rpms/volume_key/devel cryptsetup-svn-r62.patch, NONE, 1.1 volume_key.spec, NONE, 1.1 .cvsignore, 1.1, 1.2 sources, 1.1, 1.2
Miloslav Trmac
mitr at fedoraproject.org
Thu Jul 23 23:16:05 UTC 2009
Author: mitr
Update of /cvs/pkgs/rpms/volume_key/devel
In directory cvs1.fedora.phx.redhat.com:/tmp/cvs-serv4053
Modified Files:
.cvsignore sources
Added Files:
cryptsetup-svn-r62.patch volume_key.spec
Log Message:
* Tue Jun 30 2009 Miloslav Trmač <mitr at redhat.com> - 0.2-1
- Initial build.
cryptsetup-svn-r62.patch:
lib/libcryptsetup.h | 72 +++++++++
lib/setup.c | 410 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
luks/keymanage.c | 22 +-
luks/luks.h | 2
4 files changed, 457 insertions(+), 49 deletions(-)
--- NEW FILE cryptsetup-svn-r62.patch ---
Index: lib/libcryptsetup.h
===================================================================
--- lib/libcryptsetup.h (revision 62)
+++ lib/libcryptsetup.h (working copy)
@@ -65,6 +65,78 @@
int crypt_luksFormat(struct crypt_options *options);
int crypt_luksDump(struct crypt_options *options);
+struct crypt_luks_volume_info;
+
+/* Get information about DEVICE,
+ Return 0 on sucess, setting INFO to the volume information.
+ return a negative errno value otherwise, the caller can try to use
+ crypt_get_error() to get an error message.
+ INFO can be NULL, in which case the function only verifies DEVICE is a valid
+ LUKS device.
+ If INFO is not not NULL, it should be freed using crypt_luks_vi_free().
+*/
+int crypt_luks_get_volume_info(struct crypt_luks_volume_info **info,
+ const char *device);
+
+/* Get cipher name from INFO.
+ Return a string for free(), or NULL if out of memory. */
+char *crypt_luks_vi_get_cipher_name(struct crypt_luks_volume_info *info);
+
+/* Get cipher mode from INFO.
+ Return a string for free(), or NULL if out of memory. */
+char *crypt_luks_vi_get_cipher_mode(struct crypt_luks_volume_info *info);
+
+/* Get number of master key bytes from INFO. */
+unsigned crypt_luks_vi_get_key_bytes(struct crypt_luks_volume_info *info);
+
+/* Get UUID from INFO.
+ Return a string for free(), or NULL if out of memory. */
+char *crypt_luks_vi_get_uuid(struct crypt_luks_volume_info *info);
+
+/* Free INFO. */
+void crypt_luks_vi_free(struct crypt_luks_volume_info *info);
+
+/* Get the master key of DEVICE, using PASSPHRASE with PASSPHRASE_LENGTH.
+ Return the used slot on success, setting KEY and KEY_LENGTH to the master
+ key;
+ return a negative errno value otherwise, the caller can try to use
+ crypt_get_error() to get an error message.
+ The caller is responsible for calling free(KEY) if this function returns
+ 0. */
+int crypt_luks_get_master_key(unsigned char **key, size_t *key_length,
+ const char *device,
+ const unsigned char *passphrase,
+ size_t passphrase_length,
+ void (*log)(int class, char *msg));
+
+/* Verify that KEY with KEY_LENGTH is valid for DEVICE.
+ Return 0 on success.
+ Return a negative errno value otherwise, the caller can try to use
+ crypt_get_error() to get an error message. */
+int crypt_luks_verify_master_key(const char *device, const unsigned char *key,
+ size_t key_length);
+
+/* Open DEVICE using KEY with KEY_LENGTH as NAME.
+ Return 0 on success.
+ Return a negative errno value otherwise, the caller can try to use
+ crypt_get_error() to get an error message. */
+int crypt_luks_open_by_master_key(const char *name, const char *device,
+ const unsigned char *key, size_t key_length,
+ int flags, void (*log)(int class, char *msg));
+
+/* Add a PASSPHRASE with PASSPHRASE_LENGTH to SLOT of DEVICE, using KEY with
+ KEY_LENGTH.
+ Return the used slot on success;
+ Return a negative errno value otherwise, the caller can try to use
+ crypt_get_error() to get an error message.
