[PATCH v3 3/6] conf: refactor launch security to allow more types
Pavel Hrdina
phrdina at redhat.com
Fri Jun 25 08:51:45 UTC 2021
On Tue, Jun 22, 2021 at 03:10:46PM +0200, Boris Fiuczynski wrote:
> Adding virDomainSecDef for general launch security data
> and moving virDomainSEVDef as an element for SEV data.
>
> Signed-off-by: Boris Fiuczynski <fiuczy at linux.ibm.com>
> ---
> src/conf/domain_conf.c | 127 +++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
> src/conf/domain_conf.h | 11 +++-
> src/conf/virconftypes.h | 2 +
> src/qemu/qemu_cgroup.c | 4 +-
> src/qemu/qemu_command.c | 44 +++++++++++--
> src/qemu/qemu_driver.c | 3 +-
> src/qemu/qemu_firmware.c | 33 ++++++----
> src/qemu/qemu_namespace.c | 20 ++++--
> src/qemu/qemu_process.c | 33 ++++++++--
> src/qemu/qemu_validate.c | 22 +++++--
> src/security/security_dac.c | 6 +-
> 11 files changed, 218 insertions(+), 87 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/src/conf/domain_conf.c b/src/conf/domain_conf.c
> index 93ec50ff5d..2bd5210a16 100644
> --- a/src/conf/domain_conf.c
> +++ b/src/conf/domain_conf.c
> @@ -3502,6 +3502,19 @@ virDomainSEVDefFree(virDomainSEVDef *def)
> g_free(def);
> }
>
> +
> +void
> +virDomainSecDefFree(virDomainSecDef *def)
> +{
> + if (!def)
> + return;
> +
> + virDomainSEVDefFree(def->sev);
> +
> + g_free(def);
> +}
> +
> +
> static void
> virDomainOSDefClear(virDomainOSDef *os)
> {
> @@ -3703,7 +3716,7 @@ void virDomainDefFree(virDomainDef *def)
> if (def->namespaceData && def->ns.free)
> (def->ns.free)(def->namespaceData);
>
> - virDomainSEVDefFree(def->sev);
> + virDomainSecDefFree(def->sec);
>
> xmlFreeNode(def->metadata);
>
> @@ -14720,57 +14733,72 @@ virDomainSEVDefParseXML(xmlNodePtr sevNode,
> {
> VIR_XPATH_NODE_AUTORESTORE(ctxt)
> unsigned long policy;
> - g_autofree char *type = NULL;
> int rc = -1;
>
> g_autoptr(virDomainSEVDef) def = g_new0(virDomainSEVDef, 1);
>
> ctxt->node = sevNode;
>
> - if (!(type = virXMLPropString(sevNode, "type"))) {
> + if (virXPathULongHex("string(./policy)", ctxt, &policy) < 0) {
> virReportError(VIR_ERR_XML_ERROR, "%s",
> - _("missing launch security type"));
> + _("failed to get launch security policy for "
> + "launch security type SEV"));
> return NULL;
> }
>
> - def->sectype = virDomainLaunchSecurityTypeFromString(type);
> - switch ((virDomainLaunchSecurity) def->sectype) {
> - case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_SEV:
> - if (virXPathULongHex("string(./policy)", ctxt, &policy) < 0) {
> - virReportError(VIR_ERR_XML_ERROR, "%s",
> - _("failed to get launch security policy for "
> - "launch security type SEV"));
> - return NULL;
> - }
> + /* the following attributes are platform dependent and if missing,
> + * we can autofill them from domain capabilities later
> + */
> + rc = virXPathUInt("string(./cbitpos)", ctxt, &def->cbitpos);
> + if (rc == 0) {
> + def->haveCbitpos = true;
> + } else if (rc == -2) {
> + virReportError(VIR_ERR_XML_ERROR, "%s",
> + _("Invalid format for launch security cbitpos"));
> + return NULL;
> + }
>
> - /* the following attributes are platform dependent and if missing,
> - * we can autofill them from domain capabilities later
> - */
> - rc = virXPathUInt("string(./cbitpos)", ctxt, &def->cbitpos);
> - if (rc == 0) {
> - def->haveCbitpos = true;
> - } else if (rc == -2) {
> - virReportError(VIR_ERR_XML_ERROR, "%s",
> - _("Invalid format for launch security cbitpos"));
> - return NULL;
> - }
