[PATCH] LSM hooks for audit

[Stephen Smalley]

Sorry, I wasn't thinking in my initial response.  These operations are
exported via netlink, which is async, right?  Hence, permission checks
based on current, including the existing capable() checks, are bogus;
you would be checking in the receiving context, not necessarily the
sending context.  Sending context is not conveyed at present via
netlink_skb_parms (no security field) other than uid and capability
set.  You can performs check upon netlink_send; see what SELinux does
there.  SELinux policy already governs ability to create and use
netlink_audit_sockets and maps the netlink operations to read or write
flows, but doesn't offer any finer granularity than that.

-- 
Stephen Smalley <sds at epoch.ncsc.mil>
National Security Agency