+ SLOT may be -1 to use the first empty slot. */
+int crypt_luks_add_passphrase_by_master_key(const char *device,
+ const unsigned char *key,
+ size_t key_length, int slot,
+ const unsigned char *passphrase,
+ size_t passphrase_length,
+ void (*log)(int class, char *msg));
+
void crypt_get_error(char *buf, size_t size);
void crypt_put_options(struct crypt_options *options);
const char *crypt_get_dir(void);
Index: lib/setup.c
===================================================================
--- lib/setup.c (revision 62)
+++ lib/setup.c (working copy)
@@ -282,7 +282,7 @@
}
}
-static int __crypt_create_device(int reload, struct setup_backend *backend,
+static int __crypt_create_device(intptr_t reload, struct setup_backend *backend,
struct crypt_options *options)
{
struct crypt_options tmp = {
@@ -359,7 +359,7 @@
return r;
}
-static int __crypt_query_device(int details, struct setup_backend *backend,
+static int __crypt_query_device(intptr_t details, struct setup_backend *backend,
struct crypt_options *options)
{
int r = backend->status(details, options, NULL);
@@ -371,7 +371,7 @@
return r;
}
-static int __crypt_resize_device(int details, struct setup_backend *backend,
+static int __crypt_resize_device(intptr_t details, struct setup_backend *backend,
struct crypt_options *options)
{
struct crypt_options tmp = {
@@ -412,7 +412,7 @@
return r;
}
-static int __crypt_remove_device(int arg, struct setup_backend *backend,
+static int __crypt_remove_device(intptr_t arg, struct setup_backend *backend,
struct crypt_options *options)
{
int r;
@@ -428,7 +428,7 @@
return backend->remove(0, options);
}
-static int __crypt_luks_format(int arg, struct setup_backend *backend, struct crypt_options *options)
+static int __crypt_luks_format(intptr_t arg, struct setup_backend *backend, struct crypt_options *options)
{
int r;
@@ -504,8 +504,94 @@
return r;
}
-static int __crypt_luks_open(int arg, struct setup_backend *backend, struct crypt_options *options)
+static int open_from_hdr_and_mk(struct luks_phdr *hdr,
+ struct luks_masterkey *mk,
+ const struct device_infos *infos,
+ struct setup_backend *backend,
+ struct crypt_options *options)
{
+ char *dmCipherSpec;
+ int excl = (options->flags & CRYPT_FLAG_NON_EXCLUSIVE_ACCESS)
+ ? 0 : O_EXCL;
+ int r;
+
+ if (infos->readonly)
+ options->flags |= CRYPT_FLAG_READONLY;
+ options->offset = hdr->payloadOffset;
+ if (asprintf(&dmCipherSpec, "%s-%s", hdr->cipherName, hdr->cipherMode)
+ < 0) {
+ r = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ options->cipher = dmCipherSpec;
+ options->key_size = mk->keyLength;
+ options->skip = 0;
+
+ options->size = infos->size;
+ if (!options->size) {
+ set_error("Not a block device.\n");
+ r = -ENOTBLK;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (options->size <= options->offset) {
+ set_error("Invalid offset");
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ options->size -= options->offset;
+ /* FIXME: code allows multiple crypt mapping, cannot use uuid then.
