[Freeipa-devel] Web SSO and securely storing the ccache

John Dennis jdennis at redhat.com
Fri Jul 10 00:32:51 UTC 2009


I think the dirsec folks should review this too, perhaps you might want 
to cc them as well.

What purpose is the sha56 hash of the session key serving? It appears to 
be only used for look-up purposes, if that's the case why not just 
lookup based on the session key?

You didn't state if this scheme would be restricted to only SSL/TLS 
sessions, if not then ...

The session key is visible in the HTML headers, correct? Doesn't that 
mean all one would need to do is sniff the session key to masquerade as 
a legitimate user and automatically be authenticated as them? (Because 
you'll look up the cached credentials under that session key and present 
them without validating there is an uncompromised association between 
the original user, the TGT, the ccache, and the currently presented 
session cookie). In which case the scheme is essentially equivalent to 
using clear text passwords with the exception the credentials will 
eventually expire.

Otherwise if the session is SSL/TLS encrypted then the primary exposure 
is reduced to brute force attacks on the session key which is probably a 
minimal risk given it's a 256 bit key which is valid only during the 
window the TGT is valid. You will have to be careful that there is no 
collision or reuse of the session key within a specified time interval 
(greater than the ticket duration).

-- 
John Dennis <jdennis at redhat.com>

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