load_policy in chroot question
russell at coker.com.au
Mon Feb 21 14:33:10 UTC 2005
On Tuesday 22 February 2005 00:54, Alexandre Oliva <aoliva at redhat.com> wrote:
> On Feb 19, 2005, Russell Coker <russell at coker.com.au> wrote:
> > SE Linux controls all aspects of system security, including global
> > thing such as mounting file systems and directly writing to block
> > devices. If the chroot had a local policy as you suggest then which
> > policy would control writing to the device node for the boot device?
> Err... No differently from the way the Xen solution you recommended
> would? Except, perhaps, for...
Xen is totally different to a chroot. Xen has a virtual environment which has
it's own access controls. The URL below concerns methods of limiting
interaction between Xen sessions (I don't know enough about Xen to comment on
With a chroot you might have /dev/hda1 mounted as the root file system, but
inside the chroot the /dev/hda1 device node will still exist and grant access
to the file system that's outside the chroot. I believe that Xen solves this
problem but don't know the details.
> > http://sourceforge.net/mailarchive/forum.php?thread_id=6364737&forum_id=3
> which would require presumably yet another layer of MAC configuration
> files. Which means yet another level of setting up and overlapping
> settings, not really different from one possible implementation for
> chroot policies.
True, it could be considered to be slightly similar in concept to a well
implemented chroot setup. But note that a Xen guest can't change the
resources managed by the Xen host, and a similar level of isolation is
required for a secure chroot.
http://www.coker.com.au/selinux/ My NSA Security Enhanced Linux packages
http://www.coker.com.au/bonnie++/ Bonnie++ hard drive benchmark
http://www.coker.com.au/postal/ Postal SMTP/POP benchmark
http://www.coker.com.au/~russell/ My home page
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