Offline audit trail analysis

Wieprecht, Karen M. Karen.Wieprecht at jhuapl.edu
Tue Sep 11 20:59:07 UTC 2007


This isn't probably as savvy as some of you would like, but I started
writing it before there were any auparse libraries to help with this
kind of stuff.    I've done similar stuff on Solaris, Mac OSX, irix,
etc.   My linux version scripting isn't finished (not enough hours in
the day), but it's still useful for my log reviews.  At some point I
hope to get out internal people to bless it enough to share with whoever
might be interested in the open source world,  but I'm not there yet.
here's the general thing I've  setting up:
 
I use scripting to do the following on each machine :
 
- rotate the log 
- (I want to try a script segment to make sure all related audit event
records are not interleaved)
- run an ausearch on it with some flags (interpret, all messages) and
some shell commands to get all related records for a particular event
onto a single line
- save this processed file (with user IDs, etc. particular to that
system) as something like audit.log.hostname.2006-09-10.ausearched
- Store the original and "ausearched" files in a central place so I have
them all gathered for my weekly log review
 
Then weekly,  I use a "reviewlogs" script to post process the
"ausearched" "single line" data into something more readable.   It also
filters some noise I don't care about.  The Chronological results look
like this from various test sessions:
 
karen    FAILED TO     mv /etc/nsswitch.conf /etc/nsswitch.conf.mine
on patton,      Permission denied       on 01/15/2007 14:05:16.582
 
dan      FAILED TO     console login   into patton on 01/17/2007
13:21:45.133
dan      successful      console login   into patton on 01/17/2007
13:21:59.152
dan      successful      console logout          from patton on
01/17/2007 13:22:26.059

karen    FAILED TO     ssh login       into patton from ? on 01/17/2007
13:34:26.517
karen    successful      ssh login       into patton from
patton.jhuapl.edu on 01/17/2007 13:34:31.387
karen    FAILED TO     touch /etc/nsswitch.conf        on patton,
Permission denied       on 01/17/2007 13:34:57.759
karen    FAILED TO     touch /etc/nsswitch.conf        on patton,
Permission denied       on 01/17/2007 13:34:57.759
karen    successful      SU LOGIN (PAM authentication)   as root
on patton on 01/17/2007 13:35:15.140
karen    successful      SU LOGIN (PAM accounting)       as root
on patton on 01/17/2007 13:35:15.141
karen    successful      SU LOGIN (PAM session open)     as root
on patton on 01/17/2007 13:35:15.141
 -- karen as root --     successful      SU LOGIN (PAM authentication)
as dan          on patton on 01/17/2007 13:35:31.364
 -- karen as root --     successful      SU LOGIN (PAM accounting)
as dan          on patton on 01/17/2007 13:35:31.366
 -- karen as root --     successful      SU LOGIN (PAM session open)
as dan          on patton on 01/17/2007 13:35:31.367
 -- karen as dan --      FAILED TO       rm /etc/hosts           on
patton,      Permission denied       on 01/17/2007 13:35:39.129
 -- karen as dan --      FAILED TO       rm /etc/hosts           on
patton,      Permission denied       on 01/17/2007 13:35:40.680
 -- karen as root --     successful      SU LOGIN (PAM setcred)
as dan          on patton on 01/17/2007 13:35:44.177
 -- karen as root --     successful      CLOSED SU as dan        on
patton on 01/17/2007 13:35:44.178
karen    successful      SU LOGIN (PAM setcred)          as root
on patton on 01/17/2007 13:35:46.089
karen    successful      CLOSED SU as root       on patton on 01/17/2007
13:35:46.089

Note that it's easy to spot users trying to make it look like other
users tried to do stuff.    When I review the logs, I usually sort the
reformatted lines  so that similar entries are all grouped (which makes
it really easy to let chunks of stuff I don't care about scroll by
quickly).  If I see something suspicious, I'll go back and look at the
stuff in chronological order to see what was going on.   Here's what the
above sample looks like sorted  (and if I had a lot of data, the chunks
of similar stuff would be more apparent):
 
