[libvirt] [PATCH] conf: Catch memory size overflow earlier

[Peter Krempa]

On Wed, May 20, 2015 at 14:20:04 +0200, Michal Privoznik wrote:
> On 19.05.2015 17:05, Peter Krempa wrote:
> > virDomainParseMemory parses the size and then rounds up while converting
> > it to kibibytes. Since the number is limit-checked before the rounding
> > it's possible to use a number that would be correctly parsed the first
> > time, but not the second time. For numbers not limited to 32 bit systems
> > the magic is 9223372036854775807 bytes. That number then can't be parsed
> > back in kibibytes.
> > 
> > To solve the issue add a second overflow check for the few values that
> > would cause the problem. Since virDomainParseMemory is used in config
> > parsing, this avoids vanishing VMs.
> > 
> > Resolves: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1221504


> 
> ACK
> 

Pushed; Thanks.

Peter
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