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[Libguestfs] [PATCH 15/16] docs: Move security documentation to guestfs-security(1).



---
 .gitignore                |   3 +
 docs/Makefile.am          |  15 ++
 docs/guestfs-faq.pod      |   2 +-
 docs/guestfs-security.pod | 338 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 po-docs/language.mk       |   1 +
 po-docs/podfiles          |   1 +
 src/guestfs.pod           | 325 +-------------------------------------------
 7 files changed, 364 insertions(+), 321 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 docs/guestfs-security.pod

diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore
index a33a286..701b6eb 100644
--- a/.gitignore
+++ b/.gitignore
@@ -136,6 +136,7 @@ Makefile.in
 /docs/guestfs-performance.1
 /docs/guestfs-recipes.1
 /docs/guestfs-release-notes.1
+/docs/guestfs-security.1
 /docs/guestfs-testing.1
 /docs/stamp-guestfs-faq.pod
 /docs/stamp-guestfs-hacking.pod
@@ -143,6 +144,7 @@ Makefile.in
 /docs/stamp-guestfs-performance.pod
 /docs/stamp-guestfs-recipes.pod
 /docs/stamp-guestfs-release-notes.pod
+/docs/stamp-guestfs-security.pod
 /docs/stamp-guestfs-testing.pod
 /edit/stamp-virt-*.pod
 /edit/virt-edit
@@ -247,6 +249,7 @@ Makefile.in
 /html/guestfs-recipes.1.html
 /html/guestfs-release-notes.1.html
 /html/guestfs-ruby.3.html
+/html/guestfs-security.1.html
 /html/guestfs-testing.1.html
 /html/guestfsd.8.html
 /html/guestmount.1.html
diff --git a/docs/Makefile.am b/docs/Makefile.am
index 9ead4c8..2b6484a 100644
--- a/docs/Makefile.am
+++ b/docs/Makefile.am
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ EXTRA_DIST = \
 	guestfs-performance.pod \
 	guestfs-recipes.pod \
 	guestfs-release-notes.pod \
+	guestfs-security.pod \
 	guestfs-testing.pod \
 	README
 
@@ -34,6 +35,7 @@ CLEANFILES = \
 	stamp-guestfs-performance.pod \
 	stamp-guestfs-recipes.pod \
 	stamp-guestfs-release-notes.pod \
+	stamp-guestfs-security.pod \
 	stamp-guestfs-testing.pod
 
 man_MANS = \
@@ -43,6 +45,7 @@ man_MANS = \
 	guestfs-performance.1 \
 	guestfs-recipes.1 \
 	guestfs-release-notes.1 \
+	guestfs-security.1 \
 	guestfs-testing.1
 noinst_DATA = \
 	$(top_builddir)/html/guestfs-faq.1.html \
@@ -51,6 +54,7 @@ noinst_DATA = \
 	$(top_builddir)/html/guestfs-performance.1.html \
 	$(top_builddir)/html/guestfs-recipes.1.html \
 	$(top_builddir)/html/guestfs-release-notes.1.html \
+	$(top_builddir)/html/guestfs-security.1.html \
 	$(top_builddir)/html/guestfs-testing.1.html
 
 guestfs-faq.1 $(top_builddir)/html/guestfs-faq.1.html: stamp-guestfs-faq.pod
@@ -119,6 +123,17 @@ stamp-guestfs-release-notes.pod: guestfs-release-notes.pod
 	  $<
 	touch $@
 
+guestfs-security.1 $(top_builddir)/html/guestfs-security.1.html: stamp-guestfs-security.pod
+
+stamp-guestfs-security.pod: guestfs-security.pod
+	$(PODWRAPPER) \
+	  --section 1 \
+	  --man guestfs-security.1 \
+	  --html $(top_builddir)/html/guestfs-security.1.html \
+	  --license LGPLv2+ \
+	  $<
+	touch $@
+
 guestfs-testing.1 $(top_builddir)/html/guestfs-testing.1.html: stamp-guestfs-testing.pod
 
 stamp-guestfs-testing.pod: guestfs-testing.pod
diff --git a/docs/guestfs-faq.pod b/docs/guestfs-faq.pod
index 5215e92..2a80b65 100644
--- a/docs/guestfs-faq.pod
+++ b/docs/guestfs-faq.pod
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ Some virt tools have been ported to Windows.
 
