FAS and public Key auth

Till Maas opensource at till.name
Thu May 22 20:28:35 UTC 2008

On Thu May 22 2008, Mike McGrath wrote:

> So what you're saying is it is impossible to do a man in the middle attack
> with OpenSSH (assuming the host keys of the server haven't been
> compromised) ?

I am saying that the information an attackers gets when a user logs in with 
public-key authentication to a server under the attackers control is not 
enough to allow the attacker to login into another machine the user can login 

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