Secrecy and user trust
Les Mikesell
lesmikesell at gmail.com
Mon Sep 8 00:50:53 UTC 2008
Ed Greshko wrote:
>
>> It's not easy to fool everyone. The question is whether there is a
>> way to start from scratch so you can't fool anyone.
>>
> And, it is even less easy to "fool" the people whose networks have
> something worth stealing....
And yet it happens regularly.
> Why go through the laughingly improbably scenario of attempting to
> subvert the public/private key infrastructure with the potential need
> need to simultaneously subvert DNS infrastructure on a single target
> when there are already other much more simple attack vectors?
What's the point of having the key at all if you implicitly trust the
delivery mechanism of the RPM packages?
--
Les Mikesell
lesmikesell at gmail.com
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