+ * anyway, it is dangerous and can corrupt data. Remove it in next version! */
+ r = backend->create(0, options, mk->key, excl ? hdr->uuid : NULL);
+ out:
+ free(dmCipherSpec);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int __crypt_luks_open_by_master_key(intptr_t arg,
+ struct setup_backend *backend,
+ struct crypt_options *options)
+{
+ struct luks_masterkey *mk;
+ struct luks_phdr hdr;
+ struct device_infos infos;
+ struct crypt_options tmp = {
+ .name = options->name,
+ };
+ int r;
+ int excl = (options->flags & CRYPT_FLAG_NON_EXCLUSIVE_ACCESS) != 0
+ ? 0 : O_EXCL ;
+
+ mk = (struct luks_masterkey *)arg;
+
+ r = backend->status(0, &tmp, NULL);
+ if (r >= 0) {
+ set_error("Device %s already exists.", options->name);
+ return -EEXIST;
+ }
+
+ if (!LUKS_device_ready(options->device, O_RDONLY | excl))
+ return -ENOTBLK;
+
+ if (get_device_infos(options->device, &infos) < 0) {
+ set_error("Can't get device information.\n");
+ return -ENOTBLK;
+ }
+
+ r = LUKS_read_phdr(options->device, &hdr);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ r = LUKS_verify_master_key(&hdr, mk);
+ if (r == -EPERM)
+ set_error("Master key does not match the volume.\n");
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ return open_from_hdr_and_mk(&hdr, mk, &infos, backend, options);
+}
+
+static int __crypt_luks_open(intptr_t arg, struct setup_backend *backend, struct crypt_options *options)
+{
struct luks_masterkey *mk=NULL;
struct luks_phdr hdr;
char *prompt = NULL;
@@ -515,7 +601,6 @@
struct crypt_options tmp = {
.name = options->name,
};
- char *dmCipherSpec = NULL;
int r, tries = options->tries;
int excl = (options->flags & CRYPT_FLAG_NON_EXCLUSIVE_ACCESS) ? 0 : O_EXCL ;
@@ -533,9 +618,6 @@
return -ENOTBLK;
}
- if (infos.readonly)
- options->flags |= CRYPT_FLAG_READONLY;
-
if(asprintf(&prompt, "Enter LUKS passphrase for %s: ", options->device) < 0)
return -ENOMEM;
@@ -559,33 +641,8 @@
logger(options, CRYPT_LOG_NORMAL,"key slot %d unlocked.\n", r);
+ r = open_from_hdr_and_mk(&hdr, mk, &infos, backend, options);
- options->offset = hdr.payloadOffset;
- if (asprintf(&dmCipherSpec, "%s-%s", hdr.cipherName, hdr.cipherMode) < 0) {
- r = -ENOMEM;
- goto out2;
- }
- options->cipher = dmCipherSpec;
- options->key_size = mk->keyLength;
- options->skip = 0;
-
- options->size = infos.size;
- if (!options->size) {
- set_error("Not a block device.\n");
- r = -ENOTBLK; goto out2;
- }
- if (options->size <= options->offset) {
- set_error("Invalid offset");
- r = -EINVAL; goto out2;
- }
- options->size -= options->offset;
- /* FIXME: code allows multiple crypt mapping, cannot use uuid then.
- * anyway, it is dangerous and can corrupt data. Remove it in next version! */
- r = backend->create(0, options, mk->key, excl ? hdr.uuid : NULL);
-
- out2:
- free(dmCipherSpec);
- dmCipherSpec = NULL;
out1:
safe_free(password);
out:
@@ -598,8 +655,76 @@
return r;
}
-static int __crypt_luks_add_key(int arg, struct setup_backend *backend, struct crypt_options *options)
+/* arg is a struct luks_masterkey **. Caller must LUKS_dealloc_masterkey(*arg)
+ if this function returns 0.
+ options->key_size is abused as passphrase length. */
+static int __crypt_luks_get_master_key(intptr_t arg,
+ struct setup_backend *backend,
+ struct crypt_options *options)
{
+ struct luks_masterkey *mk;
+ struct luks_phdr hdr;
+ int r;
+
+ if (!LUKS_device_ready(options->device, O_RDONLY))
+ return -ENOTBLK;
+
+ r = LUKS_open_any_key(options->device, options->passphrase,
+ options->key_size, &hdr, &mk, backend);
+ if (r == -EPERM)
+ set_error("No key available with this passphrase.");
+ if (r < 0) {
+ LUKS_dealloc_masterkey(mk);
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ *(struct luks_masterkey **)arg = mk;
+ return r;
+}
+
+/* options->key_size is abused as passphrase length. */
+static int __crypt_luks_add_passphrase_by_master_key
