[libvirt] [PATCH v4 5/7] qemu: Add secinfo for hotplug virtio disk

[John Ferlan]

Commit id 'a1344f70a' added AES secret processing for RBD when starting
up a guest. As such, when the hotplug code calls qemuDomainSecretDiskPrepare
an AES secret could be added to the disk about to be hotplugged. If an AES
secret was added, then the hotplug code would need to generate the secret
object because qemuBuildDriveStr would add the "password-secret=" to the
returned 'driveStr' rather than the base64 encoded password.

Signed-off-by: John Ferlan <jferlan at redhat.com>
---
 src/qemu/qemu_hotplug.c | 53 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 50 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_hotplug.c b/src/qemu/qemu_hotplug.c
index 093aaf9..004d6e3 100644
--- a/src/qemu/qemu_hotplug.c
+++ b/src/qemu/qemu_hotplug.c
@@ -303,13 +303,16 @@ qemuDomainAttachVirtioDiskDevice(virConnectPtr conn,
 {
     int ret = -1;
     qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv = vm->privateData;
-    virErrorPtr orig_err;
+    virErrorPtr orig_err = NULL;
     char *devstr = NULL;
     char *drivestr = NULL;
     char *drivealias = NULL;
     bool releaseaddr = false;
     virQEMUDriverConfigPtr cfg = virQEMUDriverGetConfig(driver);
     const char *src = virDomainDiskGetSource(disk);
+    virJSONValuePtr secobjProps = NULL;
+    qemuDomainDiskPrivatePtr diskPriv;
+    qemuDomainSecretInfoPtr secinfo;
 
     if (!disk->info.type) {
         if (qemuDomainMachineIsS390CCW(vm->def) &&
@@ -342,6 +345,13 @@ qemuDomainAttachVirtioDiskDevice(virConnectPtr conn,
     if (qemuDomainSecretDiskPrepare(conn, priv, disk) < 0)
         goto error;
 
+    diskPriv = QEMU_DOMAIN_DISK_PRIVATE(disk);
+    secinfo = diskPriv->secinfo;
+    if (secinfo && secinfo->type == VIR_DOMAIN_SECRET_INFO_TYPE_AES) {
+        if (qemuBuildSecretInfoProps(secinfo, &secobjProps) < 0)
+            goto error;
+    }
+
     if (!(drivestr = qemuBuildDriveStr(disk, false, priv->qemuCaps)))
         goto error;
 
@@ -354,9 +364,13 @@ qemuDomainAttachVirtioDiskDevice(virConnectPtr conn,
     if (VIR_REALLOC_N(vm->def->disks, vm->def->ndisks+1) < 0)
         goto error;
 
-    /* Attach the device - 2 step process */
     qemuDomainObjEnterMonitor(driver, vm);
 
+    if (secobjProps && qemuMonitorAddObject(priv->mon, "secret",
+                                            secinfo->s.aes.alias,
+                                            secobjProps) < 0)
+        goto exit_monitor;
+
     if (qemuMonitorAddDrive(priv->mon, drivestr) < 0)
         goto failadddrive;
 
@@ -368,12 +382,18 @@ qemuDomainAttachVirtioDiskDevice(virConnectPtr conn,
         goto failexitmonitor;
     }
 
+    /* qemuMonitorAddObject consumes the props, but we need to wait
+     * for successful exit from monitor to clear; otherwise, error
+     * paths wouldn't clean up properly */
+    secobjProps = NULL;
+
     virDomainAuditDisk(vm, NULL, disk->src, "attach", true);
 
     virDomainDiskInsertPreAlloced(vm->def, disk);
     ret = 0;
 
  cleanup:
+    virJSONValueFree(secobjProps);
     qemuDomainSecretDiskDestroy(disk);
     VIR_FREE(devstr);
     VIR_FREE(drivestr);
@@ -387,14 +407,23 @@ qemuDomainAttachVirtioDiskDevice(virConnectPtr conn,
         VIR_WARN("Unable to remove drive %s (%s) after failed "
                  "qemuMonitorAddDevice", drivealias, drivestr);
     }
+
+ failadddrive:
+    if (secobjProps) {
+        if (!orig_err)
+            orig_err = virSaveLastError();
+        ignore_value(qemuMonitorDelObject(priv->mon, secinfo->s.aes.alias));
+    }
+
     if (orig_err) {
         virSetError(orig_err);
         virFreeError(orig_err);
     }
 
- failadddrive:
+ exit_monitor:
     if (qemuDomainObjExitMonitor(driver, vm) < 0)
         releaseaddr = false;
+    secobjProps = NULL; /* qemuMonitorAddObject consumes props on failure too */
 
  failexitmonitor:
     virDomainAuditDisk(vm, NULL, disk->src, "attach", false);
@@ -2808,6 +2837,7 @@ qemuDomainRemoveDiskDevice(virQEMUDriverPtr driver,
     const char *src = virDomainDiskGetSource(disk);
     qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv = vm->privateData;
     char *drivestr;
+    char *objAlias = NULL;
 
     VIR_DEBUG("Removing disk %s from domain %p %s",
               disk->info.alias, vm, vm->def->name);
@@ -2818,7 +2848,24 @@ qemuDomainRemoveDiskDevice(virQEMUDriverPtr driver,
                     QEMU_DRIVE_HOST_PREFIX, disk->info.alias) < 0)
         return -1;
 
+    /* Let's look for some markers for a secret object and create an alias
+     * object to be used to attempt to delete the object that was created */
+    if (virQEMUCapsGet(priv->qemuCaps, QEMU_CAPS_OBJECT_SECRET) &&
+        qemuDomainSecretDiskCapable(disk->src)) {
+
+        if (!(objAlias = qemuDomainGetSecretAESAlias(disk->info.alias))) {
+            VIR_FREE(drivestr);
+            return -1;
+        }
+    }
+
     qemuDomainObjEnterMonitor(driver, vm);
+
+    /* If it fails, then so be it - it was a best shot */
+    if (objAlias)
+        ignore_value(qemuMonitorDelObject(priv->mon, objAlias));
+    VIR_FREE(objAlias);
+
     qemuMonitorDriveDel(priv->mon, drivestr);
     VIR_FREE(drivestr);
     if (qemuDomainObjExitMonitor(driver, vm) < 0)
-- 
2.5.5