Setting loginuid for a process starting at boot

[Maupertuis Philippe]

Auditctl -e wont probably go unnoticed while an inconspicuous echo probably would.
Is there a rule to track this action without overloading the system ?
Alternatively, is a post mortem analysis viable ?
I was thinking of finding process in the audit.log whose loginuid differs from parent's loginuid.
Is there a way to extract information and reformat the result (to keep process pid ppid loginuid for example) ?

Philippe

-----Message d'origine-----
De : Steve Grubb [mailto:sgrubb at redhat.com]
Envoyé : lundi 13 janvier 2014 23:06
À : Maupertuis Philippe
Cc : linux-audit at redhat.com
Objet : Re: Setting loginuid for a process starting at boot


On Monday, January 13, 2014 10:17:43 PM Maupertuis Philippe wrote:
> The process listens on a network port. It receives custom commands
> that are executed on the server. Only one remote host can communicate
> with the host, the user identifies himself on the remote host only.
> The goal is to allow the user to run  the same scripts  on a  lot of server in one command.

OK, then it sounds like you have an entry point daemon and it should be setting the loginuid.


> Please don't tell me it's silly or insecure or that softwares exist to do
> that in a secure  way. I would like to be able to at least monitor what
> happend throughthis channel. That means the listening process and all its
> childs where the valuable changes to the system are made. It's why I was
> thinking of setting a dedicated loginuid.
>
> Maybe, eventually it would turn in a PAM-aware application with a proper
> user authentication and my problems will be solved.
>
> If a simple echo does the trick what is the use of audit_setloginuid or
> pam_loginuid ?

They hide the implementation details in case it changes someday.

>Any root script can defeat audit with a single command.

There are restrictions (fs/proc/base.c). You can only set the loginuid on
yourself.

> I am gobsmacked !
> I hope I missed something.

And besides, any root process can run auditctl -e 0 and disable the audit
system (unless it was marked immutable).

-Steve


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