 Libguestfs takes a different approach from kpartx.  kpartx needs root,
 and mounts filesystems on the host kernel (which can be insecure - see
-L<guestfs(3)/SECURITY>).  Libguestfs isolates your host kernel from
+L<guestfs-security(1)>).  Libguestfs isolates your host kernel from
 guests, is more flexible, scriptable, supports LVM, doesn't require
 root, is isolated from other processes, and cleans up after itself.
 Libguestfs is more than just file access because you can use it to
diff --git a/docs/guestfs-security.pod b/docs/guestfs-security.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d34b7b5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/guestfs-security.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,338 @@
+=head1 NAME
+
+guestfs-security - security of libguestfs
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+This manual page discusses security implications of using libguestfs,
+particularly with untrusted or malicious guests or disk images.
+
+=head2 SECURITY OF MOUNTING FILESYSTEMS
+
+You should never mount an untrusted guest filesystem directly on your
+host kernel (eg. using loopback or kpartx).
+
+When you mount a filesystem, mistakes in the kernel filesystem (VFS)
+can be escalated into exploits by attackers creating a malicious
+filesystem.  These exploits are very severe for two reasons.  Firstly
+there are very many filesystem drivers in the kernel, and many of them
+are infrequently used and not much developer attention has been paid
+to the code.  Linux userspace helps potential crackers by detecting
+the filesystem type and automatically choosing the right VFS driver,
+even if that filesystem type is unexpected.  Secondly, a kernel-level
+exploit is like a local root exploit (worse in some ways), giving
+immediate and total access to the system right down to the hardware
+level.
+
+These exploits can be present in the kernel for a very long time
+(L<https://lwn.net/Articles/538898/>).
+
+Libguestfs provides a layered approach to protecting you from
+exploits:
+
+   untrusted filesystem
+ --------------------------------------
+   appliance kernel
+ --------------------------------------
+   qemu process running as non-root
+ --------------------------------------
+   sVirt [if using libvirt + SELinux]
+ --------------------------------------
+   host kernel
+
+We run a Linux kernel inside a qemu virtual machine, usually running
+as a non-root user.  The attacker would need to write a filesystem
+which first exploited the kernel, and then exploited either qemu
+virtualization (eg. a faulty qemu driver) or the libguestfs protocol,
+and finally to be as serious as the host kernel exploit it would need
+to escalate its privileges to root.  Additionally if you use the
+libvirt back end and SELinux, sVirt is used to confine the qemu
+process.  This multi-step escalation, performed by a static piece of
+data, is thought to be extremely hard to do, although we never say
+'never' about security issues.
+
+Callers can also reduce the attack surface by forcing the filesystem
+type when mounting (use L</guestfs_mount_vfs>).
+
+=head2 GENERAL SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS
+
+Be careful with any files or data that you download from a guest (by
+"download" we mean not just the L</guestfs_download> command but any
+command that reads files, filenames, directories or anything else from
+a disk image).  An attacker could manipulate the data to fool your
+program into doing the wrong thing.  Consider cases such as:
+
+=over 4
+
+=item *
+
+the data (file etc) not being present
+
+=item *
+
+being present but empty
+
+=item *
+
+being much larger than normal
+
+=item *
+
+containing arbitrary 8 bit data
+
+=item *
+
+being in an unexpected character encoding
+
+=item *
+
+containing homoglyphs.
+
+=back
+
+=head2 PROTOCOL SECURITY
+
+The protocol is designed to be secure, being based on RFC 4506 (XDR)
+with a defined upper message size.  However a program that uses
+libguestfs must also take care - for example you can write a program
+that downloads a binary from a disk image and executes it locally, and
+no amount of protocol security will save you from the consequences.
+
+=head2 INSPECTION SECURITY
+
+Parts of the inspection API (see L</INSPECTION>) return untrusted
+strings directly from the guest, and these could contain any 8 bit
+data.  Callers should be careful to escape these before printing them
+to a structured file (for example, use HTML escaping if creating a web
+page).
+
+Guest configuration may be altered in unusual ways by the
+administrator of the virtual machine, and may not reflect reality
+(particularly for untrusted or actively malicious guests).  For
+example we parse the hostname from configuration files like
+F</etc/sysconfig/network> that we find in the guest, but the guest
+administrator can easily manipulate these files to provide the wrong
+hostname.
+
+The inspection API parses guest configuration using two external
+libraries: Augeas (Linux configuration) and hivex (Windows Registry).
+Both are designed to be robust in the face of malicious data, although
+denial of service attacks are still possible, for example with
+oversized configuration files.
+
+=head2 RUNNING UNTRUSTED GUEST COMMANDS
+
+Be very cautious about running commands from the guest.  By running a
+command in the guest, you are giving CPU time to a binary that you do
+not control, under the same user account as the library, albeit
+wrapped in qemu virtualization.  More information and alternatives can
+be found in the section L</RUNNING COMMANDS>.
+
+=head2 CVE-2010-3851
+
+L<https://bugzilla.redhat.com/642934>
+
+This security bug concerns the automatic disk format detection that
+qemu does on disk images.
+
+A raw disk image is just the raw bytes, there is no header.  Other
+disk images like qcow2 contain a special header.  Qemu deals with this
+by looking for one of the known headers, and if none is found then
+assuming the disk image must be raw.
+
+This allows a guest which has been given a raw disk image to write
+some other header.  At next boot (or when the disk image is accessed
+by libguestfs) qemu would do autodetection and think the disk image
+format was, say, qcow2 based on the header written by the guest.
+
+This in itself would not be a problem, but qcow2 offers many features,
+one of which is to allow a disk image to refer to another image
+(called the "backing disk").  It does this by placing the path to the
+backing disk into the qcow2 header.  This path is not validated and
+could point to any host file (eg. "/etc/passwd").  The backing disk is
+then exposed through "holes" in the qcow2 disk image, which of course
+is completely under the control of the attacker.
+
+In libguestfs this is rather hard to exploit except under two
+circumstances:
+
+=over 4
+
+=item 1.
+
+You have enabled the network or have opened the disk in write mode.
+
+=item 2.
+
+You are also running untrusted code from the guest (see
+L</RUNNING COMMANDS>).
+
+=back
