[libvirt] [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v4] Add support for fd: protocol

[Anthony Liguori]

On 08/22/2011 01:22 PM, Daniel P. Berrange wrote:
> On Mon, Aug 22, 2011 at 12:25:25PM -0500, Anthony Liguori wrote:
>> On 08/22/2011 11:50 AM, Daniel P. Berrange wrote:
>>> On Mon, Aug 22, 2011 at 11:29:12AM -0500, Anthony Liguori wrote:
>>>> I don't think it makes sense to have qemu-fe do dynamic labelling.
>>>> You certainly could avoid the fd passing by having qemu-fe do the
>>>> open though and just let qemu-fe run without the restricted security
>>>> context.
>>>
>>> qemu-fe would also not be entirely simple,
>>
>> Indeed.
>>
>>> because it will need to act
>>> as a proxy for the monitor, in order to make hotplug work. ie the mgmt
>>> app would be sending 'drive_add file:/foo/bar' to qemu-fe, which would
>>> then have to open the file and send 'drive_add fd:NN' onto the real QEMU,
>>> and then pass the results on back.
>>>
>>> In addition qemu-fe would still have to be under some kind of restricted
>>> security context for it to be acceptable. This is going to want to be as
>>> locked down as possible.
>>
>> I think there's got to be some give and take here.
>>
>> It should at least be as locked down as libvirtd.  From a security
>> point of view, we should be able to agree that we want libvirtd to
>> be as locked down as possible.
>>
>> But there shouldn't be a hard requirement to lock down qemu-fe more
>> than libvirtd.  Instead, the requirement should be for qemu-fe to be
>> as/more vigilant in not trusting qemu-system-x86_64 as libvirtd is.
>>
>> The fundamental problem here, is that there is some logic in
>> libvirtd that rightly belongs in QEMU.  In order to preserve the
>> security model, that means that we're going to have to take a
>> subsection of QEMU and trust it more.
>
> Well we have a process that makes security decisions, and a process
> which applies those security decisions and a process which is confined
> by those decisions. Currently libvirtd makes&  applies the decisions,
> and qemu is confined. A qemu-fe model would mean that libvirt is making
> the decisions, but is then relying on qemu-fe to apply them. IMHO that
> split is undesirable, but that's besides the point, since this is not
> a decision that needs to be made now.
>
> 'qemu-fe' needs to have a way to communicate with the confined process
> ('qemu-system-XXX') to supply it the resources (file FDs) it needs to
> access. The requirements of such a comms channel for qemu-fe are going
> to be the same as those needed by libvirtd talking to QEMU today, or
> indeed by any process that is applying security decisions to QEMU.

But the fundamental difference is that libvirtd uses what's ostensible a 
public, supported interface.  That means when we add things like this, 
we're stuck supporting it for general use cases.

It's much more palatable to do these things using a private interface 
such that we can change these things down the road without worrying 
about compatibility with third-party tools.

Regards,

Anthony Liguori