+ (intptr_t arg, struct setup_backend *backend,
+ struct crypt_options *options)
+{
+ struct luks_phdr hdr;
+ unsigned int keyIndex;
+ struct luks_masterkey *mk;
+ const char *device = options->device;
+ int r;
+
+ mk = (struct luks_masterkey *)arg;
+
+ if (!LUKS_device_ready(options->device, O_RDWR))
+ return -ENOTBLK;
+
+ r = LUKS_read_phdr(device, &hdr);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ r = LUKS_verify_master_key(&hdr, mk);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ set_error("Master key does not match the volume");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ keyIndex = keyslot_from_option(options->key_slot, &hdr, options);
+ if (keyIndex == -EINVAL)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ hdr.keyblock[keyIndex].passwordIterations
+ = at_least_one(LUKS_benchmarkt_iterations()
+ * ((float)options->iteration_time / 1000));
+
+ r = LUKS_set_key(device, keyIndex, options->passphrase,
+ options->key_size, &hdr, mk, backend);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+ return keyIndex;
+}
+
+static int __crypt_luks_add_key(intptr_t arg, struct setup_backend *backend, struct crypt_options *options)
+{
struct luks_masterkey *mk=NULL;
struct luks_phdr hdr;
char *password=NULL; unsigned int passwordLen;
@@ -664,7 +789,7 @@
return r;
}
-static int luks_remove_helper(int arg, struct setup_backend *backend, struct crypt_options *options, int supply_it)
+static int luks_remove_helper(intptr_t arg, struct setup_backend *backend, struct crypt_options *options, int supply_it)
{
struct luks_masterkey *mk;
struct luks_phdr hdr;
@@ -735,18 +860,18 @@
return r;
}
-static int __crypt_luks_kill_slot(int arg, struct setup_backend *backend, struct crypt_options *options) {
+static int __crypt_luks_kill_slot(intptr_t arg, struct setup_backend *backend, struct crypt_options *options) {
return luks_remove_helper(arg, backend, options, 0);
}
-static int __crypt_luks_remove_key(int arg, struct setup_backend *backend, struct crypt_options *options) {
+static int __crypt_luks_remove_key(intptr_t arg, struct setup_backend *backend, struct crypt_options *options) {
return luks_remove_helper(arg, backend, options, 1);
}
-static int crypt_job(int (*job)(int arg, struct setup_backend *backend,
+static int crypt_job(int (*job)(intptr_t arg, struct setup_backend *backend,
struct crypt_options *options),
- int arg, struct crypt_options *options)
+ intptr_t arg, struct crypt_options *options)
{
struct setup_backend *backend;
int r;
@@ -807,6 +932,96 @@
return crypt_job(__crypt_luks_format, 0, options);
}
+int crypt_luks_get_master_key(unsigned char **key, size_t *key_length,
+ const char *device,
+ const unsigned char *passphrase,
+ size_t passphrase_length,
+ void (*log)(int class, char *msg))
+{
+ struct crypt_options options;
+ struct interface_callbacks icb;
+ struct luks_masterkey *mk;
+ int r;
+
+ memset(&icb, 0, sizeof(icb));
+ icb.log = log;
+ memset(&options, 0, sizeof(options));
+ options.device = device;
+ options.icb = &icb;
+ options.passphrase = (const char *)passphrase;
+ options.key_size = passphrase_length; /* Abusing the field */
+ if (options.key_size != passphrase_length) {
+ set_error("passphrase_length too large");
+ return -EOVERFLOW;
+ }
+ r = crypt_job(__crypt_luks_get_master_key, (intptr_t)&mk, &options);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+ /* Note: this memory is not mlock()ed */
+ *key = malloc(mk->keyLength);
+ if (*key == NULL) {
+ LUKS_dealloc_masterkey(mk);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+ memcpy(*key, mk->key, mk->keyLength);
+ *key_length = mk->keyLength;
+ LUKS_dealloc_masterkey(mk);
+ return r;
+}
+
+int crypt_luks_verify_master_key(const char *device, const unsigned char *key,
+ size_t key_length)
+{
+ struct luks_masterkey *mk;
+ struct luks_phdr hdr;
