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Re: Experiences with selinux enabled targetted on Fedora Core 3



On Wednesday 20 April 2005 19:22, Richard Hally <rhally mindspring com> wrote:
> >Using dontaudit rules for such things also gives correct behavior in
> >situations where relabelling will not.  As an example there is the
> > following rule:
> >dontaudit lvm_t file_t:dir search;
> >
> >Without this rule the lvm utilities when run before /var is mounted would
> >create the /var/lock directory on the mount-point.  This is not desired
> >functionality, the machine is in single-user mode at the time (so the lack
> > of locking is not a problem) and creating directories that later get
> > hidden by mounting a file system is not desirable.
> >
> >So far no-one has provided any reasons not to use dontaudit rules.
> >Accusations of kludging don't count as a reason.
> >
> >I don't consider file_t labelling for a mount point as "mislabelling". 
> > The mount point directory is expected to be hidden, so generally only
> > mount needs to access it.
>
> I for one consider the use of "dontaudit" to be unethical but that is
> just my opinion.

Why is it unethical to make software perform correctly even when it is not 
written to?

> Think about preventing someone's software from doing what was designed
> and implemented to do. Shouldn't you at least notify the
> developer/maintainer that there is a problem with their software? That

Yes, I do that.  I don't always notify them first.  The first priority is to 
get the policy fixed, if I don't do it then someone else may do it and do it 
badly (see this thread as an example).

> seems to be the correct thing to do in the open source community.
> If there is a actual security problem shouldn't there be some
> notification of the vulnerability as a minimum? If it is not an actual
> security vulnerability but perhaps a theoretical one, a proof of concept
> is usually appropriate.

If it's a functionality issue such as creating a directory /var/lock on the 
root file system when /var is a mount point then it's not such a big deal.

> If it is a violation of some generally accepted standard, isn't a
> bugzilla the right thing to do?

Yes.  Of course there are other considerations.  Sometimes I already have some 
open bug reports and don't feel inclined to make minor bug reports when more 
serious bugs are open.

> If some action by the software is "uninteresting" shouldn't it be
> allowed absent some reason that makes it in fact "interesting"?

Searching a directory of type file_t that is an empty mount point isn't 
interesting.  If however a directory that shouldn't be accessed by the 
program in question gets type file_t through file system corruption or other 
errors then we do not want to allow such access.

> I would like to hear what others think of  this "dontaudit considered
> harmful"  idea. I understand the use of dontaudit as a temporary
> expedient but other than that it seem that there should be more done
> about the situations where it is used at least in terms of notifying the
> developers/maintainers of the software involved.

Why don't you go through the policy, remove a bunch of dontaudit rules and see 
what happens.

-- 
http://www.coker.com.au/selinux/   My NSA Security Enhanced Linux packages
http://www.coker.com.au/bonnie++/  Bonnie++ hard drive benchmark
http://www.coker.com.au/postal/    Postal SMTP/POP benchmark
http://www.coker.com.au/~russell/  My home page


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