+
+The way to avoid this is to specify the expected disk format when
+adding disks (the optional C<format> option to
+L</guestfs_add_drive_opts>).  You should always do this if the disk is
+raw format, and it's a good idea for other cases too.
+(See also L</DISK IMAGE FORMATS>).
+
+For disks added from libvirt using calls like L</guestfs_add_domain>,
+the format is fetched from libvirt and passed through.
+
+For libguestfs tools, use the I<--format> command line parameter as
+appropriate.
+
+=head2 CVE-2011-4127
+
+L<https://bugzilla.redhat.com/752375>
+
+This is a bug in the kernel which allowed guests to overwrite
+parts of the host's drives which they should not normally
+have access to.
+
+It is sufficient to update libguestfs to any version E<ge> 1.16 which
+contains a change that mitigates the problem.
+
+=head2 CVE-2012-2690
+
+L<https://bugzilla.redhat.com/831117>
+
+Old versions of both virt-edit and the guestfish C<edit> command
+created a new file containing the changes but did not set the
+permissions, etc of the new file to match the old one.  The result of
+this was that if you edited a security sensitive file such as
+F</etc/shadow> then it would be left world-readable after the edit.
+
+It is sufficient to update libguestfs to any version E<ge> 1.16.
+
+=head2 CVE-2013-2124
+
+L<https://bugzilla.redhat.com/968306>
+
+This security bug was a flaw in inspection where an untrusted guest
+using a specially crafted file in the guest OS could cause a
+double-free in the C library (denial of service).
+
+It is sufficient to update libguestfs to a version that is not
+vulnerable: libguestfs E<ge> 1.20.8, E<ge> 1.22.2 or E<ge> 1.23.2.
+
+=head2 CVE-2013-4419
+
+L<https://bugzilla.redhat.com/1016960>
+
+When using the L<guestfish(1)> I<--remote> or guestfish I<--listen>
+options, guestfish would create a socket in a known location
+(F</tmp/.guestfish-$UID/socket-$PID>).
+
+The location has to be a known one in order for both ends to
+communicate.  However no checking was done that the containing
+directory (F</tmp/.guestfish-$UID>) is owned by the user.  Thus
+another user could create this directory and potentially hijack
+sockets owned by another user's guestfish client or server.
+
+It is sufficient to update libguestfs to a version that is not
+vulnerable: libguestfs E<ge> 1.20.12, E<ge> 1.22.7 or E<ge> 1.24.
+
+=head2 Denial of service when inspecting disk images with corrupt btrfs volumes
+
+It was possible to crash libguestfs (and programs that use libguestfs
+as a library) by presenting a disk image containing a corrupt btrfs
+volume.
+
+This was caused by a NULL pointer dereference causing a denial of
+service, and is not thought to be exploitable any further.
+
+See commit d70ceb4cbea165c960710576efac5a5716055486 for the fix.  This
+fix is included in libguestfs stable branches S<E<ge> 1.26.0>, S<E<ge>
+1.24.6> and S<E<ge> 1.22.8>, and also in RHEL S<E<ge> 7.0>.
+Earlier versions of libguestfs are not vulnerable.
+
+=head2 CVE-2014-0191
+
+Libguestfs previously used unsafe libxml2 APIs for parsing libvirt
+XML.  These APIs defaulted to allowing network connections to be made
+when certain XML documents were presented.  Using a malformed XML
+document it was also possible to exhaust all CPU, memory or file
+descriptors on the machine.
+
+Since the libvirt XML comes from a trusted source (the libvirt daemon)
+it is not thought that this could have been exploitable.
+
+This was fixed in libguestfs E<ge> 1.27.9 and the fix was backported
