Thank you, unknown genius!

Les Mikesell lesmikesell at gmail.com
Sat Apr 12 23:09:41 UTC 2008


Rahul Sundaram wrote:
> 
>>>>> Bruno is noting that the current methods of exploitation tend to be 
>>>>> web
>>>>> pages, flash, java, media files and a firewall isn't going to be of 
>>>>> much
>>>>> help with this type of intrusion but selinux clearly could be a 
>>>>> layer of
>>>>> use here.
>>>> Does it actually prevent browser plugins from doing things that the 
>>>> running user can't do in the default configuration?
>>>
>>> Yes.
>>
>> I thought plugins ran as libraries within the same process. SELinux 
>> can prevent them from loading which isn't particularly useful. How can 
>> it control separately what a plugin can do without breaking the 
>> browser's  own ability to it?
> 
> I already gave you the link earlier. Nspluginwrapper is installed by 
> default which can run plugins in a separate memory address making it 
> possible to confine it by policy. If a flash plugin tries to access 
> files under .ssh for example, SELinux policy can prevent that as a 
> obvious violation.

That hasn't been released yet has it?  Are there policies that actually 
do something useful that are known not to break anything?

-- 
   Les Mikesell
    lesmikesell at gmail.com




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