[Freeipa-devel] [RFE] CA-less install

[Robert Relyea]

On 03/29/2013 07:40 AM, John Dennis wrote:
> On 03/29/2013 07:57 AM, Petr Viktorin wrote:
>> On 03/27/2013 04:40 PM, John Dennis wrote:
>>> On 03/27/2013 11:23 AM, Petr Viktorin wrote:
>>>> I don't want to check the subject because this RFE was prompted by 
>>>> IPA's
>>>> normal CA rejecting valid wildcart certs. Is there a reasonable way to
>>>> ask NSS if it will trust the cert?
>>>
>>> Yes. NSS provides a variety of tools to test validation.
>>>
>>> Going just on memory here, our current version of python-nss has a
>>> simple call to test validation. Sometime in the last year I added a 
>>> fair
>>> amount of new support for certificate validation including getting back
>>> diagnostic information for validation failures, however if I recall
>>> correctly the extended functionality in python-nss has not been 
>>> released
>>> yet.
>>
>> Does the new code include downloading and importing CRLs?
>
> Cert verification is a complex topic. This is further exacerbated by 
> the introduction of PKIX. My understanding is NSS had "classic" 
> verification code and later introduced PKIX. There has been an 
> evolution between classic verification and PKIX. This is outside my 
> domain of expertise. How and when CRL's are loaded in NSS is not 
> something I can give advice on, especially in an area undergoing change.
>
> I'm going to have to defer to an expert in this area, Bob Relyea, I've 
> CC'ed him on this email.
It's hard to get the context in the middle, and and John had noted, NSS 
is transitioning from the old Cert_Verify interface to the new PKIX_ code.

I'll answer the question for the traditional CERTVerify code, which is 
the only you get in SSL by default, and the one most people still use:

No, CRLs are not downloaded and imported automatically, but if you 
download and import CRL's, NSS will use them. There's an installable 
PKCS #11 module which can be configured to download and install CRLs, 
then provide them to NSS. It's call mod_revocator.

The expected revocation strategy NSS uses is OCSP, and you can turn on 
automatic OCSP fetching.

>
> Bob, to put this in context [1] the functionality in python-nss being 
> discussed is the binding of the CERT_VerifyCertificate() function, 
> something I added recently. Now the question arises as to how CRL's 
> are meant to play into the verification process. Can you please 
> explain how NSS expects this to be done? Pointers to existing 
> documentation and code examples would also be helpful.

There's a separate CERT_ImportCRL() which will import the CRL into the 
database. mod_revocator() can also be used to do the fetching for you, 
Matthew has examples on how various servers set them up (I believe the 
only NSS set up is installing the module in your secmod.db/pkcs11.txt 
with modutil.

>
> It would also be helpful to understand the PKIX roadmap and how this 
> might affect coding decisions at the API level.

the PKIX interface is available now, and is actually used by Chrome (for 
all certs) and Firefox (for ev processing). Firefox is in the process of 
moving to libpkix for everything.  There is an environment variable you 
can set (I don't remember it specifically, but I could look it up for 
you if you want) that will cause the transitional 
CERT_VerifyCertificate() interface to use the libpkix engine, but it 
keeps the old CERT_VerifyCertificate semantics (like no CRL or AIA cert 
fetching)..

With libpkix, the revocation options are quite broad and complexed. We 
really expect people would use a set of preconfigured policies, though 
libpkix API allows for quite some variance. It would take me some time 
to dig up all the descriptions, but I can if you want them.
>
> [1] Some additional context, the original motivation for exposing NSS 
> cert verification to IPA was to solve the following problem. If 
> someone wants to make the IPA CA a sub-CA (as opposed to a self-signed 
> CA) we want to validate the externally provided CA cert *before* 
> proceeding with the IPA installation. This is because if the CA cert 
> is invalid everything will hugely blow-up (because we use the CA cert 
> to sign all the certs issued in IPA, especially those used to validate 
> cooperating components/agents, if those certs do not work nothing in 
> IPA works). In addition to this narrow goal we in general want to be 
> able to perform cert verification correctly in other contexts as well 
> so the extent to which you can educate us in general on this topic 
> will be appreciated.
OK, thanks. I'd go ahead and start with CERT_VerifyCertificate() unless 
you specifically need some of the advanced libpkix features.
>
>
>


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