+ int r;
+
+ r = LUKS_read_phdr(device, &hdr);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ mk = LUKS_alloc_masterkey(key_length);
+ if (mk == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ memcpy(mk->key, key, key_length);
+
+ r = LUKS_verify_master_key(&hdr, mk);
+ if (r == -EPERM)
+ set_error("Master key does not match the volume.\n");
+
+ LUKS_dealloc_masterkey(mk);
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+int crypt_luks_open_by_master_key(const char *name, const char *device,
+ const unsigned char *key, size_t key_length,
+ int flags, void (*log)(int class, char *msg))
+{
+ struct crypt_options options;
+ struct interface_callbacks icb;
+ struct luks_masterkey *mk;
+ int r;
+
+ memset(&icb, 0, sizeof(icb));
+ icb.log = log;
+ memset(&options, 0, sizeof(options));
+ options.name = name;
+ options.device = device;
+ options.flags = flags;
+ options.offset = 0;
+ options.icb = &icb;
+
+ mk = LUKS_alloc_masterkey(key_length);
+ if (mk == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ memcpy(mk->key, key, key_length);
+ r = crypt_job(__crypt_luks_open_by_master_key, (intptr_t)mk, &options);
+ LUKS_dealloc_masterkey(mk);
+
+ return r;
+}
+
int crypt_luksOpen(struct crypt_options *options)
{
return crypt_job(__crypt_luks_open, 0, options);
@@ -822,6 +1037,39 @@
return crypt_job(__crypt_luks_remove_key, 0, options);
}
+int crypt_luks_add_passphrase_by_master_key(const char *device,
+ const unsigned char *key,
+ size_t key_length, int slot,
+ const unsigned char *passphrase,
+ size_t passphrase_length,
+ void (*log)(int class, char *msg))
+{
+ struct crypt_options options;
+ struct interface_callbacks icb;
+ struct luks_masterkey *mk;
+ int r;
+
+ memset(&icb, 0, sizeof(icb));
+ icb.log = log;
+ memset(&options, 0, sizeof(options));
+ options.device = device;
+ options.passphrase = (const char *)passphrase;
+ options.key_size = passphrase_length; /* Abusing the field */
+ options.key_slot = slot;
+ options.iteration_time = 1000;
+ options.icb = &icb;
+
+ mk = LUKS_alloc_masterkey(key_length);
+ if (mk == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ memcpy(mk->key, key, key_length);
+ r = crypt_job(__crypt_luks_add_passphrase_by_master_key, (intptr_t)mk,
+ &options);
+ LUKS_dealloc_masterkey(mk);
+
+ return r;
+}
+
int crypt_luksAddKey(struct crypt_options *options)
{
return crypt_job(__crypt_luks_add_key, 0, options);
@@ -840,6 +1088,84 @@
return 0;
}
+struct crypt_luks_volume_info
+{
+ struct luks_phdr h;
+};
+
+int crypt_luks_get_volume_info(struct crypt_luks_volume_info **info,
+ const char *device)
+{
+ struct crypt_luks_volume_info *vi;
+ int r;
+
+ vi = malloc(sizeof(*vi));
+ if (vi == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ r = LUKS_read_phdr(device, &vi->h);
+ if (r != 0) {
+ free(vi);
+ return r;
+ }
+ if (info != NULL)
+ *info = vi;
+ else
+ free(vi);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+char *crypt_luks_vi_get_cipher_name(struct crypt_luks_volume_info *info)
+{
+ size_t field_size;
+ char *r;
+
+ field_size = sizeof(info->h.cipherName);
+ r = malloc(field_size + 1);
+ if (r != NULL) {
+ memcpy(r, info->h.cipherName, field_size);
+ r[field_size] = '\0';
+ }
+ return r;
+}
+
+char *crypt_luks_vi_get_cipher_mode(struct crypt_luks_volume_info *info)
+{
+ size_t field_size;
+ char *r;
+
+ field_size = sizeof(info->h.cipherMode);
+ r = malloc(field_size + 1);
+ if (r != NULL) {
+ memcpy(r, info->h.cipherMode, field_size);
+ r[field_size] = '\0';
+ }
+ return r;
+}
+
+unsigned crypt_luks_vi_get_key_bytes(struct crypt_luks_volume_info *info)
+{
+ return info->h.keyBytes;
+}
+
+char *crypt_luks_vi_get_uuid(struct crypt_luks_volume_info *info)
+{
+ size_t field_size;
+ char *r;
+
+ field_size = sizeof(info->h.uuid);
+ r = malloc(field_size + 1);
+ if (r != NULL) {
+ memcpy(r, info->h.uuid, field_size);
