Secrecy and user trust

[Ed Greshko]

Les Mikesell wrote:
> Ed Greshko wrote:
>>
>
>>>> I think you have no concept of public/private encryption or signing.
>>>>
>>> My concept is that if I can fool you into accepting a false public
>>> key, I can sign packages with the matching false private key, and when
>>> you install the first such package it may (probably will) include evil
>>> things of some nature.
>>>
>>> Do you disagree? Or feel that if I can get you to run one evil package
>>> I can't put in a root kit, or rend personal information from your
>>> systems, or otherwise attack your system?
>>>
>>> If you feel that line of attack is not possible do tell me how your
>>> concept of encryption and signing prevents it.
>>>
>> I thought you were talking "real world" as opposed to purely
>> hypothetical.
>
> I think it is a reasonable real world assumption that some users could
> have their DNS compromised in a way that would make them pull packages
> from somewhere other than the official repositories.  Can any key
> trust scenario where they have to obtain a new key protect against
> installing modified packages? (i.e. assume that the fake key and
> packages come from the same place(s) pretending to be the official
> repositories and mirrors).
>
It would be very nice if someone would fully define what they mean by
the very vague term "fake key".

-- 
It is now 10 p.m. Do you know where Henry Kissinger is? -- Elizabeth
Carpenter