinterpreted what you said initially.

[...snip...]

> 
> I think it would be worth explaining how this works in Fedora (as
> opposed to other UNIX-family systems), so people aren't worried
> needlessly about specific security factors. But, as the point of your
> tutorial is to harden the system, you don't want to discourage people
> from being paranoid. :-)
> 
> > > 7. Also in chapter 3, you mention tripwire, et al., but don't note
> > > anything about the rpm -V function.
> > > 
> > 
> > The 'rpm -V' function has a slightly smaller scope than I was going for,
> > since you can only verify packages, AND only those that were installed
> > with rpm.  But it may be worth a bullet.  ;-)
> 
> Of course, using RPM has specific security concerns as well. If a reader
> is worried about security, they should only be installing software that
> they can trust is not compromised. Any tutorial on hardening should be
> *discouraging* people from just getting tarballs and building from them,
> *unless* those tarballs are cryptographically signed by a trusted party.
> (Note that comparing an MD5 or SHA-1 checksum isn't automatically
> helpful, unless the document providing the checksum is itself
> cryptographically signed by a trusted party.) RPMs don't automatically
> mean better security unless you trust the vendor who provides them to
> (a) check their content, and (b) certify to you they have done so. Only
> RPM packages signed by a trusted party should be installed and used.
> 
> Note also that for all these factors, "trusted party" != "the Web site
> that comes up in my Web browser."

True.  Defense in depth.  ;-)  I was trying to stay away from mentioning
installing anything from source (tarball) as it would stray away from
the core install.  But everyone installs "other" software, so it's a
good point to mention.

[...snip...]

> > 
> > > Just some thoughts....
> > 
> > And they are ALWAYS appreciated! I never claim to be the pentultimate
> > source on linux or linux security, and I'm learning more and more every
> > day.  There is a learning curve with this documentation method, and
> > insight from those that have been here a while is always valuable.
> 
> FC3 is SELinux-enabled. Wait! I hear Karsten's footsteps outside the
> door. Hide! QUICK!  :-D
> 
> Thanks for your continued hard work, it's much appreciated!

Thanks.  Should have some more updates soon.

> 
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-- 
-tuxxer

gpg:  57EB F948 76AE 25BC E340  EFA9 FAF6 E1AC F1E1 1EA1
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