+ r[field_size] = '\0';
+ }
+ return r;
+}
+
+void crypt_luks_vi_free(struct crypt_luks_volume_info *info)
+{
+ free(info);
+}
+
int crypt_isLuks(struct crypt_options *options)
{
struct luks_phdr hdr;
Index: luks/keymanage.c
===================================================================
--- luks/keymanage.c (revision 62)
+++ luks/keymanage.c (working copy)
@@ -280,6 +280,20 @@
return r;
}
+/* Check whether a master key is invalid. */
+int LUKS_verify_master_key(const struct luks_phdr *hdr,
+ const struct luks_masterkey *mk)
+{
+ char checkHashBuf[LUKS_DIGESTSIZE];
+
+ PBKDF2_HMAC_SHA1(mk->key, mk->keyLength, hdr->mkDigestSalt,
+ LUKS_SALTSIZE, hdr->mkDigestIterations, checkHashBuf,
+ LUKS_DIGESTSIZE);
+
+ return memcmp(checkHashBuf, hdr->mkDigest, LUKS_DIGESTSIZE) == 0
+ ? 0 : -EPERM;
+}
+
/* Try to open a particular key slot,
*/
@@ -295,7 +309,6 @@
char derivedKey[hdr->keyBytes];
char *AfKey;
size_t AFEKSize;
- char checkHashBuf[LUKS_DIGESTSIZE];
int r;
if(hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].active != LUKS_KEY_ENABLED) {
@@ -329,13 +342,8 @@
r = AF_merge(AfKey,mk->key,mk->keyLength,hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].stripes);
if(r < 0) goto out;
-
- PBKDF2_HMAC_SHA1(mk->key,mk->keyLength,
- hdr->mkDigestSalt,LUKS_SALTSIZE,
- hdr->mkDigestIterations,
- checkHashBuf,LUKS_DIGESTSIZE);
- r = (memcmp(checkHashBuf,hdr->mkDigest, LUKS_DIGESTSIZE) == 0)?0:-EPERM;
+ r = LUKS_verify_master_key(hdr, mk);
out:
free(AfKey);
return r;
Index: luks/luks.h
===================================================================
--- luks/luks.h (revision 62)
+++ luks/luks.h (working copy)
@@ -124,6 +124,8 @@
struct luks_masterkey **mk,
struct setup_backend *backend);
+int LUKS_verify_master_key(const struct luks_phdr *hdr,
+ const struct luks_masterkey *mk);
int LUKS_del_key(const char *device, unsigned int keyIndex);
int LUKS_is_last_keyslot(const char *device, unsigned int keyIndex);
--- NEW FILE volume_key.spec ---
%{!?python_sitearch: %global python_sitearch %(%{__python} -c "from distutils.sysconfig import get_python_lib; print get_python_lib(1)")}
Summary: An utility for manipulating storage encryption keys and passphrases
Name: volume_key
Version: 0.2
Release: 1
License: GPLv2
Group: Applications/System
URL: https://fedorahosted.org/volume_key/
Requires: volume_key-libs = %{version}-%{release}
Source0: https://fedorahosted.org/releases/v/o/volume_key/volume_key-%{version}.tar.bz2
Source1: http://cryptsetup.googlecode.com/files/cryptsetup-1.0.7-rc1.tar.bz2
# http://code.google.com/p/cryptsetup/issues/detail?id=15
Patch0: https://fedorahosted.org/releases/v/o/volume_key/cryptsetup-svn-r62.patch
BuildRoot: %(mktemp -ud %{_tmppath}/%{name}-%{version}-%{release}-XXXXXX)
BuildRequires: gettext-devel, glib2-devel, gnupg, gpgme-devel, libblkid-devel
BuildRequires: nss-devel, python-devel
# For cryptsetup
BuildRequires: device-mapper-devel, e2fsprogs-devel, libgcrypt-devel
BuildRequires: libgpg-error-devel, libselinux-devel, libsepol-devel, popt-devel
%description
This package provides a command-line tool for manipulating storage volume
encryption keys and storing them separately from volumes.
The main goal of the software is to allow restoring access to an encrypted
hard drive if the primary user forgets the passphrase. The encryption key
back up can also be useful for extracting data after a hardware or software
failure that corrupts the header of the encrypted volume, or to access the
company data after an employee leaves abruptly.
%package devel
Summary: A library for manipulating storage encryption keys and passphrases
Group: Development/Libraries
Requires: volume_key-libs = %{version}-%{release}
%description devel
This package provides libvolume_key, a library for manipulating storage volume
encryption keys and storing them separately from volumes.