> + rc = virXPathUInt("string(./reducedPhysBits)", ctxt,
> + &def->reduced_phys_bits);
> + if (rc == 0) {
> + def->haveReducedPhysBits = true;
> + } else if (rc == -2) {
> + virReportError(VIR_ERR_XML_ERROR, "%s",
> + _("Invalid format for launch security "
> + "reduced-phys-bits"));
> + return NULL;
> + }
>
> - rc = virXPathUInt("string(./reducedPhysBits)", ctxt,
> - &def->reduced_phys_bits);
> - if (rc == 0) {
> - def->haveReducedPhysBits = true;
> - } else if (rc == -2) {
> - virReportError(VIR_ERR_XML_ERROR, "%s",
> - _("Invalid format for launch security "
> - "reduced-phys-bits"));
> - return NULL;
> - }
> + def->policy = policy;
> + def->dh_cert = virXPathString("string(./dhCert)", ctxt);
> + def->session = virXPathString("string(./session)", ctxt);
> +
> + return g_steal_pointer(&def);
> +}
> +
> +
> +static virDomainSecDef *
> +virDomainSecDefParseXML(xmlNodePtr lsecNode,
> + xmlXPathContextPtr ctxt)
> +{
> + g_autoptr(virDomainSecDef) sec = g_new0(virDomainSecDef, 1);
> + g_autofree char *type = NULL;
>
> - def->policy = policy;
> - def->dh_cert = virXPathString("string(./dhCert)", ctxt);
> - def->session = virXPathString("string(./session)", ctxt);
> + ctxt->node = lsecNode;
>
> - return g_steal_pointer(&def);
> + if (!(type = virXMLPropString(lsecNode, "type"))) {
> + virReportError(VIR_ERR_XML_ERROR, "%s",
> + _("missing launch security type"));
> + return NULL;
> + }
> +
> + sec->sectype = virDomainLaunchSecurityTypeFromString(type);
> + switch ((virDomainLaunchSecurity) sec->sectype) {
> + case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_SEV:
> + sec->sev = virDomainSEVDefParseXML(lsecNode, ctxt);
> + if (!sec->sev)
> + return NULL;
> + break;
> case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_NONE:
> case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_LAST:
> default:
> @@ -14779,6 +14807,8 @@ virDomainSEVDefParseXML(xmlNodePtr sevNode,
> type);
> return NULL;
> }
> +
> + return g_steal_pointer(&sec);
> }
>
>
> @@ -20098,10 +20128,10 @@ virDomainDefParseXML(xmlDocPtr xml,
> ctxt->node = node;
> VIR_FREE(nodes);
>
> - /* Check for SEV feature */
> + /* Check for launch security e.g. SEV feature */
> if ((node = virXPathNode("./launchSecurity", ctxt)) != NULL) {
> - def->sev = virDomainSEVDefParseXML(node, ctxt);
> - if (!def->sev)
> + def->sec = virDomainSecDefParseXML(node, ctxt);
> + if (!def->sec)
> goto error;
> }
>
> @@ -26832,15 +26862,19 @@ virDomainKeyWrapDefFormat(virBuffer *buf, virDomainKeyWrapDef *keywrap)
>
>
> static void
> -virDomainSEVDefFormat(virBuffer *buf, virDomainSEVDef *sev)
> +virDomainSecDefFormat(virBuffer *buf, virDomainSecDef *sec)
> {
> - if (!sev)
> + if (!sec)
> return;
>
> - switch ((virDomainLaunchSecurity) sev->sectype) {
> + switch ((virDomainLaunchSecurity) sec->sectype) {
> case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_SEV: {
> + virDomainSEVDef *sev = sec->sev;
> + if (!sev)
> + return;
> +
> virBufferAsprintf(buf, "<launchSecurity type='%s'>\n",
> - virDomainLaunchSecurityTypeToString(sev->sectype));
> + virDomainLaunchSecurityTypeToString(sec->sectype));
> virBufferAdjustIndent(buf, 2);
>
> if (sev->haveCbitpos)
> @@ -26860,6 +26894,7 @@ virDomainSEVDefFormat(virBuffer *buf, virDomainSEVDef *sev)
> virBufferAddLit(buf, "</launchSecurity>\n");
> break;
> }
> +
> case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_NONE:
> case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_LAST:
> break;
