Auditd & Strict Policy 1.19

Stephen Smalley sds at
Fri May 20 12:08:45 UTC 2005

On Fri, 2005-05-20 at 10:12 +0300, George J. Jahchan wrote:
> On a Bastilled FC3 latest kernel and with the strict SE Linux policy (1.19), if
> not in permissive mode, the auditd daemon refuses to start with the following
> error messages in /var/log/messages:
> ... Unable to set audit pid, exiting.
> ... Error sending failure mode request (Operation not permitted).
> Once the daemon starts in permissive mode, it is not a problem to revert SE
> Linux back to enforcing mode, the daemon stays up (and performs as expected).
> Have started Fedora with audit=1 kernel option and enabled the noisy events in
> SE Linux (make enableaudit & make load in the strict policy source directory),
> auditd-related denials have all been explicitly allowed in our custom.te policy
> under domains/misc. Auditd daemon still fails to start in enforcing mode, and no
> selinux denials are generated when we try to start it.
> Using the above method, we have been able to get the system to boot in enforcing
> mode and run all the programs & daemons we needed to run (with no selinux
> denials, except attempts to access shadow_t which is protected by an assertion
> in the strict policy), except for auditd.
> Any hints on how to resolve this issue?

With regard to the denial, I suspect it is due to recently introduced
(as of 2.6.11) new capability checks performed in the receive-side
kernel audit code, which unfortunately cannot generate audit messages
presently.  This will hopefully be resolved as part of some ongoing
work.  Hence, you likely need:
	allow auditd_t self:capability { audit_write audit_control };
in policy/domains/program/auditd.te, and you likely need to add those
permission definitions to policy/flask/access_vectors at the end of the
class capability definition as the FC3 policy would not have included

BTW, when using strict policy, it is always advisable to use the latest
rawhide policy (in this case, FC4/devel) in order to pick up the latest
fixes.  Also, there has been a lot of work done in FC4/devel on the
kernel audit framework, auditd, auditctl, and other userspace support
for auditing in order to prepare it for CAPP evaluation, so if you truly
want to use auditing in general (beyond just the SELinux auditing), you
may want to move to FC4.

Stephen Smalley
National Security Agency

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