rpms/kernel/F-11 personality-fix-per_clear_on_setid.patch, NONE, 1.1.2.1 security-use-mmap_min_addr-indepedently-of-security-models.patch, NONE, 1.1.2.1 config-generic, 1.286, 1.286.2.1 kernel.spec, 1.1679.2.1, 1.1679.2.2

Wed Jul 29 17:08:18 UTC 2009

Author: cebbert

Update of /cvs/pkgs/rpms/kernel/F-11
In directory cvs1.fedora.phx.redhat.com:/tmp/cvs-serv1497

Modified Files:
      Tag: private-fedora-11-2_6_29_6
	config-generic kernel.spec 
Added Files:
      Tag: private-fedora-11-2_6_29_6
	personality-fix-per_clear_on_setid.patch 
	security-use-mmap_min_addr-indepedently-of-security-models.patch 
Log Message:
Fix mmap_min_addr security bugs (CVE-2009-1895)

personality-fix-per_clear_on_setid.patch:
 personality.h |    5 ++++-
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- NEW FILE personality-fix-per_clear_on_setid.patch ---
>From f9fabcb58a6d26d6efde842d1703ac7cfa9427b6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Julien Tinnes <jt at cr0.org>
Date: Fri, 26 Jun 2009 20:27:40 +0200
Subject: personality: fix PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID (CVE-2009-1895)

From: Julien Tinnes <jt at cr0.org>

commit f9fabcb58a6d26d6efde842d1703ac7cfa9427b6 upstream.

We have found that the current PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID mask on Linux doesn't
include neither ADDR_COMPAT_LAYOUT, nor MMAP_PAGE_ZERO.

The current mask is READ_IMPLIES_EXEC|ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE.

We believe it is important to add MMAP_PAGE_ZERO, because by using this
personality it is possible to have the first page mapped inside a
process running as setuid root.  This could be used in those scenarios:

 - Exploiting a NULL pointer dereference issue in a setuid root binary
 - Bypassing the mmap_min_addr restrictions of the Linux kernel: by
   running a setuid binary that would drop privileges before giving us
   control back (for instance by loading a user-supplied library), we
   could get the first page mapped in a process we control.  By further
   using mremap and mprotect on this mapping, we can then completely
   bypass the mmap_min_addr restrictions.

Less importantly, we believe ADDR_COMPAT_LAYOUT should also be added
since on x86 32bits it will in practice disable most of the address
space layout randomization (only the stack will remain randomized).

Signed-off-by: Julien Tinnes <jt at cr0.org>
Signed-off-by: Tavis Ormandy <taviso at sdf.lonestar.org>
Acked-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch at infradead.org>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees at ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Eugene Teo <eugene at redhat.com>
[ Shortened lines and fixed whitespace as per Christophs' suggestion ]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds at linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh at suse.de>

---
 include/linux/personality.h |    5 ++++-
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/include/linux/personality.h
+++ b/include/linux/personality.h
@@ -40,7 +40,10 @@ enum {
  * Security-relevant compatibility flags that must be
  * cleared upon setuid or setgid exec:
  */
-#define PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID (READ_IMPLIES_EXEC|ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE)
+#define PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID (READ_IMPLIES_EXEC  | \
+			    ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE  | \
+			    ADDR_COMPAT_LAYOUT | \
+			    MMAP_PAGE_ZERO)
 
 /*
  * Personality types.

security-use-mmap_min_addr-indepedently-of-security-models.patch:
 include/linux/mm.h       |    2 --
 include/linux/security.h |    2 ++
 kernel/sysctl.c          |    2 --
 mm/Kconfig               |   18 ++++++++++++++++++
 mm/mmap.c                |    3 +++
 security/Kconfig         |   22 +---------------------
 security/security.c      |    3 ---
 7 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)

--- NEW FILE security-use-mmap_min_addr-indepedently-of-security-models.patch ---
>From e0a94c2a63f2644826069044649669b5e7ca75d3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Christoph Lameter <cl at linux-foundation.org>
Date: Wed, 3 Jun 2009 16:04:31 -0400
Subject: security: use mmap_min_addr indepedently of security models

From: Christoph Lameter <cl at linux-foundation.org>

commit e0a94c2a63f2644826069044649669b5e7ca75d3 upstream.

