constraining an app in targeted policy
Daniel J Walsh
dwalsh at redhat.com
Tue Dec 20 19:17:20 UTC 2005
Benjamin Youngdahl wrote:
> Stephen, thanks for your help.
> Why I thought the restricted application was running with all the
> power of an unconfined_t process is that the bentest script was:
> ps -Z
> touch /usr/bentest/touched
> touch /usr/touched
> All the commands in this file succeeded. I expected them all to fail
> (including the shell invocation itself), as I hadn't explicitly given
> any "allow"s to bentest_t. The file contexts were:
> /usr/bentest/bentest --
> The system is running in enforcing mode according to "getenforce".
> The files were correctly labeled. I was running as root, but I
> expected that wouldn't matter.
> I must be misunderstanding the fundamentals here. Any help you can
> give would be greatly appreciated.
Please show us your te file?
> On 12/20/05, *Stephen Smalley* <sds at tycho.nsa.gov
> <mailto:sds at tycho.nsa.gov>> wrote:
> On Mon, 2005-12-19 at 23:16 -0600, Benjamin Youngdahl wrote:
> > I have a question on locking down an application under the targeted
> > policy.
> > The policy module I've tried is below. I can see that the
> process has
> > the appropriate type in "ps -Z".:
> > root:system_r:bentest_t:SystemLow-SystemHigh 13127 pts/1 00:00:00
> > bentest
> > But it still appears to have all the power of "unconfined_t". I
> > to a "restorecon -RF", and the files are appropriately labeled.
> What makes you say it has all the power of unconfined_t?
> > Is it possible for an app to confine "unconfined_t", or should I be
> > switching over to the replacement for the strict policy? (I
> think it
> > is just called "mls" at this point, which is a confusing name
> > considering that targeted itself is an "mls" it seems.)
> You should be able to confine a particular application under targeted
> policy, just by putting it into its own domain, as you seem to be
> No need to switch to strict policy for that. MLS has a specific
> meaning, not relevant here.
> Stephen Smalley
> National Security Agency
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> fedora-selinux-list at redhat.com
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