+to stable versions E<ge> 1.26.2, E<ge> 1.24.9, E<ge> 1.22.10 and E<ge>
+1.20.13.
+
+=head2 Shellshock (bash CVE-2014-6271)
+
+This bash bug indirectly affects libguestfs.  For more information
+see:
+L<https://www.redhat.com/archives/libguestfs/2014-September/msg00252.html>
+
+=head2 CVE-2014-8484
+
+=head2 CVE-2014-8485
+
+These two bugs in binutils affect the GNU L<strings(1)> program, and
+thus the L</guestfs_strings> and L</guestfs_strings_e> APIs in
+libguestfs.  Running strings on an untrusted file could cause
+arbitrary code execution (confined to the libguestfs appliance).
+
+In libguestfs E<ge> 1.29.5 and E<ge> 1.28.3, libguestfs uses the
+C<strings> I<-a> option to avoid BFD parsing on the file.
+
+=head2 CVE-2015-5745
+
+L<https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1251157>
+
+This is not a vulnerability in libguestfs, but because we always give
+a virtio-serial port to each guest (since that is how guest-host
+communication happens), an escalation from the appliance to the host
+qemu process is possible.  This could affect you if:
+
+=over 4
+
+=item *
+
+your libguestfs program runs untrusted programs out of the guest
+(using L</guestfs_sh> etc), or
+
+=item *
+
+another exploit was found in (for example) kernel filesystem code that
+allowed a malformed filesystem to take over the appliance.
+
+=back
+
+If you use sVirt to confine qemu, that would thwart some attacks.
+
+=head2 Permissions of F<.ssh> and F<.ssh/authorized_keys>
+
+L<https://bugzilla.redhat.com/1260778>
+
+The tools L<virt-customize(1)>, L<virt-sysprep(1)> and
+L<virt-builder(1)> have an I<--ssh-inject> option for injecting an SSH
+key into virtual machine disk images.  They may create a F<~user/.ssh>
+directory and F<~user/.ssh/authorized_keys> file in the guest to do
+this.
+
+In libguestfs E<lt> 1.31.5 and libguestfs E<lt> 1.30.2, the new
+directory and file would get mode C<0755> and mode C<0644>
+respectively.  However these permissions (especially for
+F<~user/.ssh>) are wider than the permissions that OpenSSH uses.  In
+current libguestfs, the directory and file are created with mode
+C<0700> and mode C<0600>.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<guestfs(3)>,
+L<guestfs-internals(3)>,
+L<guestfs-release-notes(1)>,
+L<guestfs-testing(1)>,
+L<http://libguestfs.org/>.
+
+=head1 AUTHORS
+
+Richard W.M. Jones (C<rjones at redhat dot com>)
+
+=head1 COPYRIGHT
+
+Copyright (C) 2009-2015 Red Hat Inc.
diff --git a/po-docs/language.mk b/po-docs/language.mk
index 73fcacd..3d3dd6f 100644
--- a/po-docs/language.mk
+++ b/po-docs/language.mk
@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ MANPAGES = \
 	guestfs-recipes.1 \
 	guestfs-release-notes.1 \
 	guestfs-ruby.3 \
+	guestfs-security.1 \
 	guestfs-testing.1 \
 	guestfsd.8 \
 	guestmount.1 \
diff --git a/po-docs/podfiles b/po-docs/podfiles
index 611b549..df0a305 100644
--- a/po-docs/podfiles
+++ b/po-docs/podfiles
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
 ../docs/guestfs-performance.pod
 ../docs/guestfs-recipes.pod
 ../docs/guestfs-release-notes.pod
+../docs/guestfs-security.pod
 ../docs/guestfs-testing.pod
 ../edit/virt-edit.pod
 ../erlang/examples/guestfs-erlang.pod
diff --git a/src/guestfs.pod b/src/guestfs.pod
index 399396e..c492c06 100644
--- a/src/guestfs.pod
+++ b/src/guestfs.pod
@@ -44,6 +44,9 @@ L<libguestfs-test-tool(1)> and L<guestfs-testing(1)>.  To contribute
 code to libguestfs, see L<guestfs-hacking(1)>.  To find out how
 libguestfs works, see L<guestfs-internals(1)>.
 