> @@ -28272,7 +28307,7 @@ virDomainDefFormatInternalSetRootName(virDomainDef *def,
> if (def->keywrap)
> virDomainKeyWrapDefFormat(buf, def->keywrap);
>
> - virDomainSEVDefFormat(buf, def->sev);
> + virDomainSecDefFormat(buf, def->sec);
>
> if (def->namespaceData && def->ns.format) {
> if ((def->ns.format)(buf, def->namespaceData) < 0)
> diff --git a/src/conf/domain_conf.h b/src/conf/domain_conf.h
> index 512c7c8bd7..fa7ab1895d 100644
> --- a/src/conf/domain_conf.h
> +++ b/src/conf/domain_conf.h
> @@ -2651,7 +2651,6 @@ typedef enum {
>
>
> struct _virDomainSEVDef {
> - int sectype; /* enum virDomainLaunchSecurity */
> char *dh_cert;
> char *session;
> unsigned int policy;
> @@ -2661,6 +2660,10 @@ struct _virDomainSEVDef {
> unsigned int reduced_phys_bits;
> };
>
> +struct _virDomainSecDef {
> + int sectype; /* enum virDomainLaunchSecurity */
> + virDomainSEVDef *sev;
I would rather use union here like we do in other similar internal
structures:
struct _virDomainSecDef {
int sectype; /* enum virDomainLaunchSecurity */
union data {
virDomainSEVDef sev;
}
}
or
struct _virDomainSecDef {
int sectype; /* enum virDomainLaunchSecurity */
union data {
virDomainSEVDef *sev;
}
}
depending if we need to have the specific SEV structure as pointer or
not based on its usage. I personally think we can do it without the
pointer as it should not happen that sectype will be set to SEV but we
will not have any data.
Pavel
> +};
>
> typedef enum {
> VIR_DOMAIN_IOMMU_MODEL_INTEL,
> @@ -2871,8 +2874,8 @@ struct _virDomainDef {
>
> virDomainKeyWrapDef *keywrap;
>
> - /* SEV-specific domain */
> - virDomainSEVDef *sev;
> + /* launch security e.g. SEV */
> + virDomainSecDef *sec;
>
> /* Application-specific custom metadata */
> xmlNodePtr metadata;
> @@ -3287,6 +3290,8 @@ void virDomainShmemDefFree(virDomainShmemDef *def);
> G_DEFINE_AUTOPTR_CLEANUP_FUNC(virDomainShmemDef, virDomainShmemDefFree);
> void virDomainSEVDefFree(virDomainSEVDef *def);
> G_DEFINE_AUTOPTR_CLEANUP_FUNC(virDomainSEVDef, virDomainSEVDefFree);
> +void virDomainSecDefFree(virDomainSecDef *def);
> +G_DEFINE_AUTOPTR_CLEANUP_FUNC(virDomainSecDef, virDomainSecDefFree);
> void virDomainDeviceDefFree(virDomainDeviceDef *def);
>
> G_DEFINE_AUTOPTR_CLEANUP_FUNC(virDomainDeviceDef, virDomainDeviceDefFree);
> diff --git a/src/conf/virconftypes.h b/src/conf/virconftypes.h
> index b21068486e..21420ba8ea 100644
> --- a/src/conf/virconftypes.h
> +++ b/src/conf/virconftypes.h
> @@ -202,6 +202,8 @@ typedef struct _virDomainResourceDef virDomainResourceDef;
>
> typedef struct _virDomainSEVDef virDomainSEVDef;
>
> +typedef struct _virDomainSecDef virDomainSecDef;
> +
> typedef struct _virDomainShmemDef virDomainShmemDef;
>
> typedef struct _virDomainSmartcardDef virDomainSmartcardDef;
> diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_cgroup.c b/src/qemu/qemu_cgroup.c
> index 038d6478b2..f2d99abcfa 100644
> --- a/src/qemu/qemu_cgroup.c
> +++ b/src/qemu/qemu_cgroup.c
> @@ -856,7 +856,9 @@ qemuSetupDevicesCgroup(virDomainObj *vm)
> return -1;
> }
>
> - if (vm->def->sev && qemuSetupSEVCgroup(vm) < 0)
> + if (vm->def->sec &&
> + vm->def->sec->sectype == VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_SEV &&
> + qemuSetupSEVCgroup(vm) < 0)
> return -1;
>
> return 0;
> diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_command.c b/src/qemu/qemu_command.c
> index ea513693f7..4135a8444a 100644
> --- a/src/qemu/qemu_command.c
> +++ b/src/qemu/qemu_command.c
