[PATCH 1/2] auditsc: audit_krule mask accesses need bounds checking

[Andy Lutomirski]

On Mon, Jun 9, 2014 at 3:30 PM, Greg KH <gregkh at linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> On Wed, May 28, 2014 at 11:09:58PM -0400, Eric Paris wrote:
>> From: Andy Lutomirski <luto at amacapital.net>
>>
>> Fixes an easy DoS and possible information disclosure.
>>
>> This does nothing about the broken state of x32 auditing.
>>
>> eparis: If the admin has enabled auditd and has specifically loaded audit
>> rules.  This bug has been around since before git.  Wow...
>>
>> Cc: stable at vger.kernel.org
>> Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto at amacapital.net>
>> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis at redhat.com>
>> ---
>>  kernel/auditsc.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++---------
>>  1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
>
> Did this patch get dropped somewhere?  Isn't it a valid bugfix, or did I
> miss a later conversation about this?

Hmm.  It seems that it didn't make it into Linus' tree.  Crap.

IMO we need some kind of real tracking system for issues reported to
security at .  This shouldn't have been possible (and if I'd realized
that the patch got dropped, I wouldn't have publicly disclosed it).

For whoever applies this: it's CVE-2014-3917.

--Andy