[Freeipa-users] Cross-Realm authentification

[Petr Spacek]

On 4.12.2014 16:58, Simo Sorce wrote:
> On Thu, 4 Dec 2014 13:22:01 +0200
> Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy at redhat.com> wrote:
> 
>> On Thu, 04 Dec 2014, Petr Spacek wrote:
>>>> And /var/log/krb5kdc.log on master.f21.test (KDC for F21.TEST) I
>>>> can see:
>>>> Dec 04 12:41:52 master.f21.test krb5kdc[1131](info): bad realm
>>>> transit path from 'admin at IPA5.TEST' to
>>>> 'host/master.f21.test at F21.TEST' via '' Dec 04 12:41:52
>>>> master.f21.test krb5kdc[1131](info): TGS_REQ (6 etypes {18 17 16
>>>> 23 25 26}) 192.168.5.109: BAD_TRANSIT: authtime 1417689777,
>>>> admin at IPA5.TEST for host/master.f21.test at F21.TEST, KDC policy
>>>> rejects request Dec 04 12:41:52 master.f21.test
>>>> krb5kdc[1131](info): bad realm transit path from 'admin at IPA5.TEST'
>>>> to 'host/master.f21.test at F21.TEST' via '' Dec 04 12:41:52
>>>> master.f21.test krb5kdc[1131](info): TGS_REQ (6 etypes {18 17 16
>>>> 23 25 26}) 192.168.5.109: BAD_TRANSIT: authtime 1417689777,
>>>> admin at IPA5.TEST for host/master.f21.test at F21.TEST, KDC policy
>>>> rejects request
>>>>
>>>> And this is correct for FreeIPA 3.3 or later because we limit
>>>> trust to those domains we defined in cn=ad,cn=trusts,$SUFFIX with
>>>> filter (objectclass=ipaNTTrustedDomain). For the rest we return
>>>> KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_ILL_CR_TKT error code which is visible as 'KDC
>>>> policy rejects request'.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> We may reconsider this check and instead of
>>>> KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_ILL_CR_TKT return KRB5_PLUGIN_NO_HANDLE to allow
>>>> fallback to krb5.conf-defined capaths but I remember we had some
>>>> issues with krb5 versions prior to 1.12 where capaths from
>>>> krb5.conf were blocking work of the DAL driver.
>>>
>>> Alexander, could you open a ticket to prevent us from forgetting
>>> about it?
>> I'm not sure yet this is valid. For FreeIPA-FreeIPA trust we'll have a
>> separate solution and it will be along the lines of existing 'ipa
>> trust-add' workflow where existing DAL driver code will work as it is.
> 
> I think we should have a way to relax this requirement, so that people
> like Andreas can play with kerberos level trusts.

I agree.

-- 
Petr^2 Spacek