[PATCH 1/2] auditsc: audit_krule mask accesses need bounds checking

[Andy Lutomirski]

On Mon, Jun 9, 2014 at 5:32 PM, Greg KH <gregkh at linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> On Mon, Jun 09, 2014 at 03:55:20PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>> On Mon, Jun 9, 2014 at 3:46 PM, Greg KH <gregkh at linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>> > On Mon, Jun 09, 2014 at 03:35:02PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>> >> On Mon, Jun 9, 2014 at 3:30 PM, Greg KH <gregkh at linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>> >> > On Wed, May 28, 2014 at 11:09:58PM -0400, Eric Paris wrote:
>> >> >> From: Andy Lutomirski <luto at amacapital.net>
>> >> >>
>> >> >> Fixes an easy DoS and possible information disclosure.
>> >> >>
>> >> >> This does nothing about the broken state of x32 auditing.
>> >> >>
>> >> >> eparis: If the admin has enabled auditd and has specifically loaded audit
>> >> >> rules.  This bug has been around since before git.  Wow...
>> >> >>
>> >> >> Cc: stable at vger.kernel.org
>> >> >> Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto at amacapital.net>
>> >> >> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis at redhat.com>
>> >> >> ---
>> >> >>  kernel/auditsc.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++---------
>> >> >>  1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
>> >> >
>> >> > Did this patch get dropped somewhere?  Isn't it a valid bugfix, or did I
>> >> > miss a later conversation about this?
>> >>
>> >> Hmm.  It seems that it didn't make it into Linus' tree.  Crap.
>> >>
>> >> IMO we need some kind of real tracking system for issues reported to
>> >> security at .
>> >
>> > That seems to be my mbox at times :)
>> >
>> > But yes, having something "real" might be good if the load gets higher,
>> > right now it's so low that my "sweep pending security patches" task
>> > usually catches anything pending, which is rare.
>> >
>>
>> There are currently at least two issues that I reported that are stuck
>> in limbo: this one and the (not-yet-public) vfs thing.
>
> That was next on my list to poke people about...
>
>> And there's the CVE-2014-0181 regression fix that almost got
>> forgotten, but that isn't really a security issue.
>
> What is that, where was that reported?

commit 2d7a85f4b06e9c27ff629f07a524c48074f07f81
Author: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm at xmission.com>
Date:   Fri May 30 11:04:00 2014 -0700

    netlink: Only check file credentials for implicit destinations


The security issue got fixed quickly, but the fix turned out to be problematic.

--Andy