[PATCH V9 3/3] audit: add audit by children of executable path

[Richard Guy Briggs]

On 15/08/06, Paul Moore wrote:
> On August 6, 2015 5:11:50 PM Steve Grubb <sgrubb at redhat.com> wrote:
> 
> >On Thursday, August 06, 2015 04:24:58 PM Paul Moore wrote:
> >> On Wednesday, August 05, 2015 04:29:38 PM Richard Guy Briggs wrote:
> >> > This adds the ability to audit the actions of children of a
> >> > not-yet-running
> >> > process.
> >> >
> >> >
> >> >
> >> > This is a split-out of a heavily modified version of a patch originally
> >> > submitted by Eric Paris with some ideas from Peter Moody.
> >> >
> >> >
> >> >
> >> > Cc: Peter Moody <peter at hda3.com>
> >> > Cc: Eric Paris <eparis at redhat.com>
> >> > Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb at redhat.com>
> >> > ---
> >> >
> >> >  include/uapi/linux/audit.h |    1 +
> >> >  kernel/auditfilter.c       |    5 +++++
> >> >  kernel/auditsc.c           |   11 +++++++++++
> >> >  3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
> >>
> >> I'm still not really comfortable with that loop and since there hasn't been
> >> a  really convincing use case I'm going to pass on this patch for right
> >> now.  If someone comes up with a *really* compelling case in the future
> >> I'll reconsider it.
> >
> >Its the same reason strace has a -f option. Sometimes you need to also see
> >what the children did. For example, maybe you want to audit file access to a
> >specific directory and several cgi-bin programs can get there. You could write
> >a rule for apache and be done. Or maybe, you have an app that lets people have
> >shell access and you need to see files accessed or connections opened. Or maybe
> >its a control panel application with helper scripts and you need to see
> >changes that its making. Or maybe you have a program that is at risk of being
> >compromised and you want to see if someone gets a shell from it. There are a
> >lot of cases where it could be useful.
> >
> >-Steve
> >
> >--
> >Linux-audit mailing list
> >Linux-audit at redhat.com
> >https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
> 
> I guess what I'm saying is that I'm not currently convinced that
> there is enough value in this to offset the risk I feel the loop
> presents. I understand the use cases that you are mentioning, the
> are the same as the last time we discussed this, but I'm going to
> need something better than that.

Can you better describe the loop that concerns you?  I don't quite see
it.

> paul moore

- RGB

--
Richard Guy Briggs <rbriggs at redhat.com>
Senior Software Engineer, Kernel Security, AMER ENG Base Operating Systems, Red Hat
Remote, Ottawa, Canada
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