 -- karen as dan --      FAILED TO       rm /etc/hosts           on
patton,      Permission denied       on 01/17/2007 13:35:39.129
 -- karen as dan --      FAILED TO       rm /etc/hosts           on
patton,      Permission denied       on 01/17/2007 13:35:40.680
 -- karen as root --     successful      CLOSED SU as dan        on
patton on 01/17/2007 13:35:44.178
 -- karen as root --     successful      SU LOGIN (PAM accounting)
as dan          on patton on 01/17/2007 13:35:31.366
 -- karen as root --     successful      SU LOGIN (PAM authentication)
as dan          on patton on 01/17/2007 13:35:31.364
 -- karen as root --     successful      SU LOGIN (PAM session open)
as dan          on patton on 01/17/2007 13:35:31.367
 -- karen as root --     successful      SU LOGIN (PAM setcred)
as dan          on patton on 01/17/2007 13:35:44.177
dan      FAILED TO     console login   into patton on 01/17/2007
13:21:45.133
dan      successful      console login   into patton on 01/17/2007
13:21:59.152
dan      successful      console logout          from patton on
01/17/2007 13:22:26.059
karen    FAILED TO     mv /etc/nsswitch.conf /etc/nsswitch.conf.mine
on patton,      Permission denied       on 01/15/2007 14:05:16.582
karen    FAILED TO     ssh login       into patton from ? on 01/17/2007
13:34:26.517
karen    FAILED TO     touch /etc/nsswitch.conf        on patton,
Permission denied       on 01/17/2007 13:34:57.759
karen    FAILED TO     touch /etc/nsswitch.conf        on patton,
Permission denied       on 01/17/2007 13:34:57.759
karen    successful      CLOSED SU as root       on patton on 01/17/2007
13:35:46.089
karen    successful      SU LOGIN (PAM accounting)       as root
on patton on 01/17/2007 13:35:15.141
karen    successful      SU LOGIN (PAM authentication)   as root
on patton on 01/17/2007 13:35:15.140
karen    successful      SU LOGIN (PAM session open)     as root
on patton on 01/17/2007 13:35:15.141
karen    successful      SU LOGIN (PAM setcred)          as root
on patton on 01/17/2007 13:35:46.089
karen    successful      ssh login       into patton from
patton.jhuapl.edu on 01/17/2007 13:34:31.387

 
We don't have a ton of Linux systems (yet), so this strategy works well
for reviewing a handful of systems from a central location.    The
scripts save me a lot of time interpretting any one given log entry as
well as keeping me from having to log into N systems one at a time  and
running M commands on each one each to decide if someone was messing
around on my machines or not. 
 
Karen Wieprecht

________________________________

From: linux-audit-bounces at redhat.com
[mailto:linux-audit-bounces at redhat.com] On Behalf Of Todd, Charles
Sent: Tuesday, September 11, 2007 3:32 PM
To: linux-audit at redhat.com
Subject: Offline audit trail analysis


Thanks to Steve for being our biggest target for questions on this list!

 
Has anyone talked about sane ways to do offline analysis of Linux audit
logs?  Presumably, this would be on another Linux system, but maybe not
the same host, and probably not on the same release or with the same
username/IP address access.  Conceptually, ausearch would save and
optionally read a system's "configuration" to be saved for
interpretation later.  
 
My goal is central logging, but doing the reporting/analysis on the
central host.  That way, I can see a user across the Enterprise (or at
least in the Linux hosts), but with all the power of ausearch for
refining the report.  Ideally, I would do an ausearch -ts <date> -te
<date> --raw --config-to=<hostname.ausearch.config> and it would do
things like saving the syscall lookup table, lookup users referenced in
the reported audit trail, and resolve IP addresses references in the
reported audit trail.  Maybe one config file could be written for each
data type in an existing format (e.g. users in /etc/passwd format, hosts
in /etc/hosts format, etc.).  I'm mainly after whether or not anyone has
considered extending ausearch for this kind of processing?
 
This way, an archive of raw logs could be kept along with the exact
system configuration which allows offloading the audit trail analysis to
a trusted location, rather than risk side effects from a rootkit.
 
Charlie Todd 
Ball Aerospace & Technologies Corp.  


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