+For security information, including CVEs affecting libguestfs, see
+L<guestfs-security(1)>.
+
 =head1 API OVERVIEW
 
 This section provides a gentler overview of the libguestfs API.  We
@@ -443,7 +446,7 @@ A secure alternative is to use libguestfs to install a "firstboot"
 script (a script which runs when the guest next boots normally), and
 to have this script run the commands you want in the normal context of
 the running guest, network security and so on.  For information about
-other security issues, see L</SECURITY>.
+other security issues, see L<guestfs-security(1)>.
 
 =back
 
@@ -1947,325 +1950,6 @@ C<qemu-img> since it cannot be parsed reliably and securely.  Also do
 not use the C<file> command since the output of that changes over
 time.
 
-=head1 SECURITY
-
-This section discusses security implications of using libguestfs,
-particularly with untrusted or malicious guests or disk images.
-
-=head2 SECURITY OF MOUNTING FILESYSTEMS
-
-You should never mount an untrusted guest filesystem directly on your
-host kernel (eg. using loopback or kpartx).
-
-When you mount a filesystem, mistakes in the kernel filesystem (VFS)
-can be escalated into exploits by attackers creating a malicious
-filesystem.  These exploits are very severe for two reasons.  Firstly
-there are very many filesystem drivers in the kernel, and many of them
-are infrequently used and not much developer attention has been paid
-to the code.  Linux userspace helps potential crackers by detecting
-the filesystem type and automatically choosing the right VFS driver,
-even if that filesystem type is unexpected.  Secondly, a kernel-level
-exploit is like a local root exploit (worse in some ways), giving
-immediate and total access to the system right down to the hardware
-level.
-
-These exploits can be present in the kernel for a very long time
-(L<https://lwn.net/Articles/538898/>).
-
-Libguestfs provides a layered approach to protecting you from
-exploits:
-
-   untrusted filesystem
- --------------------------------------
-   appliance kernel
- --------------------------------------
-   qemu process running as non-root
- --------------------------------------
-   sVirt [if using libvirt + SELinux]
- --------------------------------------
-   host kernel
-
-We run a Linux kernel inside a qemu virtual machine, usually running
-as a non-root user.  The attacker would need to write a filesystem
-which first exploited the kernel, and then exploited either qemu
-virtualization (eg. a faulty qemu driver) or the libguestfs protocol,
-and finally to be as serious as the host kernel exploit it would need
-to escalate its privileges to root.  Additionally if you use the
-libvirt back end and SELinux, sVirt is used to confine the qemu
-process.  This multi-step escalation, performed by a static piece of
-data, is thought to be extremely hard to do, although we never say
-'never' about security issues.
-
-Callers can also reduce the attack surface by forcing the filesystem
-type when mounting (use L</guestfs_mount_vfs>).
-
-=head2 GENERAL SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS
-
-Be careful with any files or data that you download from a guest (by
-"download" we mean not just the L</guestfs_download> command but any
-command that reads files, filenames, directories or anything else from
-a disk image).  An attacker could manipulate the data to fool your
-program into doing the wrong thing.  Consider cases such as:
-
-=over 4
-
-=item *
-
-the data (file etc) not being present
-
-=item *
-
-being present but empty
-
-=item *
-
-being much larger than normal
-
-=item *
-
-containing arbitrary 8 bit data
-
-=item *
-
-being in an unexpected character encoding
-
-=item *
-
-containing homoglyphs.
-
-=back
-
-=head2 PROTOCOL SECURITY
-
-The protocol is designed to be secure, being based on RFC 4506 (XDR)
-with a defined upper message size.  However a program that uses
-libguestfs must also take care - for example you can write a program
-that downloads a binary from a disk image and executes it locally, and
-no amount of protocol security will save you from the consequences.
-
-=head2 INSPECTION SECURITY
-
-Parts of the inspection API (see L</INSPECTION>) return untrusted
-strings directly from the guest, and these could contain any 8 bit
-data.  Callers should be careful to escape these before printing them