This patch removes the dependency of mmap_min_addr on CONFIG_SECURITY.
It also sets a default mmap_min_addr of 4096.

mmapping of addresses below 4096 will only be possible for processes
with CAP_SYS_RAWIO.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Lameter <cl at linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis at redhat.com>
Looks-ok-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds at linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris at namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh at suse.de>

---
 include/linux/mm.h       |    2 --
 include/linux/security.h |    2 ++
 kernel/sysctl.c          |    2 --
 mm/Kconfig               |   19 +++++++++++++++++++
 mm/mmap.c                |    3 +++
 security/Kconfig         |   22 +---------------------
 security/security.c      |    3 ---
 7 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)

--- a/include/linux/mm.h
+++ b/include/linux/mm.h
@@ -580,12 +580,10 @@ static inline void set_page_links(struct
  */
 static inline unsigned long round_hint_to_min(unsigned long hint)
 {
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
 	hint &= PAGE_MASK;
 	if (((void *)hint != NULL) &&
 	    (hint < mmap_min_addr))
 		return PAGE_ALIGN(mmap_min_addr);
-#endif
 	return hint;
 }
 
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -2197,6 +2197,8 @@ static inline int security_file_mmap(str
 				     unsigned long addr,
 				     unsigned long addr_only)
 {
+	if ((addr < mmap_min_addr) && !capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
+		return -EACCES;
 	return 0;
 }
 
--- a/kernel/sysctl.c
+++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
@@ -1225,7 +1225,6 @@ static struct ctl_table vm_table[] = {
 		.strategy	= &sysctl_jiffies,
 	},
 #endif
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
 	{
 		.ctl_name	= CTL_UNNUMBERED,
 		.procname	= "mmap_min_addr",
@@ -1234,7 +1233,6 @@ static struct ctl_table vm_table[] = {
 		.mode		= 0644,
 		.proc_handler	= &proc_doulongvec_minmax,
 	},
-#endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
 	{
 		.ctl_name	= CTL_UNNUMBERED,
--- a/mm/Kconfig
+++ b/mm/Kconfig
@@ -216,3 +216,21 @@ config HAVE_MLOCKED_PAGE_BIT
 
 config MMU_NOTIFIER
 	bool
+
+config DEFAULT_MMAP_MIN_ADDR
+        int "Low address space to protect from user allocation"
+        default 4096
+        help
+	  This is the portion of low virtual memory which should be protected
+	  from userspace allocation.  Keeping a user from writing to low pages
+	  can help reduce the impact of kernel NULL pointer bugs.
+
+	  For most ia64, ppc64 and x86 users with lots of address space
+	  a value of 65536 is reasonable and should cause no problems.
+	  On arm and other archs it should not be higher than 32768.
+	  Programs which use vm86 functionality would either need additional
+	  permissions from either the LSM or the capabilities module or have
+	  this protection disabled.
+
+	  This value can be changed after boot using the
+	  /proc/sys/vm/mmap_min_addr tunable.
--- a/mm/mmap.c
+++ b/mm/mmap.c
@@ -87,6 +87,9 @@ int sysctl_overcommit_ratio = 50;	/* def
 int sysctl_max_map_count __read_mostly = DEFAULT_MAX_MAP_COUNT;
 struct percpu_counter vm_committed_as;
 
+/* amount of vm to protect from userspace access */
+unsigned long mmap_min_addr = CONFIG_DEFAULT_MMAP_MIN_ADDR;
+
 /*
  * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
  * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -110,28 +110,8 @@ config SECURITY_ROOTPLUG
 
 	  See <http://www.linuxjournal.com/article.php?sid=6279> for
 	  more information about this module.
-	  
-	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
-
-config SECURITY_DEFAULT_MMAP_MIN_ADDR
-        int "Low address space to protect from user allocation"
-        depends on SECURITY
-        default 0
-        help
-	  This is the portion of low virtual memory which should be protected
-	  from userspace allocation.  Keeping a user from writing to low pages
-	  can help reduce the impact of kernel NULL pointer bugs.
-
-	  For most ia64, ppc64 and x86 users with lots of address space
-	  a value of 65536 is reasonable and should cause no problems.
-	  On arm and other archs it should not be higher than 32768.
-	  Programs which use vm86 functionality would either need additional
-	  permissions from either the LSM or the capabilities module or have
-	  this protection disabled.
-
-	  This value can be changed after boot using the
-	  /proc/sys/vm/mmap_min_addr tunable.
 
