Secrecy and user trust

[Patrick O'Callaghan]

On Fri, 2008-09-05 at 08:02 +0800, Ed Greshko wrote:
> Patrick O'Callaghan wrote:
> >
> > The hypothetical scenario being discussed is that you have already
> > replaced the former (good but now possibly suspect) public key with a
> > spurious new one. If that were to happen, you would be in danger of
> > accepting trojanned packages signed with this new fake key. My point is
> > that you would also *reject* packages signed with the new good key, and
> > this would be noticed very quickly (basically the next time you did an
> > update).
> >   
> That is an extremely unlikely possibility as you have to generate a key
> with the same key id (fingerprint)as the original.  Also, you have to
> determine how to trick all users in to replacing the original. 

Exactly. That's what I've been saying all along. I don't understand what
the disagreement is about, if anything.

poc