[libvirt] QEMU soundcards vulnerable to jack retasking?

[bancfc at openmailbox.org]

Recent security research shows that soundcards support surreptitiously 
switching line-out jacks into line-in by modifying the software stack. 
The way modern speakers and headphones are designed makes them readily 
usable as microphones. The Intel High Definition (HD) Audio standards 
which all modern consumer soundcards are based mandates this stupidity.

https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1611/1611.07350.pdf

Does anyone know if QEMU's emulated sound devices follow this standard? 
If yes then a malicious guest that can modify the virt sound hardware 
can turn PC speakers into surveillance devices even if the microphone is 
disabled on the host. The only solution is completely denying untrusted 
VMs access to a virtual sound device.

/CC'd the respective researchers for input on this too.