+	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
 
 source security/selinux/Kconfig
 source security/smack/Kconfig
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -26,9 +26,6 @@ extern void security_fixup_ops(struct se
 
 struct security_operations *security_ops;	/* Initialized to NULL */
 
-/* amount of vm to protect from userspace access */
-unsigned long mmap_min_addr = CONFIG_SECURITY_DEFAULT_MMAP_MIN_ADDR;
-
 static inline int verify(struct security_operations *ops)
 {
 	/* verify the security_operations structure exists */


Index: config-generic
===================================================================
RCS file: /cvs/pkgs/rpms/kernel/F-11/config-generic,v
retrieving revision 1.286
retrieving revision 1.286.2.1
diff -u -p -r1.286 -r1.286.2.1
--- config-generic	1 Jul 2009 02:26:10 -0000	1.286
+++ config-generic	29 Jul 2009 17:08:18 -0000	1.286.2.1
@@ -3279,7 +3279,7 @@ CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE=
 CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE=1
 CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_ENABLE_SECMARK_DEFAULT=y
 CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_AVC_STATS=y
-CONFIG_SECURITY_DEFAULT_MMAP_MIN_ADDR=65536
+CONFIG_DEFAULT_MMAP_MIN_ADDR=32768
 # CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK is not set
 CONFIG_AUDIT=y
 CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL=y


Index: kernel.spec
===================================================================
RCS file: /cvs/pkgs/rpms/kernel/F-11/kernel.spec,v
retrieving revision 1.1679.2.1
retrieving revision 1.1679.2.2
diff -u -p -r1.1679.2.1 -r1.1679.2.2
--- kernel.spec	29 Jul 2009 16:48:25 -0000	1.1679.2.1
+++ kernel.spec	29 Jul 2009 17:08:18 -0000	1.1679.2.2
@@ -810,6 +810,10 @@ Patch11110: via-padlock-cryptodev-2-64bi
 Patch11120: via-padlock-fix-might-sleep.patch
 Patch11130: via-hwmon-temp-sensor.patch
 
+# CVE-2009-1895
+Patch12000: security-use-mmap_min_addr-indepedently-of-security-models.patch
+Patch12010: personality-fix-per_clear_on_setid.patch
+
 %endif
 
 BuildRoot: %{_tmppath}/kernel-%{KVERREL}-root
@@ -1516,6 +1520,10 @@ ApplyPatch linux-2.6-usb-remove-low-late
 
 ApplyPatch linux-2.6-x86-delay-tsc-barrier.patch
 
+# CVE-2009-1895
+ApplyPatch security-use-mmap_min_addr-indepedently-of-security-models.patch
+ApplyPatch personality-fix-per_clear_on_setid.patch
+
 # VIA: add 64-bit padlock support, sdmmc driver, temp sensor driver
 ApplyPatch via-centaur-merge-32-64-bit-init.patch
 ApplyPatch via-padlock-fix-might-sleep.patch
@@ -2113,7 +2121,10 @@ fi
 # and build.
 
 %changelog
-* Wed Jul 29 2009 Chuck Ebbert <cebbert at redhat.com> 2.6.29.6-218
+* Wed Jul 29 2009 Chuck Ebbert <cebbert at redhat.com> 2.6.29.6-217.2.2
+- Fix mmap_min_addr security bugs (CVE-2009-1895)
+
+* Wed Jul 29 2009 Chuck Ebbert <cebbert at redhat.com> 2.6.29.6-217.2.1
 - Fix eCryptfs overflow issues (CVE-2009-2406, CVE-2009-2407)
 
 * Thu Jul 23 2009 Kyle McMartin <kyle at redhat.com> 2.6.29.6-217