The main goal of the software is to allow restoring access to an encrypted
hard drive if the primary user forgets the passphrase. The encryption key
back up can also be useful for extracting data after a hardware or software
failure that corrupts the header of the encrypted volume, or to access the
company data after an employee leaves abruptly.
%package libs
Summary: A library for manipulating storage encryption keys and passphrases
Group: System Environment/Libraries
%description libs
This package provides libvolume_key, a library for manipulating storage volume
encryption keys and storing them separately from volumes.
The main goal of the software is to allow restoring access to an encrypted
hard drive if the primary user forgets the passphrase. The encryption key
back up can also be useful for extracting data after a hardware or software
failure that corrupts the header of the encrypted volume, or to access the
company data after an employee leaves abruptly.
%package -n python-volume_key
Summary: Python bindings for libvolume_key
Group: System Environment/Libraries
Requires: volume_key-libs = %{version}-%{release}
%description -n python-volume_key
This package provides Python bindings for libvolume_key, a library for
manipulating storage volume encryption keys and storing them separately from
volumes.
The main goal of the software is to allow restoring access to an encrypted
hard drive if the primary user forgets the passphrase. The encryption key
back up can also be useful for extracting data after a hardware or software
failure that corrupts the header of the encrypted volume, or to access the
company data after an employee leaves abruptly.
volume_key currently supports only the LUKS volume encryption format. Support
for other formats is possible, some formats are planned for future releases.
%prep
%setup -q -a 1
pushd cryptsetup-1.0.7-rc1
%patch0 -p0 -b .cs-vk
popd
%build
cryptsetup_root=$(pwd)/cryptsetup-root
pushd cryptsetup-1.0.7-rc1
%configure --enable-static --disable-shared --with-pic
make %{?_smp_mflags}
make install "DESTDIR=$cryptsetup_root" INSTALL='install -p'
popd
%configure "CPPFLAGS=-I$cryptsetup_root"%{_includedir} \
"LDFLAGS=-L$cryptsetup_root"%{_libdir} --disable-static
make %{?_smp_mflags}
%install
rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT
make install DESTDIR=$RPM_BUILD_ROOT
%find_lang volume_key
%clean
rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT
%post libs -p /sbin/ldconfig
%postun libs -p /sbin/ldconfig
%files
%defattr(-,root,root,-)
%doc README
%{_bindir}/volume_key
%{_mandir}/man8/volume_key.8*
%files devel
%defattr(-,root,root,-)
%{_includedir}/volume_key
%exclude %{_libdir}/libvolume_key.la
%{_libdir}/libvolume_key.so
%files libs -f volume_key.lang
%defattr(-,root,root,-)
%doc AUTHORS COPYING ChangeLog NEWS
%{_libdir}/libvolume_key.so.*
%files -n python-volume_key
%defattr(-,root,root,-)
%exclude %{python_sitearch}/_volume_key.la
%{python_sitearch}/_volume_key.so
%{python_sitearch}/volume_key.py*
%changelog
* Tue Jun 30 2009 Miloslav Trmač <mitr at redhat.com> - 0.2-1
- Initial build.
Index: .cvsignore
===================================================================
RCS file: /cvs/pkgs/rpms/volume_key/devel/.cvsignore,v
retrieving revision 1.1
retrieving revision 1.2
diff -u -p -r1.1 -r1.2
--- .cvsignore 21 Jul 2009 15:25:18 -0000 1.1
+++ .cvsignore 23 Jul 2009 23:16:04 -0000 1.2
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+volume_key-0.2.tar.bz2
+cryptsetup-1.0.7-rc1.tar.bz2
Index: sources
===================================================================
RCS file: /cvs/pkgs/rpms/volume_key/devel/sources,v
retrieving revision 1.1
retrieving revision 1.2
diff -u -p -r1.1 -r1.2
--- sources 21 Jul 2009 15:25:19 -0000 1.1
+++ sources 23 Jul 2009 23:16:05 -0000 1.2
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+882ec96bef41962a33a24d6ee5821a29 volume_key-0.2.tar.bz2
+0910632173fb960252412bf7342b42fc cryptsetup-1.0.7-rc1.tar.bz2
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