[libvirt] [Qemu-devel] libvirt/QEMU/SEV interaction

[Michael S. Tsirkin]

On Fri, Sep 29, 2017 at 03:07:40PM -0500, Richard Relph wrote:
> On 9/29/17 2:48 PM, Richard Relph wrote:
> > On 9/29/17 2:34 PM, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
> > > On Wed, Sep 27, 2017 at 02:06:10PM -0500, Richard Relph wrote:
> > > > Whether the "BIOS" is a "static shim" as Michael suggests, or a
> > > > full BIOS,
> > > > or even a BIOS+kernel+initrd is really not too significant. What is
> > > > significant is that the GO has a basis for trusting all code that is
> > > > imported in to their VM by the CP. And that NONE of the code
> > > > provided by the
> > > > CP is "unknown" and unauditable by the GO. If the CP has a way to inject
> > > > code unknown to the GO in to the guest VM, the trust model is broken and
> > > > both GO and CP suffer the consequences.
> > > 
> > > Absolutely.
> > > 
> > > > When the CP needs to update the BIOS image, they will have to
> > > > inform the GO
> > > > and allow the GO to establish trust in the CP's new BIOS image somehow.
> > > 
> > > This GO update on every BIOS change is imho is not a workable model. You
> > > want something like checking the BIOS signature instead. And since
> > > hardware is all hash based, you need the shim to do it in software.
> > 
> > A BIOS "signed" by the CP doesn't meet the security requirement. It is
> > code that is "unknown" to the GO.
> > 
> > The (legitimate) CP does NOT want to be in that position of trust. If
> > they are, then some government somewhere is going to insist that they
> > sign a BIOS that allows the government to spy on the GO's VMs, and steal
> > secrets from it. Or some hacker admin will do it "for fun".
> > 
> > How often do large public CPs really change their BIOSes? My sense is
> > that large public CPs prefer stability over "latest and greatest".
> > 
> > And, perhaps more importantly, if a CP are able to sell a "more secure"
> > VM, one that justifies a higher price per vCPU hour, wouldn't that
> > warrant some changes in the "insecure" model being used today?
> 
> Ultimately, I think both approaches are "doable". It will be a CP and GO
> decision. If the GO trusts the CP, the shim+signed BIOS will work fine.

I think there's a misunderstanding. A trusted software vendor would
sign the BIOS. GO would verify it. Trusting the CP is not required.

> If
> GO requires a more secure VM and the CP wants to offer it, the CP will
> figure out a way to satisfy the GO's "trust issue" that the BIOS can't be
> used to circumvent SEV's protections. Depending on your level of paranoia,
> that may require advance notice of BIOS changes, or even allowing the GO to
> provide the BIOS themselves, written to a spec supported by the CP's HV,
> and/or based on BIOS code provided by the CP.

We are discussing this on a qemu mailing list, aren't we? And from QEMU
point of view,  I think it won't be able to support a requirement
to boot ancient bios versions on new machine types indefinitely
with good performance and also fix security issues in them
in a timely manner somehow.


> 
> It's a business decision and I think SEV can support both. That said, AMD
> currently has no plans to write a shim that can verify the signature on a
> CP-provided BIOS image.
> 
> Richard

Someone else will have to work on a supportable solution for QEMU then.

> > 
> > Richard