DNS Attacks

Mikkel L. Ellertson mikkel at infinity-ltd.com
Sat Jul 26 13:00:31 UTC 2008

Björn Persson wrote:
> Les Mikesell wrote:
>> You aren't paranoid enough.  What if the spoofer is also a system
>> administrator at the bank with access to a copy of the real certificate
>> that he installs on the machine he's tricked your dns into reaching -
>> with the expected name that you'll still see.
> Then the bank has failed to protect its secret key. I expect banks to have 
> rigorous security routines to control who can access sensitive systems, and 
> to be able to check afterwards who did what.
> Could you elaborate on how whois guards against malicious system 
> administrators? Do you think security could be improved by having browsers 
> and other programs make whois queries automatically?
> Björn Persson
Also, if it is the a system administrator at the bank, what is to 
prevent him from just changing the real name servers? Or putting in 
a program on the bank's web server to capture the username and 
password when you enter them? Lets face it, if a bank employee wants 
to embezzle money from the bank, there is not much we as costumers 
can do about it.


   Do not meddle in the affairs of dragons,
for thou art crunchy and taste good with Ketchup!

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