[libvirt] [PATCH v4 08/10] qemu: Add secinfo for hotplug virtio disk

[John Ferlan]

Commit id 'a1344f70a' added AES secret processing for RBD when starting
up a guest. As such, when the hotplug code calls qemuDomainSecretDiskPrepare
an AES secret could be added to the disk about to be hotplugged. If an AES
secret was added, then the hotplug code would need to generate the secret
object because qemuBuildDriveStr would add the "password-secret=" to the
returned 'driveStr' rather than the base64 encoded password.

Signed-off-by: John Ferlan <jferlan at redhat.com>
---

 This *replaces* the v3 of the series. The differences are entirely
 from code review comments. Differences are:

 1. Initialize orig_err to NULL since there are multiple failure paths
    which will need to possible use it.
 2. Remove the extraneous comment regarding 3 step process
 3. Use exit_monitor instead of failaddobjsecret as label
 4. Only clear secobjProps once successfully exit monitor
 5. Check for secobjProps in failadddrive, set orig_err if not already
    set.


 src/qemu/qemu_hotplug.c | 53 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 50 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_hotplug.c b/src/qemu/qemu_hotplug.c
index f695903..0638978 100644
--- a/src/qemu/qemu_hotplug.c
+++ b/src/qemu/qemu_hotplug.c
@@ -303,13 +303,16 @@ qemuDomainAttachVirtioDiskDevice(virConnectPtr conn,
 {
     int ret = -1;
     qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv = vm->privateData;
-    virErrorPtr orig_err;
+    virErrorPtr orig_err = NULL;
     char *devstr = NULL;
     char *drivestr = NULL;
     char *drivealias = NULL;
     bool releaseaddr = false;
     virQEMUDriverConfigPtr cfg = virQEMUDriverGetConfig(driver);
     const char *src = virDomainDiskGetSource(disk);
+    virJSONValuePtr secobjProps = NULL;
+    qemuDomainDiskPrivatePtr diskPriv;
+    qemuDomainSecretInfoPtr secinfo;
 
     if (!disk->info.type) {
         if (qemuDomainMachineIsS390CCW(vm->def) &&
@@ -342,6 +345,13 @@ qemuDomainAttachVirtioDiskDevice(virConnectPtr conn,
     if (qemuDomainSecretDiskPrepare(conn, priv, disk) < 0)
         goto error;
 
+    diskPriv = QEMU_DOMAIN_DISK_PRIVATE(disk);
+    secinfo = diskPriv->secinfo;
+    if (secinfo && secinfo->type == VIR_DOMAIN_SECRET_INFO_TYPE_AES) {
+        if (qemuBuildSecretInfoProps(secinfo, &secobjProps) < 0)
+            goto error;
+    }
+
     if (!(drivestr = qemuBuildDriveStr(disk, false, priv->qemuCaps)))
         goto error;
 
@@ -354,9 +364,13 @@ qemuDomainAttachVirtioDiskDevice(virConnectPtr conn,
     if (VIR_REALLOC_N(vm->def->disks, vm->def->ndisks+1) < 0)
         goto error;
 
-    /* Attach the device - 2 step process */
     qemuDomainObjEnterMonitor(driver, vm);
 
+    if (secobjProps && qemuMonitorAddObject(priv->mon, "secret",
+                                            secinfo->s.aes.alias,
+                                            secobjProps) < 0)
+        goto exit_monitor;
+
     if (qemuMonitorAddDrive(priv->mon, drivestr) < 0)
         goto failadddrive;
 
@@ -368,12 +382,18 @@ qemuDomainAttachVirtioDiskDevice(virConnectPtr conn,
         goto failexitmonitor;
     }
 
+    /* qemuMonitorAddObject consumes the props, but we need to wait
+     * for successful exit from monitor to clear; otherwise, error
+     * paths wouldn't clean up properly */
+    secobjProps = NULL;
+
     virDomainAuditDisk(vm, NULL, disk->src, "attach", true);
 
     virDomainDiskInsertPreAlloced(vm->def, disk);
     ret = 0;
 
  cleanup:
+    virJSONValueFree(secobjProps);
     qemuDomainSecretDiskDestroy(disk);
     VIR_FREE(devstr);
     VIR_FREE(drivestr);
@@ -387,14 +407,23 @@ qemuDomainAttachVirtioDiskDevice(virConnectPtr conn,
         VIR_WARN("Unable to remove drive %s (%s) after failed "
                  "qemuMonitorAddDevice", drivealias, drivestr);
     }
+
+ failadddrive:
+    if (secobjProps) {
+        if (!orig_err)
+            orig_err = virSaveLastError();
+        ignore_value(qemuMonitorDelObject(priv->mon, secinfo->s.aes.alias));
+    }
+
     if (orig_err) {
         virSetError(orig_err);
         virFreeError(orig_err);
     }
 
- failadddrive:
+ exit_monitor:
     if (qemuDomainObjExitMonitor(driver, vm) < 0)
         releaseaddr = false;
+    secobjProps = NULL; /* qemuMonitorAddObject consumes props on failure too */
 
  failexitmonitor:
     virDomainAuditDisk(vm, NULL, disk->src, "attach", false);
@@ -2791,6 +2820,7 @@ qemuDomainRemoveDiskDevice(virQEMUDriverPtr driver,
     const char *src = virDomainDiskGetSource(disk);
     qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv = vm->privateData;
     char *drivestr;
+    char *objAlias = NULL;
 
     VIR_DEBUG("Removing disk %s from domain %p %s",
               disk->info.alias, vm, vm->def->name);
@@ -2801,7 +2831,24 @@ qemuDomainRemoveDiskDevice(virQEMUDriverPtr driver,
                     QEMU_DRIVE_HOST_PREFIX, disk->info.alias) < 0)
         return -1;
 
+    /* Let's look for some markers for a secret object and create an alias
+     * object to be used to attempt to delete the object that was created */
+    if (virQEMUCapsGet(priv->qemuCaps, QEMU_CAPS_OBJECT_SECRET) &&
+        qemuDomainSecretDiskCapable(disk->src)) {
+
+        if (!(objAlias = qemuDomainGetSecretAESAlias(disk->info.alias))) {
+            VIR_FREE(drivestr);
+            return -1;
+        }
+    }
+
     qemuDomainObjEnterMonitor(driver, vm);
+
+    /* If it fails, then so be it - it was a best shot */
+    if (objAlias)
+        ignore_value(qemuMonitorDelObject(priv->mon, objAlias));
+    VIR_FREE(objAlias);
+
     qemuMonitorDriveDel(priv->mon, drivestr);
     VIR_FREE(drivestr);
     if (qemuDomainObjExitMonitor(driver, vm) < 0)
-- 
2.5.5