> @@ -6966,11 +6966,20 @@ qemuBuildMachineCommandLine(virCommand *cmd,
> if (virQEMUCapsGet(qemuCaps, QEMU_CAPS_LOADPARM))
> qemuAppendLoadparmMachineParm(&buf, def);
>
> - if (def->sev) {
> - if (virQEMUCapsGet(qemuCaps, QEMU_CAPS_MACHINE_CONFIDENTAL_GUEST_SUPPORT)) {
> - virBufferAddLit(&buf, ",confidential-guest-support=sev0");
> - } else {
> - virBufferAddLit(&buf, ",memory-encryption=sev0");
> + if (def->sec) {
> + switch ((virDomainLaunchSecurity) def->sec->sectype) {
> + case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_SEV:
> + if (virQEMUCapsGet(qemuCaps, QEMU_CAPS_MACHINE_CONFIDENTAL_GUEST_SUPPORT)) {
> + virBufferAddLit(&buf, ",confidential-guest-support=sev0");
> + } else {
> + virBufferAddLit(&buf, ",memory-encryption=sev0");
> + }
> + break;
> + case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_NONE:
> + break;
> + case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_LAST:
> + virReportEnumRangeError(virDomainLaunchSecurity, def->sec->sectype);
> + return -1;
> }
> }
>
> @@ -9860,6 +9869,29 @@ qemuBuildSEVCommandLine(virDomainObj *vm, virCommand *cmd,
> return 0;
> }
>
> +
> +static int
> +qemuBuildSecCommandLine(virDomainObj *vm, virCommand *cmd,
> + virDomainSecDef *sec)
> +{
> + if (!sec)
> + return 0;
> +
> + switch ((virDomainLaunchSecurity) sec->sectype) {
> + case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_SEV:
> + return qemuBuildSEVCommandLine(vm, cmd, sec->sev);
> + break;
> + case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_NONE:
> + break;
> + case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_LAST:
> + virReportEnumRangeError(virDomainLaunchSecurity, sec->sectype);
> + return -1;
> + }
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +
> static int
> qemuBuildVMCoreInfoCommandLine(virCommand *cmd,
> const virDomainDef *def)
> @@ -10559,7 +10591,7 @@ qemuBuildCommandLine(virQEMUDriver *driver,
> if (qemuBuildVMCoreInfoCommandLine(cmd, def) < 0)
> return NULL;
>
> - if (qemuBuildSEVCommandLine(vm, cmd, def->sev) < 0)
> + if (qemuBuildSecCommandLine(vm, cmd, def->sec) < 0)
> return NULL;
>
> if (snapshot)
> diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c b/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
> index 235f575901..9973875092 100644
> --- a/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
> +++ b/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
> @@ -19830,7 +19830,8 @@ qemuDomainGetLaunchSecurityInfo(virDomainPtr domain,
> if (virDomainGetLaunchSecurityInfoEnsureACL(domain->conn, vm->def) < 0)
> goto cleanup;
>
> - if (vm->def->sev) {
> + if (vm->def->sec &&
> + vm->def->sec->sectype == VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_SEV) {
> if (qemuDomainGetSEVMeasurement(driver, vm, params, nparams, flags) < 0)
> goto cleanup;
> }
> diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_firmware.c b/src/qemu/qemu_firmware.c
> index e17b024b06..6d1bab181e 100644
> --- a/src/qemu/qemu_firmware.c
> +++ b/src/qemu/qemu_firmware.c
> @@ -1053,19 +1053,28 @@ qemuFirmwareMatchDomain(const virDomainDef *def,
> return false;
> }
>
> - if (def->sev &&
> - def->sev->sectype == VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_SEV) {
> - if (!supportsSEV) {
> - VIR_DEBUG("Domain requires SEV, firmware '%s' doesn't support it",
> - path);
> - return false;
> - }
> + if (def->sec) {
> + switch ((virDomainLaunchSecurity) def->sec->sectype) {
> + case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_SEV:
