Sudo from scripts

[Jerry Feldman]

On 11/18/2008 11:25 AM, Gordon Messmer wrote:
> Mikkel L. Ellertson wrote:
>> Patrick O'Callaghan wrote:
>>> In any case, the owner of the script is only security-relevant in two
>>> cases: 1) if it allows someone to edit the script who normally 
>>> couldn't,
>>> or 2) if the script is setuid. Of course it could also change who can
>>> *execute* the script, but if it's not setuid they'll be doing it as
>>> themselves, not as the owner.
>>>
>> Does setuid work on scrips? I know it did not in the past, but I
>> have not checked to see if that has changed.
>
> No, it doesn't, and it never will.  Making "root" a script's owner is 
> not a "security issue".
>
I don't know if it ever did on Linux, but at one time you could have 
setuid and setgid on scripts. I've never investigated that since because 
it is a bad thing to do..

-- 
Jerry Feldman <gaf at blu.org>
Boston Linux and Unix
PGP key id: 537C5846
PGP Key fingerprint: 3D1B 8377 A3C0 A5F2 ECBB  CA3B 4607 4319 537C 5846


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