-to a structured file (for example, use HTML escaping if creating a web
-page).
-
-Guest configuration may be altered in unusual ways by the
-administrator of the virtual machine, and may not reflect reality
-(particularly for untrusted or actively malicious guests).  For
-example we parse the hostname from configuration files like
-F</etc/sysconfig/network> that we find in the guest, but the guest
-administrator can easily manipulate these files to provide the wrong
-hostname.
-
-The inspection API parses guest configuration using two external
-libraries: Augeas (Linux configuration) and hivex (Windows Registry).
-Both are designed to be robust in the face of malicious data, although
-denial of service attacks are still possible, for example with
-oversized configuration files.
-
-=head2 RUNNING UNTRUSTED GUEST COMMANDS
-
-Be very cautious about running commands from the guest.  By running a
-command in the guest, you are giving CPU time to a binary that you do
-not control, under the same user account as the library, albeit
-wrapped in qemu virtualization.  More information and alternatives can
-be found in the section L</RUNNING COMMANDS>.
-
-=head2 CVE-2010-3851
-
-L<https://bugzilla.redhat.com/642934>
-
-This security bug concerns the automatic disk format detection that
-qemu does on disk images.
-
-A raw disk image is just the raw bytes, there is no header.  Other
-disk images like qcow2 contain a special header.  Qemu deals with this
-by looking for one of the known headers, and if none is found then
-assuming the disk image must be raw.
-
-This allows a guest which has been given a raw disk image to write
-some other header.  At next boot (or when the disk image is accessed
-by libguestfs) qemu would do autodetection and think the disk image
-format was, say, qcow2 based on the header written by the guest.
-
-This in itself would not be a problem, but qcow2 offers many features,
-one of which is to allow a disk image to refer to another image
-(called the "backing disk").  It does this by placing the path to the
-backing disk into the qcow2 header.  This path is not validated and
-could point to any host file (eg. "/etc/passwd").  The backing disk is
-then exposed through "holes" in the qcow2 disk image, which of course
-is completely under the control of the attacker.
-
-In libguestfs this is rather hard to exploit except under two
-circumstances:
-
-=over 4
-
-=item 1.
-
-You have enabled the network or have opened the disk in write mode.
-
-=item 2.
-
-You are also running untrusted code from the guest (see
-L</RUNNING COMMANDS>).
-
-=back
-
-The way to avoid this is to specify the expected disk format when
-adding disks (the optional C<format> option to
-L</guestfs_add_drive_opts>).  You should always do this if the disk is
-raw format, and it's a good idea for other cases too.
-(See also L</DISK IMAGE FORMATS>).
-
-For disks added from libvirt using calls like L</guestfs_add_domain>,
-the format is fetched from libvirt and passed through.
-
-For libguestfs tools, use the I<--format> command line parameter as
-appropriate.
-
-=head2 CVE-2011-4127
-
-L<https://bugzilla.redhat.com/752375>
-
-This is a bug in the kernel which allowed guests to overwrite
-parts of the host's drives which they should not normally
-have access to.
-
-It is sufficient to update libguestfs to any version E<ge> 1.16 which
-contains a change that mitigates the problem.
-
-=head2 CVE-2012-2690
-
-L<https://bugzilla.redhat.com/831117>
-
-Old versions of both virt-edit and the guestfish C<edit> command
-created a new file containing the changes but did not set the
-permissions, etc of the new file to match the old one.  The result of
-this was that if you edited a security sensitive file such as
-F</etc/shadow> then it would be left world-readable after the edit.
-
-It is sufficient to update libguestfs to any version E<ge> 1.16.
-
-=head2 CVE-2013-2124
-
-L<https://bugzilla.redhat.com/968306>
-
-This security bug was a flaw in inspection where an untrusted guest
-using a specially crafted file in the guest OS could cause a
-double-free in the C library (denial of service).
-
-It is sufficient to update libguestfs to a version that is not
-vulnerable: libguestfs E<ge> 1.20.8, E<ge> 1.22.2 or E<ge> 1.23.2.
-
-=head2 CVE-2013-4419
-
