New Key Repo Locations

Seth Vidal skvidal at
Sun Aug 31 04:06:00 UTC 2008

On Sat, 2008-08-30 at 23:53 -0400, Warren Togami wrote:
> Axel Thimm wrote:
> > 
> > Either the key is considered compromized and one needs to do the full
> > program, or it is reasonably considered safe (by a brute-force safe
> > passphrase and really assuming the passphrase has not been lost to the
> > intruder as well), in which case no steps are needed, but phasing it
> > out before the computing power gets accessible to break it (e.g. new
> > keys for F10 upwards).
> > 
> > The current program looks like a mix of assuming "safe" (so the old
> > key can be used for signing new packages, even if it just a few) and
> > assuming "compromised" needing a resiging of all content.
> It turns out that we're ahead of schedule in re-signing.  Due to bodhi 
> limitations we needed to resign all updates before pushing any new 
> updates, and that is done now.  I have to check with Jesse but I suspect 
> resigning of Everything should be done early during this upcoming week. 
>     (It might even be close to done now, I dunno.)
> The re-signing of Everything however is not blocking implementation of 
> the first stages of the plan - which includes updates going out.
> Anyhow, updates should begin flowing soon, and shortly thereafter the 
> old key is removed.  Oh, did you actually test rpm -e during %post? 
> According to skvidal it doesn't work because it locks the transaction. 
> Jeremy thinks the only assured way we can remove the old key is with a 
> hardcoded hack in rpm that will be removed in F10 rpm.

I tested rpm -e during %post on two f9 systems, It locked the rpmdb


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