> + if (!supportsSEV) {
> + VIR_DEBUG("Domain requires SEV, firmware '%s' doesn't support it",
> + path);
> + return false;
> + }
>
> - if (def->sev->policy & VIR_QEMU_FIRMWARE_AMD_SEV_ES_POLICY &&
> - !supportsSEVES) {
> - VIR_DEBUG("Domain requires SEV-ES, firmware '%s' doesn't support it",
> - path);
> - return false;
> + if (def->sec->sev &&
> + def->sec->sev->policy & VIR_QEMU_FIRMWARE_AMD_SEV_ES_POLICY &&
> + !supportsSEVES) {
> + VIR_DEBUG("Domain requires SEV-ES, firmware '%s' doesn't support it",
> + path);
> + return false;
> + }
> + break;
> + case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_NONE:
> + break;
> + case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_LAST:
> + virReportEnumRangeError(virDomainLaunchSecurity, def->sec->sectype);
> + return -1;
> }
> }
>
> diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_namespace.c b/src/qemu/qemu_namespace.c
> index 98495e8ef8..35c8eb83fd 100644
> --- a/src/qemu/qemu_namespace.c
> +++ b/src/qemu/qemu_namespace.c
> @@ -594,16 +594,26 @@ static int
> qemuDomainSetupLaunchSecurity(virDomainObj *vm,
> GSList **paths)
> {
> - virDomainSEVDef *sev = vm->def->sev;
> + virDomainSecDef *sec = vm->def->sec;
>
> - if (!sev || sev->sectype != VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_SEV)
> + if (!sec)
> return 0;
>
> - VIR_DEBUG("Setting up launch security");
> + switch ((virDomainLaunchSecurity) sec->sectype) {
> + case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_SEV:
> + VIR_DEBUG("Setting up launch security for SEV");
>
> - *paths = g_slist_prepend(*paths, g_strdup(QEMU_DEV_SEV));
> + *paths = g_slist_prepend(*paths, g_strdup(QEMU_DEV_SEV));
> +
> + VIR_DEBUG("Set up launch security for SEV");
> + break;
> + case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_NONE:
> + break;
> + case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_LAST:
> + virReportEnumRangeError(virDomainLaunchSecurity, sec->sectype);
> + return -1;
> + }
>
> - VIR_DEBUG("Set up launch security");
> return 0;
> }
>
> diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_process.c b/src/qemu/qemu_process.c
> index 2b03b0ab98..d9073fb3a3 100644
> --- a/src/qemu/qemu_process.c
> +++ b/src/qemu/qemu_process.c
> @@ -6480,7 +6480,7 @@ qemuProcessUpdateSEVInfo(virDomainObj *vm)
> {
> qemuDomainObjPrivate *priv = vm->privateData;
> virQEMUCaps *qemuCaps = priv->qemuCaps;
> - virDomainSEVDef *sev = vm->def->sev;
> + virDomainSEVDef *sev = vm->def->sec->sev;
> virSEVCapability *sevCaps = NULL;
>
> /* if platform specific info like 'cbitpos' and 'reducedPhysBits' have
> @@ -6636,7 +6636,8 @@ qemuProcessPrepareDomain(virQEMUDriver *driver,
> for (i = 0; i < vm->def->nshmems; i++)
> qemuDomainPrepareShmemChardev(vm->def->shmems[i]);
>
> - if (vm->def->sev) {
> + if (vm->def->sec &&
> + vm->def->sec->sectype == VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_SEV) {
> VIR_DEBUG("Updating SEV platform info");
> if (qemuProcessUpdateSEVInfo(vm) < 0)
> return -1;
> @@ -6674,10 +6675,10 @@ qemuProcessSEVCreateFile(virDomainObj *vm,
> static int
> qemuProcessPrepareSEVGuestInput(virDomainObj *vm)
> {
> - virDomainSEVDef *sev = vm->def->sev;
> + virDomainSEVDef *sev = vm->def->sec->sev;
>
> if (!sev)
> - return 0;
> + return -1;
This should not happen as we would abort if allocation of
virDomainSEVDef failed. In addition if we go with the union where the
data would not be a pointer there is no need for this check at all.
