Core 2 SELinux installation

[Bill Rugolsky Jr.]

On Fri, Apr 30, 2004 at 10:02:32AM -0400, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> Better to have SELinux enabled
> all the time with two different policies that are appropriately tuned to
> the needs and desires of differing user communities.
 
I concur with that sentiment, and didn't mean to imply that a relaxed
policy is not desirable.  Not having to frantically rebuild a server
app the moment an exploit is discovered is reason enough to have SELinux
confining all network-facing servers.  I only wanted to highlight that
expectations need to be reset as both the default policy has been loosened,
and the relaxed policy will loosen things further.  I would hate for it
to reflect negatively on SELinux when someone exploits an FC2 default
SELinux install; the press will not make fine distinctions, and there
will be gloating from other corners.  Toward that end, I think it is
important that users understand where along the "low-medium-high"
spectrum they have set their security.

Having SELinux on by default, even with a relatively permissive policy,
will (1) ensure that the code is exercised, and (2) force developers,
packagers, etc., to think about the required logic, and address any
performance problems, so we can get to a more secure default install.

Regards,

	Bill Rugolsky