SElinux

[Robert Nichols]

Craig White wrote:
> On Mon, 2006-04-03 at 09:21 +0200, Eugen Leitl wrote:
> 
>>On Sun, Apr 02, 2006 at 08:08:42PM -0300, Jacques B. wrote:
> 
> 
>>SELinux has no business running on a user desktop (=kitchensink) 
>>if the policy is not well maintained. Things like RSBAC/grsecurity/SELinux+PaX
>>can be useful on a server.
> 
> ----
> if Windows exploits are any indication, it is primarily desktop systems
> which are the target for malware that infects the system for nefarious
> purposes. Why? Because the users are often not knowledgeable, run with
> elevated privileges, travel to web sites that attempt every conceivable
> exploit in a plethora of scripting languages, etc.
> 
> The policy updates from Fedora have been frequent and are automatically
> installed/applied

True, and they might even be workable on a system that is set up
with 100% standard file system structure and users whose interaction
with the OS is limited to clicking on icons.  Add a separate
filesystem for large downloaded files or have a user that uses the
(gasp!) command line to do bizarre things like redirect the output
from ping onto a file in his home directory and SELinux starts
blocking you at every turn unless you can spend the time to become
an SELinux guru and figure out what needs to be tweaked in the
policy or attributes to fix things _this_ time, and try to guess
how badly that change will break when tomorrow's policy update gets
installed.

I'm sure SELinux can be great on a server where a well defined set
of operations are performed over and over, but trying to write a
security policy that can accommodate the huge variety of things
that can be legitimately expected to be done on a desktop system
looks like a task doomed to failure.

-- 
Bob Nichols         Yes, "NOSPAM" is really part of my email address.