Pavel
> VIR_DEBUG("Preparing SEV guest");
>
> @@ -6695,6 +6696,28 @@ qemuProcessPrepareSEVGuestInput(virDomainObj *vm)
> }
>
>
> +static int
> +qemuProcessPrepareLaunchSecurityGuestInput(virDomainObj *vm)
> +{
> + virDomainSecDef *sec = vm->def->sec;
> +
> + if (!sec)
> + return 0;
> +
> + switch ((virDomainLaunchSecurity) sec->sectype) {
> + case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_SEV:
> + return qemuProcessPrepareSEVGuestInput(vm);
> + case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_NONE:
> + break;
> + case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_LAST:
> + virReportEnumRangeError(virDomainLaunchSecurity, sec->sectype);
> + return -1;
> + }
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +
> static int
> qemuProcessPrepareHostStorage(virQEMUDriver *driver,
> virDomainObj *vm,
> @@ -6874,7 +6897,7 @@ qemuProcessPrepareHost(virQEMUDriver *driver,
> if (qemuExtDevicesPrepareHost(driver, vm) < 0)
> return -1;
>
> - if (qemuProcessPrepareSEVGuestInput(vm) < 0)
> + if (qemuProcessPrepareLaunchSecurityGuestInput(vm) < 0)
> return -1;
>
> return 0;
> diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_validate.c b/src/qemu/qemu_validate.c
> index 382473d03b..957dbc906c 100644
> --- a/src/qemu/qemu_validate.c
> +++ b/src/qemu/qemu_validate.c
> @@ -1214,12 +1214,22 @@ qemuValidateDomainDef(const virDomainDef *def,
> if (qemuValidateDomainDefPanic(def, qemuCaps) < 0)
> return -1;
>
> - if (def->sev &&
> - !virQEMUCapsGet(qemuCaps, QEMU_CAPS_SEV_GUEST)) {
> - virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, "%s",
> - _("SEV launch security is not supported with "
> - "this QEMU binary"));
> - return -1;
> + if (def->sec) {
> + switch ((virDomainLaunchSecurity) def->sec->sectype) {
> + case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_SEV:
> + if (!virQEMUCapsGet(qemuCaps, QEMU_CAPS_SEV_GUEST)) {
> + virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, "%s",
> + _("SEV launch security is not supported with "
> + "this QEMU binary"));
> + return -1;
> + }
> + break;
> + case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_NONE:
> + break;
> + case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_LAST:
> + virReportEnumRangeError(virDomainLaunchSecurity, def->sec->sectype);
> + return -1;
> + }
> }
>
> if (def->naudios > 1 &&
> diff --git a/src/security/security_dac.c b/src/security/security_dac.c
> index 4909107fcc..b874dd4ab6 100644
> --- a/src/security/security_dac.c
> +++ b/src/security/security_dac.c
> @@ -1958,7 +1958,8 @@ virSecurityDACRestoreAllLabel(virSecurityManager *mgr,
> rc = -1;
> }
>
> - if (def->sev) {
> + if (def->sec &&
> + def->sec->sectype == VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_SEV) {
> if (virSecurityDACRestoreSEVLabel(mgr, def) < 0)
> rc = -1;
> }
> @@ -2165,7 +2166,8 @@ virSecurityDACSetAllLabel(virSecurityManager *mgr,
> return -1;
> }
>
> - if (def->sev) {
> + if (def->sec &&
> + def->sec->sectype == VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_SEV) {
> if (virSecurityDACSetSEVLabel(mgr, def) < 0)
> return -1;
> }
> --
> 2.30.2
>
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