-L<https://bugzilla.redhat.com/1016960>
-
-When using the L<guestfish(1)> I<--remote> or guestfish I<--listen>
-options, guestfish would create a socket in a known location
-(F</tmp/.guestfish-$UID/socket-$PID>).
-
-The location has to be a known one in order for both ends to
-communicate.  However no checking was done that the containing
-directory (F</tmp/.guestfish-$UID>) is owned by the user.  Thus
-another user could create this directory and potentially hijack
-sockets owned by another user's guestfish client or server.
-
-It is sufficient to update libguestfs to a version that is not
-vulnerable: libguestfs E<ge> 1.20.12, E<ge> 1.22.7 or E<ge> 1.24.
-
-=head2 Denial of service when inspecting disk images with corrupt btrfs volumes
-
-It was possible to crash libguestfs (and programs that use libguestfs
-as a library) by presenting a disk image containing a corrupt btrfs
-volume.
-
-This was caused by a NULL pointer dereference causing a denial of
-service, and is not thought to be exploitable any further.
-
-See commit d70ceb4cbea165c960710576efac5a5716055486 for the fix.  This
-fix is included in libguestfs stable branches S<E<ge> 1.26.0>, S<E<ge>
-1.24.6> and S<E<ge> 1.22.8>, and also in RHEL S<E<ge> 7.0>.
-Earlier versions of libguestfs are not vulnerable.
-
-=head2 CVE-2014-0191
-
-Libguestfs previously used unsafe libxml2 APIs for parsing libvirt
-XML.  These APIs defaulted to allowing network connections to be made
-when certain XML documents were presented.  Using a malformed XML
-document it was also possible to exhaust all CPU, memory or file
-descriptors on the machine.
-
-Since the libvirt XML comes from a trusted source (the libvirt daemon)
-it is not thought that this could have been exploitable.
-
-This was fixed in libguestfs E<ge> 1.27.9 and the fix was backported
-to stable versions E<ge> 1.26.2, E<ge> 1.24.9, E<ge> 1.22.10 and E<ge>
-1.20.13.
-
-=head2 Shellshock (bash CVE-2014-6271)
-
-This bash bug indirectly affects libguestfs.  For more information
-see:
-L<https://www.redhat.com/archives/libguestfs/2014-September/msg00252.html>
-
-=head2 CVE-2014-8484
-
-=head2 CVE-2014-8485
-
-These two bugs in binutils affect the GNU L<strings(1)> program, and
-thus the L</guestfs_strings> and L</guestfs_strings_e> APIs in
-libguestfs.  Running strings on an untrusted file could cause
-arbitrary code execution (confined to the libguestfs appliance).
-
-In libguestfs E<ge> 1.29.5 and E<ge> 1.28.3, libguestfs uses the
-C<strings> I<-a> option to avoid BFD parsing on the file.
-
-=head2 CVE-2015-5745
-
-L<https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1251157>
-
-This is not a vulnerability in libguestfs, but because we always give
-a virtio-serial port to each guest (since that is how guest-host
-communication happens), an escalation from the appliance to the host
-qemu process is possible.  This could affect you if:
-
-=over 4
-
-=item *
-
-your libguestfs program runs untrusted programs out of the guest
-(using L</guestfs_sh> etc), or
-
-=item *
-
-another exploit was found in (for example) kernel filesystem code that
-allowed a malformed filesystem to take over the appliance.
-
-=back
-
-If you use sVirt to confine qemu, that would thwart some attacks.
-
-=head2 Permissions of F<.ssh> and F<.ssh/authorized_keys>
-
-L<https://bugzilla.redhat.com/1260778>
-
-The tools L<virt-customize(1)>, L<virt-sysprep(1)> and
-L<virt-builder(1)> have an I<--ssh-inject> option for injecting an SSH
-key into virtual machine disk images.  They may create a F<~user/.ssh>
-directory and F<~user/.ssh/authorized_keys> file in the guest to do
-this.
-
-In libguestfs E<lt> 1.31.5 and libguestfs E<lt> 1.30.2, the new
-directory and file would get mode C<0755> and mode C<0644>
-respectively.  However these permissions (especially for
-F<~user/.ssh>) are wider than the permissions that OpenSSH uses.  In
-current libguestfs, the directory and file are created with mode
-C<0700> and mode C<0600>.
-
 =head1 CONNECTION MANAGEMENT
 
 =head2 guestfs_h *
@@ -3815,6 +3499,7 @@ L<guestfs-hacking(1)>,
 L<guestfs-internals(1)>,
 L<guestfs-performance(1)>,
 L<guestfs-release-notes(1)>,
+L<guestfs-security(1)>,
 L<guestfs-testing(1)>,
 L<libguestfs-test-tool(1)>,
 L<libguestfs-make-fixed-appliance(1)>,
-- 
2.5.0


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