Secrecy and user trust

[Ed Greshko]

Bill Davidsen wrote:
> Ed Greshko wrote:
>> Bill Davidsen wrote:
>>
>>
>>>> If the public/private key methods employed today are as easy to
>>>> penetrate and subvert as some seem to be claiming then one has to
>>>> question why  it hasn't already been done.
>>>>
>>> It has already been proved to be possible, so discussion of how easy
>>> it is or way is irrelevant, at least to me.
>> ???  It has?  So, what was done?  Was the signing key of Fedora
>> compromised?  Was a replacement key public key generated and
>> distributed?  Were packages signed by the replacement key distributed?
>> What was "proven".
>
> What was done was to breach security to the extent that new keys are
> prudent, and in a way that may not be quantifyable. The action on the
> RHEL side indicates that a bogus ssh package may have been
> distributed. I encourage you to read the announcements and see if my
> interpretation is not correct. A new ssh package was released "just in
> case," which is good procedure.
Which may simply be good practice to keep people from asking "what if"
and to satisfy the masses. 

If RH/Fedora was to determine that nothing was compromised and that new
keys were not necessary they would have a similar problem in that some
contingent would claim RH/Fedora was lying to them.  It could be (note I
am as well informed as you are as to what actually occurred) they are
picking their poison, choosing between 2 bad choices.  Damned if they
do, damned if they don't.
>>
>>> The new public key could be distributed from the master Red Hat
>>> servers, not from mirrors, which would allow validation of the content
>>> by the validity of the SSL certificate. Once a trusted signature is
>>> available, all other packages, from mirror or torrent, could be
>>> properly validated.
>> "Could"...how?
>
> Sorry, I thought you understood how signing works. Once a user has a
> trusted "new" public key, it can be used to check the signing on any
> new packages. The current distribution has the ability to do this,
> limited by the correctness of the public key.
You have given zero details (and it has to be detailed and plausible) as
to how you go about distributing and having the key installed.  You
don't say how this "fake-trusted" key will interact with previously
signed packages. Along those lines, you've not indicated if this
"fake-trusted" key will replace or coexist with the current public key.
> Note that if your system is compromised, this isn't going to be safe,
> many things could be faking correct operation. You can go back to the
> original install media and start over depending on your evaluation of
> exposure. Since Fedora hasn't provided a date before which packages
> were known to be trusted, I can't say if any updates past the install
> media are safe, but since they are still available I assume that's the
> case.

>
>>> While this is inconvenient, it is also as secure as the original, and
>>> not readily vulnerable to attacks in the distribution, since middlemen
>>> are not involved. And once the key is out for a few days, and many
>>> users have it and can quickly compare it to any other key distributed
>>> by other means, then it can be sent out in a more convenient manner if
>>> people really feel the need to trade some security for ease of use.
>>>
>> A whole bunch of people are wringing their hands over nothing.  I
>> suppose if you want to continue doing that that is your choice. 
>
> Do you personally warrant that there is no problem, and that you will
> make good any damage if you're wrong, and that you have the resources
> to do so? Didn't think so, so it isn't nothing, it's a low probability
> risk which can be reduced by securely distributing the new public key.
I personally am losing "zero" sleep over this non issue.  I personally
don't give a darn if RH/Fedora releases a new public key or not.

-- 
Why does New Jersey have more toxic waste dumps and California have more
lawyers? New Jersey had first choice.