Desktop apps interoperability

[Tom]

On Mon, Mar 28, 2005 at 11:04:26AM -0500, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> I'm not sure I understand your intent.  There are two scenarios:
> 1) mplayer directly launched by firefox.  As the attacker already has
[...]
> 2) mplayer launched by something other than firefox, e.g. user shell,
[...]
> user of the downloaded file.  Naturally, what you really want there is a
> trusted path mechanism.

Hmm.
I think you are right. I did forget about programs launching other
programs. On the other hand, doesn't that give us another option within
SELinux? Can't we make mplayer-launched-by-firefox run in a different
domain than mplayer-run-by-user? In that domain, it would have access
to the downloaded files, but not to the remainder of the user data.


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